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ABSTRACT
In the event of a bioterrorist attack, emergency departments are
considered the first line of response for all acute levels of care. This study
focused on hospital emergency departments in Florida and the activities, policies,
and procedures involved in preparing for a bioterrorist attack. Hospital size,
location, and system affiliation were related to attaining these levels, and their
impact was assessed.
Through a cross-sectional survey design, the physical properties of the 77
hospitals (i.e. facilities, equipment, communication systems, etc.), and the social
characteristics of the organizations (managerial functions including: planning,
training, financial, and environmental characteristics) were examined. One-way
analysis of variance and t-tests revealed that bed size was a significant predictor
of mean levels of preparedness. In addition, although more hospitals are
conducting training activities, a disconnect between plans and communications of
said plans still exists along with many deficiencies still needing to be corrected.
Study limitations are discussed and important policy implications are presented.
Suggestions for improving preparedness levels and implementing new policies
include: conducting training exercises, developing community ties and mutual aid
agreements, and using information technology with detection of an event and
communication of the information garnered from these efforts.
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION
A holiday shopping season is in full swing. Shoppers are milling around
the new local mall, excited that the holidays are here. Tourists from around the
world mingle with local shoppers. They are wrapped up in their own shopping
lists, trying to figure out what to get for their family and friends. Holiday music
can be heard through the three dimensional sound system, adding to the
excitement of the start of the holiday season.
Through all of the hustle and bustle, no one notices a nondescript man
carries a large shopping bag. He looks around as he nears his destination- a
crowded food court. Glancing to all sides of him, he takes out a device that
appears to be a small thermostat box. But this seemingly ordinary box is much
more than a thermostat box – it contains two vials of fluid attached to straw
hoses, and connected to a micro-aerozolizer. He quickly attaches the box to a
wall, flips the timer switch, and hurriedly leaves the building. In a matter of
minutes, millions of particles will spill out from the aerozolizer in the form of an
odorless, undetected mist. No one will notice that they are inhaling these tiny
particles as they shop for their families. No one will feel anything as the particles
are absorbed by their unsuspecting bodies.
In this crowded mall full of holiday shoppers, no one is safe, and yet no
one feels afraid. They are completely oblivious to the fact that a smallpox virus
was just released into the air, silently infecting many in the crowd.
When the day is over, the shoppers will go their separate ways back to
their normal lives. Some will go home locally, others will return to places in
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Central Florida, and still others will return to places around the world. All are
virtual strangers to each other, but carry a similar, but silent tie that binds them
together – they are now carriers of the smallpox virus.
In the days and weeks to come, people present themselves to the
emergency department with flu like symptoms – fevers, headaches, vomiting,
and backaches. The doctors cringe at what they believe to be an early rush of
the flu season virus. Many patients receive medication and are sent home to
their families. No one suspects that they are dealing with a far more powerful
and deadly virus. But as the cases mount, someone decides that something is
amiss and calls in the Centers for Disease Control (CDC). Once the first case of
smallpox is diagnosed, panic ensues as a desperate attempt is made to locate
those who have been in contact with the disease, and determine where it came
from. By this time, people all over the world have begun to show symptoms of
the disease, and others are silent carriers to other family members and friends.
The outbreak has begun and emergency departments around the world are
scrambling to deal with a massive influx of patients – both those who are truly
sick and the “worried well” (As adapted from Osterholm & Schwartz, 2001).

The previous scenario, while fictional, could prove to be all too realistic as the
possibility of a bioterrorist attack becomes a better identified risk in America. One only
needs to look to terrorist attacks such the 1995 Sarin Nerve Gas attacks in Tokyo or the
October 2001 anthrax attacks (described below) in the United States to demonstrate the
vulnerability that exists for exposure to such attacks.
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For example, on March 20, 1995, unsuspecting Japanese citizens made their
way to the Tokyo subway system. What awaited them was the vicious plot of Aum
Shinrikyo to disrupt life and kill innocent people. It represented the most serious attack
in modern history on Japanese soil by terrorists, and demonstrated the ease of smaller
terrorist groups to engage in chemical warfare (Council on Foreign Relations, 2003).
Members of the Aum Shinrikyo cult placed packages shaped like everyday items, filled
with plastic bags full of chemicals on five separate trains within the Tokyo subway
system (Olson, 1999). They then punctured the bags with the tips of umbrellas and
quickly fled the trains, allowing the chemical to seep out of the bags and evaporate into
the air, exposing thousands of people to Sarin Nerve gas (Council on Foreign Relations,
2003). In the end, the death toll stood at 12, with over 3,800 people injured and
thousands more fearful (Olson, 1999).
The anthrax attacks in October of 2001 occurred on the heels of the September
11, 2001 tragedy, and exacerbated fears of a widespread bioterrorist attack in the
United States. The first brush with anthrax occurred in Palm Beach County Florida
when a sixty three year old male was hospitalized, subsequently diagnosed with
inhalational anthrax, and eventually succumbed to the exposure three days after
diagnosis (Trager, Wiersma, Rosenstein, Malecki, Shepard, & Raghunathan, 2002). A
series of other brushes with anthrax followed through a succession of envelopes mailed
through the United States Postal Service to various individuals in New York, Florida,
and Washington DC (Hsu, Lukacs, Handzel, Hayslett, Harper, & Hales, 2002).
Although no one individual or group claimed responsibility for the attacks, in the end,
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twenty-two individuals were diagnosed with exposure to anthrax and five fatalities were
recorded (Wikepedia, 2004).
As citizens of Central Florida, home to Walt Disney World and other theme
parks, we are particularly vulnerable to a covert attack due to our prime location and
propensity to support tourism. Should an attack of this magnitude occur here, the
previous scenario could create a nightmare of the proportion outlined in the preamble to
this chapter.
The question is, can our hospitals and their respective emergency departments
(EDs) handle such an influx of patients? Could they quickly recognize the symptoms of
small pox, anthrax, or any other biological weapon in time to contain a potential
outbreak? According to Donald Henderson, former director of the Johns Hopkins Center
for Civilian Biodefense, and current Chairman of the National Advisory Council on
Public Health Preparedness, “the major problem is that there is really no public health
‘system’ for dealing with infectious disease in this country, but, rather, a fragmented
pattern of activities” (2001, p.67).
To be successful, the health care community, along with other local, state, and
national entities, must work in concert with each other. This study focused specifically
on these hospital emergency departments and the activities, policies, and procedures
involved in preparing for a bioterrorist attack. The purpose of this study was to quantify
different levels of preparedness in hospital emergency departments (EDs), and
compare them to other EDs in the state of Florida. Further, this researcher explored the
role of hospital size (small vs. medium vs. large), location (urban vs. rural), and system
affiliation (system vs. non-system) in attaining these levels, and evaluated their impact.
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Additionally, this study was one of the first to quantify the levels of
preparedness since the events of September 11, 2001 and assess its impact, if any, on
the way Florida hospitals prepare for the possibility of a bioterrorist attack. It also
provided a baseline assessment of the levels of preparedness among Florida hospitals.
If and when a brush with bioterrorism occurs, the results of this study can be used to
benchmark preparedness levels and compare them to levels of preparedness after an
attack has actually occurred.
Prior to September 11 and the anthrax scare of October 2001, bioterrorism
preparedness was not a high priority for healthcare organizations. However, the events
of September 11, 2001 and October 4, 2001, helped to place a high priority on
bioterrorism preparedness. “It has breached our sense of security and exposed our
vulnerability, forcing the Federal government and the country's emergency services to
take a long hard look at what could happen if an act of terrorism involving weapons of
mass destruction were to occur in Anytown, USA” (Dittmar, 1998, p.66). Further still, a
bioterrorist attack can potentially cripple a hospital emergency department if the proper
protocols are not in place, possibly rendering a life saving organization useless.
Definitions
Although the definition of bioterrorism brings about different meanings for
different people, Edlin defines it as, “the threat of mass destruction by weapons of
biological origin such as bacteria, toxins, and viruses” (2001,p.30). A more thorough
definition, as provided by the General Accounting Office (GAO) builds upon this and
defines it as, “the intentional use of any microorganism, virus, infectious substance, or
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biological product that may be engineered as a result of biotechnology, or any naturally
occurring or bioengineered component of any such microorganism, virus, infectious
substance, or biological product, to cause death, disease, or any other biological
malfunction in a human, an animal, a plant, or another living organism in order to
influence the conduct of the government or to intimidate or coerce a civilian population”
(2000, p. # unavailable). Utilizing either definition, however, one can see the enormous
potential threat that an attack of this nature poses.

Further, there are several key characteristics to consider in dealing with a bioterrorist
attack that set it apart from previous disaster scenarios. They are listed as follows:
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

“The onset of the incident may remain unknown for several days before
symptoms appear,
Even when symptoms appear, they may be distributed throughout the
community’s health system and not be recognized immediately by any one
provider or practitioner,
Once identified, the initial symptoms are likely to mirror those of the flu or the
common cold so that the health system will have to care for both those infected
and the “worried well,”
Having gone undetected for several days or a week, some infectious agents may
already be in their “second wave” before the first wave of casualties is identified,
Public confidence in government officials and health care authorities may be
undermined by the initial uncertainty about the cause of and treatment for the
outbreak,
Health care authorities and hospitals may want to restrict those infected to a
limited number of hospitals but the public may seek care from a wide range of
practitioners and institutions, and
Health care workers may be reluctant to place themselves or family members at
increased risk by reporting to work” (American Hospital Association, 2000, p.18).
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Levels of Preparedness
Prior to the events of September 11, 2001, preparations for a bioterrorist attack
“were moving at a snail’s pace in most of the medical community” (Edlin, 2001, p.30).
Johnson concurs adding that, “there are widespread concerns that the country and its
hospitals aren’t prepared for germ warfare attacks by terrorists” (2001, p.14).

He also

points to the fact that, ”a few physicians have been trained to deal with biological and
chemical attacks, but most are unprepared” (2001, p.15). In fact, one physician in
charge of planning and training hospitals for bioterrorism estimated in 2000 that, “only
15 percent of hospitals have the equipment or training to properly decontaminate
victims in the event of a bioterrorist attack” (Costello, 2000, p.5). A more recent report
released by the group known as Trust for America’s Health (TFAH) in late 2004
concurred with these notions. “It found that more than three years after 9/11 and the
anthrax tragedies, we’ve only made baby steps toward better bioterrorism
preparedness, rather than the giant leaps required to adequately protect the American
people,” said Lowell Weicker, Jr., TFAH Board President (Hearne, Segal, Earls, &
Unruh, 2004, p.1)
Since September 11, 2001, a call to plan and prepare for a potential attack has
been heard around the country, and has prompted hospitals and other healthcare
facilities to evaluate their circumstance, and create or revamp plans of their own.
According to Susan Pisano, the Vice President of communications for the American
Association of Health Plans (AAHP), “a lot of emergency preparedness manuals and
thinking prior to September 11th focused on natural disasters; however, after September
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11, these assumptions had to change” (Krizner, 2002, p.28). The shift in preparedness
has several major differences, the most important of which is the fact that emergency
departments will often be called on as the first line of defenders (American Hospital
Association, 2000). This shift is a critical issue for dealing with a bioterrorist attack due
to the fact that in previous disasters, the traditional first responders were the “lights and
sirens” type of responders – fire rescue, law enforcement, and emergency medical
services (Henderson, 2001). In fact, it was not until the late 1990s that public health
personnel and emergency department physicians were even recognized as the first line
of defense in a bioterrorist attack (Henderson, 2001).
In the past, “the diverse initiatives taken by different agencies of the government
were not well-coordinated, even within the agencies themselves, and many have been
designed with little comprehension of what is implied for the civilian population when a
biological weapon is used” (Henderson, 2001, p.66). To be truly prepared, a
comprehensive effort must be undertaken in concert with all those involved. This
involves cooperation among medical and public health professionals, emergency
management officials, the military, government, and law enforcement (Centers for
Disease Control, 2000).
Barriers to Planning and Preparedness
Monetary issues also remain central to the quest to better prepare the nation’s
healthcare facilities, and often can predict the levels of preparedness based upon a
distribution of funds. The fight against bioterrorism received its first significant monetary
gain in fiscal year 1999 due to the funds allocated to the Department of Health and
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Human Services, and more specifically the Centers for Disease Control (CDC)
(Henderson, 2001). These funds went toward readying the states for development of
response and surveillance programs, to procuring stockpiles of antibiotics, for smallpox
vaccines, and to establishing a national network of laboratories that were capable of
diagnosing the organism or virus in question (Henderson, 2001). Unfortunately, at that
time, the budgeted amount left little, if any, to train the new first responders, leaving a
gap in the new policies and procedures (Henderson, 2001). However, since the events
of September 11, the call for financial assistance to prepare our nation’s hospitals has
been heard, and in many cases answered. For example, in February 2002, the
Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS) announced $20 million dollars in
funding for a nationwide network of Centers for Health Preparedness, which linked
academic and community health partners together to help fight the war on bioterrorism
(Krizner, 2002). Additionally, DHHS asked for $518 million dollars to help prepare
county hospitals for a bioterrorist attack for the 2003 fiscal year (Krizner, 2002). In
2004, the State of Florida was allocated a $25 million dollar grant to help hospitals
around the state prepare for a bioterrorist attack (AP, 2004). However, even with these
enormous contributions, there is still room for improvement and the need for an
allocation of additional funds. In fact, Florida’s Secretary of Health, John Agwunobi
stated that, “Preparedness is an ongoing effort, you never really get to an end point”
(AP, 2004, page unavailable).
Regardless of these issues, problems abound in the healthcare industry as it
struggles to deal with everyday patient flow (Barbera, Macintyre, & DeAtley, 2001).
“While the public and the political communities assume that healthcare systems are
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adequately preparing for terrorism incidents that would generate catastrophic casualty
loads, the medical community is struggling just to maintain its everyday capacity”
(Barbera, Macintyre, & DeAtley, 2001, p.1). “While nearly 39 million people were
uninsured for the entire year in 2000, it is estimated that approximately 45 million people
will have no health insurance by the end of 2002” due to the economic events following
the September 11th tragedies (Miller, 2001, p. i). Add these financial constraints with
other financial issues, staffing concerns, and a lack of experience to fall back on, and
the healthcare industry faces the daunting task of preparing for an attack that has never
been experienced.
Compounding the problem, American citizens have come to expect
healthcare to be provided without regard to any extraneous circumstances, such as a
disaster scenario (Barbera, Macintyre, & DeAtley, 2001). “If hospitals became
overwhelmed and were paralyzed by chaos, it would have serious implications for public
morale and for the potential for containing an epidemic, let alone treating those who
were already sick” (Henderson, 2001, p. 67; Karwa, Curie, & Kvetan, 2005;).
Americans expect that hospital facilities will continue to function and provide care to
individuals regardless of the situation, and will do so in a manner consistent with the
laws and principles that govern healthcare. For example, regardless of the chaos and
overcrowding that a bioterrorist attack can produce, the Emergency Medical Treatment
and Active Labor Act (EMTALA) will still remain in effect. In essence, it provides that, “If
any individual (whether or not eligible for Medicare benefits and regardless of ability to
pay) comes by him or herself or with another person to the emergency department and
a request is made on the individual’s behalf for examination or treatment of a medical
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condition by qualified medical personnel (as determined by the hospital in its rules and
regulations), the hospital must provide for an appropriate Medical Screening
Examination within the capability of the hospital’s emergency department, including
ancillary services routinely available to the emergency department” (EMTALA, 1996,
page unavailable). Individuals will assume that this principle will hold true even in the
case of a bioterrorist attack, which has the capability to overwhelm the hospital.
Sample planning guidelines
Until the recent past, disasters fit neatly into disaster plans, and the medical
community was able to follow scripts formulated through previous experiences (Bullard,
Strack, & Scharoun, 2002). “With biologic and chemical disasters arriving on the scene,
multiple new scripts must be written, even subscripts for the different agents” (Bullard,
Strack, & Scharoun, 2002, p. 66). While few have been developed through experience,
many hospital disaster plans have taken shape through recommendations from
government agencies such as the Centers for Disease Control, The American Hospital
Association (AHA), and the Johns Hopkins Center for Civilian Biodefense Studies
(CCBS). All point to the importance of several areas of focus including: preparedness
and prevention, detection and surveillance, diagnosis and characterization of biological
and chemical agents, response, and communication (AHA, 2000; CDC, 2000; Johns
Hopkins, 2001). While most of the objectives deal with the issue of bioterrorism
planning from a comprehensive level, many hospital’s policies and procedures can be
derived from the guidelines that have been set. Even if a hospital already has a
disaster plan in effect, it is critical that a separate, detailed bioterrorism plan be added to
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the organization as a stand-alone policy (Evans, 2002). It is also important to note that
not only will health care facilities be dealing with the infected victims; they will also
encounter the “worried well,” who will also seek medical attention out of fear and panic
(CDC, 2000; Karwa, Curie, and Kvetan, 2005). The ability to balance the needs of both
groups will represent a key component of a successful plan.
Preparedness and prevention activities, in order to best serve and protect the
public, must focus on the biological or chemical agents that could have the potential for
the greatest impact on the health and security of the United States (CDC, 2000). For
example, “Without special preparation at the local and state levels, a large-scale attack
with variola virus, aerosolized anthrax spores, a nerve gas, or a food borne biological or
chemical agent, could overwhelm the local, as well as, the national public health
infrastructure” (CDC, 2000, p.12). In keeping with this focus area, the CDC suggests
the following activities and goals to be undertaken by a hospital:
•
•
•

Maintain a public health preparedness and response cooperative agreement that
provides support to state health agencies who are working with local agencies in
developing coordinated bioterrorism plans and protocol.
Establish a national public health distance-learning system that provides
biological and chemical terrorism preparedness training to health-care workers
and to state and local public health workers.
Disseminate public health guidelines and performance standards on biological
and chemical terrorism preparedness planning for use by state and local health
agencies (2000, p.12).
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In addition, The Johns Hopkins Center for Civilian Biodefense suggests that hospitals:
•
•
•

Review all relevant disaster response plans and assure appropriately designated
staff are familiar with their content and strategies,
Quantify pharmaceutical and antibiotic supplies, both at central and satellite
locations and routinely update that list, and
Assess routine staffing and emergency call-up plans to assure an adequate
number of personnel (2001, page # unavailable).
Detection and surveillance is an equally critical piece of bioterrorism planning. It

is crucial that emergency department personnel and other first line responders be able
to delineate the symptoms of a biological or chemical agent from that of the common
cold or flu (Scharoun, VanCaulil, & Liberman, 2002). “Early detection is essential for
ensuring a prompt response to a biological or chemical attack, including the provision of
prophylactic medicines, chemical antidotes, or vaccines” (CDC, 2000, p.9). As such,
the CDC has formulated guidelines for this piece of the preparedness plan which
include the following objectives:
•
•
•

Strengthen state and local surveillance systems for illness and injury resulting
from pathogens and chemical substances that are on CDC's critical agents list.
Develop new algorithms and statistical methods for searching medical
databases on a real-time basis for evidence of suspicious events.
Establish criteria for investigating and evaluating suspicious clusters of human or
animal disease or injury and triggers for notifying law enforcement of suspected
acts of biological or chemical terrorism (2000, p.12).

It is also crucial, at this stage, to include the non-traditional, community-based
healthcare providers that may care for other sub-populations, such as the indigent and
uninsured (Scharoun, Van Caulil, & Liberman, 2002). “The population served by these
providers is difficult to track and account for, a concern for controlling the impact and
spread of a potential bioterrorist attack” (Scharoun, Van Caulil, & Liberman, 2002, p.
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83). It is important not to discount these potential carriers, as they, too, can impact how
a hospital emergency department deals with a bioterrorist outbreak.
Detection and surveillance go hand-in-hand with diagnosis and characterization
of the agent used in planning for a bioterrorist attack. In this stage of planning, it is
necessary for hospitals to identify the nearest laboratory that has the capabilities and
authority to affirm a biological or chemical weapon diagnosis (CDC, 2000). Prompt
detection can mean the difference between life and death depending upon the agent
used, and can help stifle the spread of the virus if detected early. This is especially
critical in the case of smallpox, as the disease rapidly and unknowingly can be spread
from person to person, pitting family members and friends against each other as they
become silent carriers (Scharoun, Van Caulil, & Liberman, 2002). Again, the CDC has
guidelines and objectives set up for this stage of the process to aid hospitals in the
process, which include:
•
•
•

Establish a multilevel laboratory response network for bioterrorism that links
public health agencies to advanced capacity facilities for the identification and
reporting of critical biological agents.
Establish regional chemical terrorism laboratories that will provide diagnostic
capacity during terrorist attacks involving chemical agents.
Establish a rapid-response and advanced technology laboratory within CDC
to provide around-the-clock diagnostic support to bioterrorism response
teams and expedite molecular characterization of critical biological agents
(2000, p. 12).

Just as it is essential to quickly detect when a bioterrorist agent has been used, it
is equally important to respond quickly. It is in this stage that the hospital’s plans go into
full effect, and the amount of training and planning done often predicts how well the
hospital will perform when the drill becomes a reality. “A comprehensive public health
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response to a biological or chemical terrorist event involves epidemiologic investigation,
medical treatment and prophylaxis for affected persons, and the initiation of disease
prevention or environmental decontamination measures” (CDC, 2000, p. 9). The
hospital will play a crucial role in this stage, as they will be the first responders to such a
situation. As such, the CDC’s objectives at this stage suggest a broad response to aid
hospitals that includes:
•
•
•

Assisting state and local health agencies in organizing response capacities to
rapidly deploy in the event of an overt attack or a suspicious outbreak that might
be the result of a covert attack;
Ensuring that procedures are in place for rapid mobilization of CDC terrorism
response teams that will provide on-site assistance to local health workers,
security agents, and law enforcement officers;
Establishing a national pharmaceutical stockpile to provide medical supplies in
the event of a terrorist attack that involves biological or chemical agents (2002,
p.12).

Lastly, communication, is essential whether it be within departments of the
hospital, or as part of a cohesive network in the community. Proper communication
helps to streamline the process, avoid miscommunication and errors, calm the public’s
fears, and avoid mass hysteria. With a clear flow of information disseminated to the
public, the impact of the worried well is lessened as the public become educated on the
facts rather than myths and folklore (Scharoun, Van Caulil, & Liberman, 2002). With
that in mind, the CDC has promoted the following objectives to help streamline
communication within the hospitals, as well as to link the hospitals to the rest of the
community. They include:
•

Establishing a national electronic infrastructure to improve exchange of
emergency health information among local, state, and federal health agencies;
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•
•

Implementing an emergency communication plan that ensures rapid
dissemination of health information to the public during actual, threatened, or
suspected acts of chemical or biological terrorism;
Creating a website that disseminates bioterrorism preparedness and training
information, as well as other bioterrorism – related preparedness information, to
public health and health care workers and to the public (2000, p.13).

While the CDC’s objectives for implementing a bioterrorist plan address the issue on a
broad level, it remains necessary for hospitals to remember that they will play a key role
in response to a bioterrorist attack. Though they will be the first line of defense, they
are not the only players in this “game.” “Therefore, hospital preparedness should
expand from planning within the context of a single hospital organization to planning by
the hospital to become part of a community-wide initiative to address mass casualties”
(AHA, 2000, p.27).
Not only will hospitals deal with the first wave of victims; they will also have to
attend to the needs of the neuroses of well persons, and other subsequent waves of
patients as the attack progresses. “Hospitals, because of their emergency services and
24 hour 7 day operation, will be seen by the public as a vital resource for diagnosis,
treatment, and follow-up for both physical and psychological care” (AHA, 2000,p.30).
This sustained demand for services has the ability to catch the unprepared hospital off
guard, and add chaos to an already chaotic event.
In response to this, agencies such as the CDC have strongly recommended that
health care organizations engage in role playing activities or drills to simulate bioterrorist
attacks. Jackie Turnbull, Director of Emergency Preparedness at McAlster (Oklahoma)
Regional Health Center, knows firsthand the importance of employing bioterror drills.
McAlster Regional used bioterror drills to put their plan into action and see where any
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deficiencies lay. She stated that, “the drill showed us lots of ways to improve our plan,
and that a bioterror attack is very different from the usual scenarios we plan for”
(Bioterror drills, 2002). By implementing these drills, issues that may not have been
thought of often come to light, allowing for changes to be made before the plan is
actually implemented in the wake of a real attack.
All of the objectives and issues discussed point to the need for a comprehensive
response to a bioterrorist attack. Without proper planning, the unthinkable disaster
escalates in size and magnitude, and can potentially result in the loss of a number of
innocent lives. It is for these reasons that further research on the issue is so critical. If
the nation, and its respective sections are to be truly prepared for a bioterrorist attack,
action needs to be taken immediately, and those actions checked regularly to ensure
the efficacy of the preparedness efforts. Since there are no massive bioterrorist attacks
to draw experience from, one can only participate in scenarios that attempt to
demonstrate the enormity of the situation at hand.
Chapter Summary
This chapter has served to explain the importance of studying further bioterrorism
in hospitals. It delved into the history of bioterrorism, as well as the definitions of
bioterrorism and its defining characteristics. In addition, this chapter has addressed the
barriers to planning for a bioterrorist attack, discussed levels of bioterrorism
preparedness, and offered sample planning guidelines.
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CHAPTER 2: SELECTED THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVES
Game Theory (1944)
Game theory, as fathered by mathematician John von Neumann, can be defined
as a mathematical analysis of any situation that involves some type of conflict or social
problem. The intent is to make the “optimal choice” while considering all given
conditions, which, if done correctly, should lead to the desired outcome (von Neumann,
1944). Although the theory was originally intended as a mathematical theory for games,
such as checkers or chess, as of late, linkages have been made to the social sciences
(Shubik, 1982; von Neumann, 1944) “In game theory, the term game means a
particular sort of conflict in which n of individuals or groups (known as players)
participate” (Dauben, 2002, page #unavailable).
Application of Game Theory to Bioterrorism Planning Levels
Application of game theory to planning for a bioterrorist attack transforms the
notion of planning for an attack into a “game”. The “players” are all those involved in the
process, including hospital ED’s and their staff, public health, government, law
enforcement, and emergency planning officials (Centers for Disease Control, 2000).
The strategic “moves” that the hospital makes could be anything from the focus areas,
including: preparedness and prevention; detection and surveillance; diagnosis and
characterization of biological and chemical agents; response; and communication (AHA,
2000; CDC, 2000; Johns Hopkins, 2001). Each move is contingent on both the internal
and external characteristics of the emergency department, including the size of the
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facility, the location of the facility, it’s linkages or affiliations with other organizations or
entities, the current political environment, and the actions of other groups.
The literature is in agreement that those internal characteristics of the hospital,
such as size and location, tend to “predict” how well the hospital can be prepared to
deal with an attack and how well the hospital can adapt to a given set of circumstances
as conditions warrant (Greenberg, Jurgens, & Gracely, 2002; Helget & Smith, 2002;
Treat, et al., 2001; Wetter, Daniell, & Treser, 2001). For example, “In general,
respondents from urban hospitals reported higher levels of awareness of a bioterrorist
attack equal to or higher than those reported by respondents from rural hospitals, and
respondents from larger urban hospitals reported the greatest awareness” (Wetter,
Daniell, & Treser, 2001, p.712). Similarly, a statistically significant correlation (p<0.011)
was identified between higher patient volume in the emergency department and
likeliness to have a written plan in place to deal with victims of a biological or chemical
attack by Greenberg, Jurgens, & Gracely in 2002. Another study was conducted by
Treat, et al. (2001) in the Federal Emergency Management Agency’s (FEMA) region III,
in an attempt to assess the levels of preparedness at hospitals within this region. This
study pointed out strong associations between preparedness and location of a hospital,
with particular focus on the association between higher levels of preparedness, albeit
perceived in some instances, and those in urban locations (Treat, et al., 2001).
A fourth study, conducted in March 2001 by Helget and Smith, looked at the
preparedness levels of hospitals, long term care facilities, and assisted living facilities in
Nebraska. Although a response rate of only 14.6 percent was attained, the
researchers felt that it was demonstrative of the Nebraska healthcare environment at
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the time (Helget & Smith, 2002). The findings suggested that in March and April of
2001, only 49 percent of those surveyed believed that a bioterrorist attack was
something that their community could encounter, although hospitals were more likely to
recognize bioterrorism as a potential threat (Helget & Smith, 2002).

The researchers

believe that, contrary to their survey results, the number of organizations today believing
that bioterrorism cannot touch them will have decreased, and a more mentally aware
facility will replace earlier misguided inclinations (Helget & Smith, 2002). This points to
the application of game theory to a conflict, and asserts that the issue or conflict needs
to first be established, thus beginning the game and dictating potential “moves.”
In furthering this aspect of game theory, a review of the literature since the
events of September 11th, and the beginning of the anthrax attacks in October 2001 was
in order. Prior to September 11th, preparations for a bioterrorist attack by hospitals
across the United States were on the bottom of the list of priorities (Costelllo, 2000;
Edlin, 2001; Johnson, 2001). No one deemed it important enough to spend a great deal
of time or energy on a problem that belonged only to other countries. The prevailing
wisdom was that it was a problem prevalent overseas; and in the United States it
belonged only in a movie plotline (Johnson, 2001). However, since September 11, the
literature suggests through small-scale surveys that this attitude has changed (Johnson,
2001). As early as one month prior to September 11, experts believed that American
hospitals were unprepared for a bioterrorist attack; however, one month after the
attacks, hospitals showed signs of progress in the quest to plan for bioterrorism
(Johnson, 2001).
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Causal Process
Using game theory, linkages can be made to demonstrate how size, location,
and system affiliation, can affect the levels of preparedness for a bioterrorist attack.
First, the concept of bioterrorism is recognized as a problem or potential conflict that
needs to be solved. The hospital, along with other key participants, such as law
enforcement, public health, and even the potential terrorists themselves, become
participants in the “game.” The characteristics of the hospital, such as size, system
affiliation, and location impact the amount of information and the resources available to
them, thus their “moves” become more educated and well thought out. This leads to
higher levels of preparedness, and, in essence, a “victory” in the “game” or conflict.
The literature (Greenberg, Jurgens, & Gracely, 2002; Helget & Smith, 2002;
Johnson, 2001; Treat, et al., 2001; Wetter, Daniell, & Treser, 2001) is in agreement that
certain characteristics of a hospital indicate higher levels of preparedness in the event
of a bioterrorist attack. In addition, and as previously demonstrated, the rise in
awareness of bioterrorism as a problem has also contributed to an increase in levels of
preparedness (Johnson, 2001). All of these studies combine together to utilize game
theory as a legitimate explanation for why these types of activities are occurring.
Environmental Jolt Theory
In 1990, Meyer, Brooks, and Goes, set out to explain the unexpected high
intensity change that was observed during their field study of San Francisco Bay area
hospitals. They found that change did not occur on a regular basis or in a continuous
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manner; rather, it occurred in spurts and was often preceded by a relatively stable
period followed by a “jolt”. In addition, “these periods of discontinuous change were
posited to be a necessary condition in order to allow for innovation and opens up
opportunities for entrepreneurs” (Friedman & Marghella, 2004, p.149). These spurts of
change observed by Meyer et al (1990), gave birth to the theory now known as
environmental jolt theory.
The application of an environmental jolt theory to the healthcare industry, and
more specifically to a bioterrorist attack, lends credence to the notion of categorizing
such an attack as an environmental jolt. This “jolt’s” impact, although never fully
planned for, can be moderated based upon the corresponding healthcare organization’s
preparedness levels. In addition, the presence of a healthcare system, rather than its
freestanding counterparts, can impact the preparedness levels for a bioterrorist attack.
It is also important to note, that while most are quick to characterize an environmental
jolt as a negative event, it also has the potential to provide new opportunities for
organizations, and can often lead to new course of action or strategies to deal with such
a jolt in the future (Friedman & Marghella, 2004).
Applying this logic to healthcare systems and a bioterrorist attack, it becomes
clear that the best defense against such a breakdown is proper planning and
preparedness. However, whether a hospital is part of a large system, a small system,
or is freestanding, the potential negative consequences of being faced with an
environmental jolt remain present and must be addressed.
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Application of Environmental Jolt Theory to Systems and Bioterrorism Planning
Levels
Perhaps one of the best examples of how an environmental jolt can impact a
system comes from the 1984 book, Normal Accidents, by Perrow. In it, Perrow
examines the complexity of systems and the consequences of responding to an
environmental jolt. He concluded that complex systems contain other subsystems that
are highly interactive with one another. In addition, the various subsystems are so
intertwined, that if one part of a system fails, a dramatic effect is likely to occur on a
number of other parts of the system (Perrow, 1984).
In contrast, healthcare systems can have positive impacts on the organizations
they are members of. According to Provan and Milward (2001), presence and
participation in a system in an area such as healthcare reduces the potential downfalls
of increased cooperation. Further, they assert that these potential downfalls of “reduced
autonomy, shared resources, and increased dependence, are less likely to be seen as a
threat to survival” to those in the healthcare arena, and can be seen as an advantage to
participating in a system (2001, p. 416).
Similarly, Cueller and Gertler (2003), assert that the presence of a healthcare
system in a local area can provide an organization with an array of potential benefits,
including the increased ability to adapt to changes in the environment. For example, as
part of a healthcare network, “hospitals can rationalize service delivery and coordinate
care more effectively within a local area” (2003, p.80).
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Charns (1997) also views the move towards system affiliation as a positive one
for the healthcare industry. He asserts that the move towards system affiliation is one
that produces an ability to provide higher quality community healthcare while sharing
resources and risk in an uncertain and hyperturbulent healthcare environment. In
addition, hospitals that are members of a healthcare system are afforded the
advantages of economies of scale, increased access to capital for expansion,
acquisition of technology, and renovations (1997).
This increase in resources available at lower costs allows the system to respond
to an environmental jolt more efficiently. Edwards and Fraser (2001) further this idea
and point to the flexibility and ability to respond quickly to an uncertain and rapidly
changing healthcare environment as some of the advantages of a system or network.
In addition, Bazzoli, Chan, Shortell, and D’Aunno (2000) state that healthcare systems
are able to develop more focused strategies and achieve a greater unity of purpose
through increased “access to financial capital; access to needed human capital; legal,
management, and marketing expertise; information systems and technologies; and total
quality management” (p. 240).
Causal Process
Using environmental jolt theory and the literature available on healthcare
systems, linkages can be made to predict the ability of hospitals to respond to a
bioterrorist attack based upon their membership in a healthcare system. An
environmental jolt, such as a bioterrorist attack, is likely to occur at some point despite
previous opinion that it is unlikely. Thus, when it occurs, the literature is in agreement
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that advantages of a healthcare system are conducive to handle an environmental jolt,
such as a bioterrorist attack, better than their free standing counterparts (Bazzoli, Chan,
Shortell, & D’Aunno, 2000; Charns, 1997; Cueller & Gertler, 2003; Edwards & Fraser,
2001; Perrow, 1984; Provan & Milward, 2001; Friedman & Marghella, 2004). This in
turn, leads to a better planned response and the corresponding higher levels of
preparation, which leads to more potential lives saved.
Chapter Summary
This chapter served to discuss the theoretical underpinnings surrounding
bioterrorism preparedness. Game Theory was offered as a possible explanation of how
certain characteristics of hospital affect their overall levels of preparedness. This theory
turned planning into a game, with the internal and external characteristics of the hospital
affecting the strategic “moves” it makes. In addition, environmental jolt theory was
explored as another means of explaining preparedness levels. Application of this theory
suggested that a jolt (bioterrorist attack) can be handled better by a hospital that is part
of a system, rather than its free standing counterparts. Both were discussed, applied
specifically to bioterrorism planning, and causal processes offered for each.
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CHAPTER 3: LITERATURE REVIEW
Several studies have been conducted in an attempt to quantify the level of
preparedness of emergency departments around the country with respect to a
bioterrorist attack (See Appendix B). The literature is in agreement that the types of
activities needed to enable a hospital to effectively function in the event of a bioterrorist
attack are being conducted on a sporadic basis, and few hospitals are truly prepared
(Braun, Darcy, Divi, Robertson, and Fishbeck , 2004; GAO, 2003; Greenberg, Jurgens,
& Gracely, 2002; Higgins, Wainright, Lu, and Carrico, 2004; Keim, Pesik, and TwumDanso, 2003; Treat, et al., 2001; Wetter, Daniell, & Treser, 2001). Further, though
many hospitals are strong in some areas, such as decontamination, few possess a
comprehensive plan that will allow the facility to operate efficiently in the event of an
attack. The literature was also in agreement that training was considered an effective
means of preparing for a bioterrorist attack (Alder, Clark, White Jr., Talboys, and Mottice
, 2004; Filoromo, Macrina, Pryor, Terndrup, and McNutt, 2003; Henning, Brennan,
Hoegg, O’Rourke, Dyer, and Grace, 2004; Klein, Atas, and Collins, 2004).
In addition, despite an increased focus on preparing for bioterrorism since
September 11, 2001, hospitals are still reporting that they are not prepared to deal with
such an attack. In fact, a poll conducted at the healthcare cooperative group VHA, Inc.’s
2002 conference revealed that 70 percent of conference attendees felt that their
hospital was not prepared to deal with bioterrorism (“Most hospital ERs”, 2003). The
Council on Public Health Preparedness concurred with this notion, finding that although
hospitals are better prepared than in 2001, significant gaps exist in preparedness as the
commitment level necessary to be truly prepared is difficult to attain (Tieman, 2002).
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Conversely, the American College of Healthcare Executives (ACHE) also conducted a
poll at their 2002 meeting and found that 69 percent of hospital chief executive officers
(CEO’s) believe that their hospital is a safer place since the 2001 terrorist attacks (“Vast
majority,” 2003). This poll however, does not rate the level of preparedness for the
hospital, rather only whether or not they are more prepared since September 11, 2001.
Various studies have explored the effect of size and location on the levels of
preparedness of a hospital emergency department and have come to these same
conclusions. Most of these studies, albeit from different sections of the country, indicate
a strong association between larger hospitals in urban areas and higher levels of
bioterrorism preparedness (Greenberg, Jurgens, & Gracely, 2002; Higgins, Wainright,
Lu, and Carrico, 2004; Keim, Pesik, and Twum-Danso, 2003; Treat, et al., 2001; Wetter,
Daniell, & Treser, 2001). Although none of the studies focused on system membership
as an indicator of levels of preparedness, this study took the conclusions of previous
researchers in other areas and applied it to this variable.
Studies on Preparedness
A survey conducted in 1998 by Wetter, Daniell, and Treser focused on
emergency department preparedness in the United States Public Health Service Region
X (Alaska, Idaho, Oregon, and Washington). Utilizing the American Hospital
Association’s directory, the researchers identified all potential hospitals in the area with
an emergency department, and sent a self-administered survey to the emergency
department managers. The survey requested information on:
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1) hospital and emergency department demographics; 2) respondent’s awareness and
opinions; 3) any planning, training, or role-playing that has taken place in the past 24
months; 4) any patient isolation and decontamination resources available, and 5) an
inventory of treatment antidotes available.
Of the 224 eligible hospitals surveyed, 186 returned the surveys for a response rate of
83 percent (Wetter, Daniell, & Treser, 2001).
The researchers then examined the data garnered for statistical associations
against the independent variables of location (urban vs. rural), emergency department
annual census, and proximity to the United States army’s chemical weapons depot in
Umatilla, Oregon. It is important to note that the emergency department census was
divided into low (< 5000 visits per year), medium (5000 –15000 per year), and large (>
15000 visits per year), and then combined low and medium into one category given that
only two low census hospitals responded.

Also, the researchers defined the proximity

to the chemical weapons depot as being within a range of 35 miles or less from the
depot. The data was then compiled and analyzed using Chi Square, or the Fischer
exact test, to test for statistical significance, and by utilizing SPSS for Windows for the
descriptive statistics (Wetter, Daniell, & Treser, 2001).
Of the respondents, 61percent of the hospitals were located in a rural area, the
median emergency department size was 8 beds, and the median census number was
10,900 patients annually. Of those responding, 57.5 percent were aware of local or
state plans to respond to a biological or chemical attack, and only 33.3 percent were
aware of national domestic preparedness plans.

“In general, respondents from urban

hospitals reported higher levels of awareness equal to or higher than those reported by
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respondents from rural hospitals, and respondents from larger urban hospitals reported
the greatest awareness” (Wetter, Daniell, & Treser, 2001, p.712).
With respect to administrative plans and training schedules in place, again urban
hospitals were shown to be more prepared. Overall, 80 percent of hospitals
responding stated that they had plans in place for dealing with hazardous materials, yet
only 16.7 percent had plans in place for biological weapons, and 11.8 percent had plans
for chemical weapons. Consistent with previous results, urban hospitals (43.1 percent
for chemical, and 37.5 percent for biological) were again more apt to have conducted
training for a biological or chemical attack than a rural hospital (10.5 percent for
chemical and 7.9 percent for biological) (Wetter, Daniell, & Treser, 2001).
The study also indicated that only 21 percent of all hospitals surveyed had an
indoor emergency department area with an isolated ventilation system, shower, and
water containment system. Additionally, “urban hospitals were more likely than rural
hospitals to report having any such form of respiratory protective equipment (urban 40
percent; rural 14 percent)” (p.712). When asked about a hypothetical chemical and
biological weapons attack, only 12 hospitals (6.5 percent) of 186 met the study definition
for “minimum recommended” physical resource preparedness for a chemical attack
(Wetter, Daniell, & Treser, 2001).
Based upon the statistics, the researchers concluded that, ”the findings of this
survey, while not surprising, are nonetheless disturbing: they indicate that hospital ED’s
generally are not prepared in an organized fashion to treat victims of incidents involving
chemical or biological weapons” (p.714). Moreover, the researchers found that levels of
preparedness were low in all areas surveyed, including awareness, plans and training,
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physical resources, and medication inventories. Urban hospitals were overall better
prepared than rural hospitals, and those in an urban area with a busier emergency
department tended to be better prepared than an emergency department that served
less patients (Wetter, Daniell, & Treser, 2001).
This study provides a snapshot of hospital emergency departments in the
Northwest part of the United States. While the findings were consistent with other
studies, it is especially important to note the findings on hospital location and size. As
hypothesized by this researcher, larger, urban hospitals will have a higher level of
preparedness than their smaller rural counterparts. It also points to the further need to
study this issue in an effort to establish a more concerted response to such an attack.
Although it provides an excellent body of information and statistics, it cannot be
generalized to other areas of the country since it only captured the Northwest United
States.
Another survey of hospital emergency departments in the greater Philadelphia
area was conducted in 2000 by Greenberg, Jurgens, and Gracely (2002). It explored
preparedness levels in the emergency departments in the event of a biological or
chemical agent release. The study utilized information from the Federally mandated
Domestic Preparedness Training Program, along with a set of criteria formulated by the
researchers to set levels of preparedness. Based upon these criteria, the researchers
set a benchmark for the minimum preparedness level, and assessed the responding
hospital’s preparedness levels against it (Greenberg, Jurgens, & Gracely, 2002).
The survey target area of Philadelphia, Chester, Bucks, Delaware, and
Montgomery counties in Pennsylvania, and Camden County, New Jersey, was
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idenitifed, and any hospital with an emergency department open to the general public
within these counties was included in the study. The hospitals were identified through
the Hospital Blue Book, a national hospital directory. The surveys were then mailed
anonymously to the Emergency Physician Directors of 61 hospital emergency
departments, using an identification code known only to the principal investigator. Of
the 61 surveys mailed, 54 were returned representing an 88.5 percent response rate
(Greenberg, Jurgens, & Gracely, 2002).
The instrument utilized was a 38-question survey that queried the directors on
everything from pharmaceutical stockpiles to types of written plans in place. The data
was then compiled and analyzed using SPSS to garner descriptive statistics. Of those
responding, 66.7 percent had written polices in place that dealt specifically with the
evaluation and treatment of a biologically or chemically exposed patient, while 24.2
percent indicated that there were no such plans in place, and 9.3 percent that they were
unsure of the existence of such plans. Additionally, 70.4 percent had plans in place with
specific protocol to deal with a biological or chemical weapon attack, while 18.5 percent
indicated that there were no such protocols in place, and 11.1 percent were unsure if
such plans were in existence. Further, the researchers found that 29.6 percent of the
emergency departments had never participated in a disaster drill or scenario that dealt
with exposure to biological or chemical weapons, and, again, 9.3 percent had no
knowledge of whether or not their facility had ever taken part in such an activity. It is
also interesting to note that the researchers found a statistically significant correlation
(p<0.01) between higher patients volume in the emergency department and likeliness to
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have a written plan in place to deal with victims of a biological or chemical attack
(Greenberg, Jurgens, & Gracely, 2002).
As mentioned previously, the researchers developed a set of minimum criteria to
establish a minimum level of preparedness for hospital emergency departments. The
criteria used to formulate these levels was: 1) At least one emergency physician on staff
who had completed formal training with respect to biological and chemical weapons; 2)
Ability to decontaminate at least 10 patients per hour; 3) Written policies that addressed
how to evaluate and treat biologically and chemically exposed patients; 4) Written
cooperative agreements with local agencies that address biological and chemical
weapons attacks; 5) Participation in a drill or exercise relating to chemical and biological
weapons within the last 12 months; and 6) A self-characterized “adequate” supply of
antidotes for the treatment of biological and chemical weapons. Based upon these
criteria, the study found that fewer than two percent of all respondent hospitals had
achieved this minimum level of preparedness (Greenberg, Jurgens, & Gracely, 2002).
Based upon these statistics, the researchers concluded that in the greater
Philadelphia area, the level of preparedness of hospital emergency departments to
evaluate and treat victims of a biological or chemical attack was at a low level. They
also point to the implications of such a lack of preparedness, and assert a need to
further quantify what constitutes preparedness for a biological or chemical attack
(Greenberg, Jurgens, & Gracely, 2002).
This study demonstrated a snapshot of another area of the United States, and a
need to further explore the issue of bioterrorism preparedness. It provided a starting
point to quantify these levels of preparedness, and will aide in future research on the
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subject. The responses garnered further support this researcher’s hypotheses, by
demonstrating the lack of preparedness for such an event, and touches on the size of
the emergency department as having a statistically significant impact on the level of
preparedness for a bioterrorist attack. Although the researchers did not look for
significance in the area of location and system affiliation, they did set up a framework on
which to test these variables.
A third study took a more qualitative approach to assessing the level of
preparedness for hospitals in the event of a biological or chemical attack. A study was
conducted by Treat, et al., (2001) in the Federal Emergency Management Agency’s
(FEMA) region III in an attempt to assess the levels of preparedness of hospitals within
this region. The region was divided into 30 hospitals with West Virginia hospitals
providing 11 interviews, Pennsylvania providing 10, Maryland five, Virginia three, and
the District of Columbia one. Of the sample, 22 of the hospitals were in rural areas and
eight were in urban areas. It is important to note that the researchers did not intend that
the sample be statistically representative of the region. Instead, it represented a
snapshot of activities, plans, and attitudes within the region (Treat, et al., 2001).
To assess the level of preparedness, the researchers conducted interviews that
posed questions to the respondent’s about perceived levels of hospital preparedness,
decontamination issues, medical response capabilities, training issues, and other facility
issues such as security. Of the responding sites, zero believed that their facility was
fully prepared to handle a biological incident, 73.3 percent believed that their facility was
not prepared at all, and 26.7 percent (all urban hospitals) believed that their facility was
somewhat prepared. With regards to decontamination, 73.3 percent of facilities would
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set up a single decontamination room to treat 1 victim at a time, 13 percent had a
mobile decontamination station that could handle 10-15 patients at a time, and 13
pecent (all rural) reported no plans at all in place for decontamination (Treat, et al.,
2001).
Additionally, biological and chemical weapons treatment plans were a part of
hospital wide disaster plans at only 27 percent of the facilities. Further, 87 percent felt
that their facility’s emergency department could handle 10-50 casualties at one time, 10
percent (all urban) felt they could handle 50-100, and three percent (1 facility) felt that
they could handle more than 500 casualties at one time (Treat, et al., 2001).
With respect to other areas of focus, all except one facility had plans in place to
deal with an overflow of patients due to seasonal fluctuations, yet none reported any
specific arrangements to deal with a mass casualty disaster. Further, with regard to
pharmacy stockpiling, only the tetanus vaccine was stockpiled by any facility; however,
one facility did report stockpiling Ciprofloxacin for possible anthrax exposure. Only 20
percent of the respondents had participated in a disaster drill or scenario that was
aimed specifically at an attack of a biological or chemical nature. Lastly, all participants
reported a need for further training on the issue, but they were unsure how to
accomplish this due to various obstacles (Treat, et al., 2001).
Based upon the statistics complied, the researchers concluded that, “hospitals in
this sample do not appear to be prepared to handle events involving WMD (weapons of
mass destruction), especially in areas such as mass decontamination, mass medical
response, awareness among health care professionals, health communications, and
facility security” (Treat, et al. p. 562). Consistent with prior studies, the researchers also

34

suggested that further research be conducted to truly amass a statistically
representative sample that can be generalized on a national level (Treat, et al., 2001).
Although this study was of a more qualitative nature, it still suggested strong
support for this researcher’s hypotheses. It noted a lack of preparedness that is
consistent with those found in other studies of this nature, and identified too many
potential issues to be researched with respect to preparedness for a biological or
chemical attack. Additionally, the study pointed out strong associations between
preparedness and location of a hospital, with particular focus on the association
between higher levels of preparedness, albeit perceived in some instances, and those
in urban locations.
A fourth study, conducted in March 2001 by Helget and Smith (2002), looked at
the preparedness levels of hospitals, long term care facilities, and assisted living
facilities in the Nebraska area. Although 900 surveys were mailed out to eligible
facilities, only 131 were completed for a response rate of 14.6 percent. The majority of
the responses came from long-term care facilities (43.5 percent), with hospitals (29
percent), and assisted living facilities (9.2 percent) rounding out the rest of the
respondents. It is important to note, that although the response rate was rather low, the
researcher’s felt that they had adequately demonstrated a proportional membership of
the Nebraska Infection Control Network, as well as the demographics of health care
institutions in Nebraska (Helget & Smith, 2002).
The researchers utilized a brief six-question survey to capture the perceptions,
and physical readiness of the facilities. The subject matter surveyed included
perceptions about the respondent’s facility and community preparedness levels, any
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anticipated telecommunications problems, and who should be contacted in the case of a
bioterrorist attack. The findings suggested that in March and April of 2001, only 49
percent of those surveyed believed that a bioterrorist attack was something that their
community could encounter, although hospitals were more likely to recognize
bioterrorism as a potential threat. Additionally, a resounding 98 percent stated that
they did not feel as if they were adequately prepared for an attack of this nature (Helget
& Smith, 2002).
When asked what the facilities would need to be prepared for a bioterrorism
event, respondents were diverse in their answers. Of the 131 responding, 17 percent
felt they needed internal policies and procedures, 16.5 percent needed community
policies and procedures, 14.5 percent needed names of contacts, 13 percent needed
medications, 13 percent protective equipment, 12 percent laboratory support, 10
percent communication devices, and four percent chose other. Additionally, although
many respondents chose local law enforcement (20 percent), emergency services (11
percent), and the health department (9 percent), 30 percent responded that they were
unsure whom to contact in the event of a bioterrorist event (Helget & Smith, 2002).
Again, it appears that Helget and Smith’s research, while only a small sample of
Nebraska healthcare facilities, demonstrates a lack of preparedness for a bioterrorist
attack. They identified a number of weak areas in the organizations surveyed, yet point
to a perceived difference in attitude post September 11th. The researchers believe that
today, contrary to their survey results, the number of organizations that believe that
bioterrorism cannot touch them will have decreased and a more mentally aware facility
will be present (Helget & Smith, 2002).
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Although the researcher did not look for statistical significance between location,
size, or system affiliation, this study does provide a baseline of information in assessing
attitudes and preparedness activities that have taken place around the country. Again,
this is only a small sample in the Nebraska area, but it points to the larger question of
how other areas feel about bioterrorism, and how other parts of the United States are
faring in the move toward better preparedness.
Keim, Pesik, and Twum-Danso (2003) took a slightly different approach to
measuring terrorism preparedness in hospitals as they examined chemical terrorism
preparedness in both 1996 and 2000. They assessed the ability of a hospital to deal
with mass casualties as a result a chemical terrorist attack. They further examined the
role of increased funding for bioterrorism preparedness allocated during this time period
to assess its impact, if any, on planning activities (Keim, Pesik, and Twum-Danso,
2003).
The researchers surveyed 21 hospitals in an unidentified major metropolitan area
of the United States both in 1996 and again in 2000. 9 of the 21 hospitals surveyed
were university affiliated, and the mean annual emergency department census was
39,290. The survey looked at area such as: stockpiles of antidotes for chemical
exposure, decontamination equipment availability, levels of worker protection
established, and staff training procedures. In 1996, the response rate per question
varied from 52-96 percent per question, whereas in 2000, a response rate of 100
percent was garnered (Keim, Pesik, and Twum-Danso, 2003).
Overall, in both years surveyed, hospitals were unprepared to deal with a
chemical terrorist attack. For example, only 10 of the 21 (47 percent) of hospitals in
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1996 had a complete decontamination system available for use in 1996. This number
increased only by 1 (52 percent) in 2000. In addition, hospitals did not have an
adequate supply of antidotes on hand to deal with a nerve agent release in 1996, and in
2000, only 1 hospital had an adequate supply (Keim, Pesik, and Twum-Danso, 2003).
The researchers also pointed to a strong need for continuing education on
clinical toxicology and aspects of proper decontamination. In addition, they suggested a
need for training and education on stockpiling antidotes based upon location and
perceived risk of an attack. Consistent with previous studies, they advocated a need
for collaborative planning with other local entities as an effective way of preparation.
Overall, they found that preparedness was lacking in all areas despite increased risk of
attack and allocation of funding to prepare. Much like other studies, they too advocated
further preparations and research into the matter (Keim, Pesik, and Twum-Danso,
2003).
A 2003 survey of American hospitals conducted by the General Accounting
Office (GAO) in 2002 revealed a healthcare system that was making strides in the war
on bioterrorism, but still had room for improvement. In it, the GAO surveyed 1,482
urban hospitals (73 percent response rate) from across the United States. Most
hospitals were privately owned not for profit (72 percent). The survey addresses issues
such as: planning and preparedness activities, training of staff, and capacity to respond
to a bioterrorist attack.
The findings suggested that while more hospitals were preparing in the form of
written plans for a bioterrorist attack, inadequacies in training and simulations exercise,
as well as a lack of the proper equipment needed for a bioterrorist attack were found.
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Most specifically, of the 89 Florida hospitals that responded, 90.4 percent had a written
bioterrorism plan in place in 2002. In addition, 75.8 percent of Florida hospitals had
mutual aid agreements in place with other hospitals, 49.8 percent had aid agreements
with the city, 64.5 percent with the county, 39.3 percent with the state, and 34.7 with
regional organizations. These findings were consistent with previous studies done both
pre and post September 11, 2001 (GAO, 2003).
Higgins, Wainright, Lu, and Carrico (2004) conducted a study assessing hospital
preparedness levels for both short and long term hospitals in Kentucky. The study,
conducted from July 2002 to February 2003, sought to quantify levels of preparedness
and assess which, if any, variables affected these levels. All short and long term
hospitals in hospitals in Kentucky (118) were surveyed on a modified version of the
Mass Casualty Disaster Plan Checklist developed by the Association of Professionals in
Infection Control and Epidemiology (APIC). Additionally, a brief supplemental survey
was added courtesy of the Agency for Healthcare Quality and Research (AHRQ) in
August of 2002, adding questions regarding surge capacity and adequacy of emergency
plans. Of the 118 hospitals surveyed, 116 returned completed at least 1 of the surveys
for a response rate of 98 percent (Higgins, et al., 2004).
The findings suggested that 99 percent of hospitals surveyed had disaster plans
in place and that 95 percent had disaster planning committees in place. However, only
73 percent reported that these disaster plans specifically addressed incidents involving
bioterrorism. Organizations that conducted annual disaster exercises comprised 96
percent of the respondents, with 90 percent of those critiquing the activity and sharing
the information with participants. Additionally, better than 90 percent of respondents
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had collaborative agreements in place with other area agencies such as law
enforcement, emergency management, fire rescue services, and health departments
(Higgins, et al., 2004).
Although emergency plans were in place in the majority of hospitals, the specific
areas addressed by each yielded some deficiencies in planning. For example,
specification of areas to close due to staffing shortages were only addressed in 26
percent of the plans, how to incorporate and manage volunteers was addressed in 35
percent of the plans, and although 78 percent could lock down the facility, only 56
percent had actually tested this capability. Pharmaceutical planning and allocation was
also cited as a weakness in planning. Only 43 percent reported having a plan in place
for prophylaxis of staff, 34 percent reported plans in place for first responders, and only
20 percent reported plans for prophylaxis of caregiver’s families (Higgins, et al., 2004).
Overall, hospitals in Kentucky appeared to be on the right track for preparations
for a bioterrorist event since the events of September 11, 2001. Respondents reported
spending over 1.7 million dollars to increase preparedness efforts since the terrorist
attacks. However, “the results suggest that more work needs to be done” (p. 331). A
prime example of this lies in the regional discrepancies cited by the survey. Hospitals
located within the Metropolitan Medical Response System (MMRS), which provides aide
to major US cities, tended to have more advanced levels of preparedness than their
non-MMRS counterparts. The researchers further suggest that this disparity should be
addressed further to narrow the gap between MMRS and non-MMRS areas (Higgins, et
al., 2004).
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Although this study pointed to higher levels of preparedness overall for hospitals
since the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, it also points to a need for further
preparations. In keeping with previous literature prior to September 11, 2001, hospitals
in urban areas tended to be better prepared than their rural counterparts. However,
much like previously reviewed studies, it can not be generalized nationally, and the
results must be carefully considered for their true impact since the period of study
followed closely on the heels of increased awareness due to the 2001 terrorist attacks.
Braun, Darcy, Divi, Robertson, and Fishbeck (2004) conducted a national survey
on the effect of pre-arranged community linkages on bioterrorism preparedness of a
hospital. The study, conducted as a pre-test/post-test design both shortly before and
after the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, surveyed hospitals scheduled for
accreditation by the Joint Commission on Accreditation of Healthcare Organizations
(JCAHO). It is important to note however, that the same hospitals were not surveyed
before and after the terrorist attacks (Braun, et al., 2004).
The final survey consisted of 51 questions that assessed the hospital’s
emergency management plans, the hospital’s perception of community wide emergency
plans, the hospital’s perception of overall community relationships for disaster, and the
hospital’s demographic information. In 2001, 68 of 82 hospital’s surveyed returned
responses (82 percent) and 97 of 141 (68.8 percent) returned surveys in the 2002
mailing.
Although the study looked at 2 independent samples over time, the only
significant demographic changes from the 2001 to the 2002 survey lay in ownership and
geographic region. The 2002 sample included less for-profit hospitals and more from
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the Mid to South Atlantic region (Delaware, DC, Florida, Georgia, Maryland, North
Carolina, South Carolina, Virginia, and West Virginia). The other questions regarding
preparedness were then compiled and assessed for significance using Chi-square tests
(Braun, et al., 2004).
In general, the greatest improvement was found in the presence of an
emergency plan specific to bioterrorism from 2001 to 2002. In 2001, 47.1 percent of
hospitals surveyed had such a plan in place whereas in 2002, 90.7 percent had a plan
in place. Perception of collaboration also showed large gains as the percentage rose by
43.2 percent from 2001 to 2002. Additionally, when stratified for bed count and
population size, the sample yielded no significance for existence of a plan both in the
hospital or as part of the community. There was however significance in 2001 for
perception of a community plan with respect to population size, as a community plan
was more likely to be found in larger communities (Braun, et al., 2004).
Consistent with studies conducted prior to the terrorist attacks of September 11,
2001 (Greenberg, Jurgens, & Gracely, 2002; Helget & Smith, 2002; Treat, et al., 2001;
Wetter, Daniell, & Treser, 2001), few hospitals had emergency plans dedicated to
bioterrorism preparedness. Following the terrorists attacks, this notion shifted
dramatically as most hospitals began to formulate such plans in response to the brush
with terrorism. In addition, training activities began to take place more frequently than
prior to 2001, and community linkages were established as a way to collaboratively deal
with such an event. Overall, planning activities demonstrated the greatest
improvement, while training, electronic information sharing, and equipment issues
showed the least amount of improvement (Braun, et al., 2004).
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Although not intentionally meant to be nationally representative, the end sample
size of 165 yielded a power estimate of 0.85 and a type 1 error alpha of 0.05, thus
allowing for generalization to the nation at large. It is important to note, however, that
despite this generalization, the time frame in which it was conducted may have skewed
the results. The 2002 survey occurred closely following the 2001 terrorist attacks at a
time when the focus dramatically shifted to bioterrorism preparedness. This dramatic
shift may have been the reasoning behind the large gains in preparedness plans and
activities. Nevertheless, the authors suggest that while this trend is positive, more
research needs to be done, and many opportunities are available to improve planning
efforts both within the hospitals and their respective communities. To be successful,
collaboration amongst community entities must be formal and frequent in order to be
truly prepared (Braun, et al., 2004).
Elin Gursky, a Senior Fellow for Biodefense and Public Health at the ANSER
Institute for Homeland Security released a more current study of hospital bioterrorism
preparedness in June of 2004. In it, Gursky points to the critical need of the nation’s
healthcare entities to be prepared in the event of a bioterrorist attack, and their
subsequent insufficiencies in budgeting and training staff for such an attack. In addition,
she points out that, “these deficits are even more acutely experienced by the nation’s
approximately 2,000 rural hospitals, which have a comparatively smaller repertoire of
medical resources and unique vulnerabilities” (Gursky, 2004, p.1).
Gursky studied a total of five hospitals located in rural locations around the
United States. She deliberately chose one hospital from each of the five geographic
locations around the United States in order to have a representative from all areas, yet
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did not intend the results to be a true representation of rural hospitals. She hoped the
results could be used as a tool with which to better prepare hospitals for an attack.
Each hospital took part in a two-day site visit, complete with meetings with key hospital
personnel, as well as open-ended interviews to gather the requested information on the
bioterrorism preparedness activities of the hospital. All study participants indicated an
improvement in preparedness activities and overall levels of preparedness, but stated
that more planning and preparedness activities needed to be undertaken. Additionally,
they pointed to a promise for funding that had yet to arrive as a barrier to such
improvements as most was going to larger cities rather than the smaller rural hospitals
(Gursky, 2004).
Studies on Training
Training has often been cited as an excellent way to prepare and plan for
disaster scenarios. Such training exercises, and consequent drills in which to test the
knowledge gained have proven effective in planning for bioterrorist attacks (Alder, Clark,
White Jr., Talboys, and Mottice , 2004; Filoromo, Macrina, Pryor, Terndrup, and McNutt,
2003; Henning, Brennan, Hoegg, O’Rourke, Dyer, and Grace, 2004; Klein, Atas, and
Collins, 2004).
A study by Filoromo, Macrina, Pryor, Terndrup, and McNutt (2003) examined the
impact of technological training on overall preparedness for a bioterrorist attack. More
specifically, the researchers sought to assess the impact of a technologically based
method aimed at educating clinicians in detection, diagnosis, treatment options, and
infection control for a bioterrorist attack. Due to the intense time constraints and
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pressures of work on hospital based clinicians, the use of computers and the World
Wide Web was selected as a palatable medium for delivery of the curriculum (Filoromo,
et al., 2003).
In keeping with this idea, a screensaver containing information about the Centers
for Disease Control’s (CDC) category A agents (those bioterrorism agents capable of
mass casualties), along with prompts to access the World Wide Web were developed.
“The screensavers, which rotate images and text, have striking visuals that serve as a
billboard to persons working at or near the computer or merely passing by the monitor”
(p. 512). The screensavers were then implemented on computers in the emergency
department of the University of Alabama Birmingham, an urban medical center. From
March to September 2001, emergency department medical student rotations were then
pre and post tested on their respective knowledge of bioterrorism as assessed by
modules contained on the web site (Filoromo, et al., 2003).
Pre and post emergency department rotations scores prior to installation of the
screensaver program yielded a statistically significant difference (p<.01) in scores with
38.8 percent for pre rotation and 52.4 percent post rotation. Moreover, upon installation
and exposure to the screensavers from the months of October thru December, the
scores increased to 59.1 percent pre rotation and 75.8 percent post rotation. However,
it is important to note that the post screensaver results may have been skewed due to
the events of September 11, 2001 and the subsequent anthrax scare in October 2001
(Filoromo, et al., 2003).
Despite the mass media coverage following the terrorist attacks, the researchers
concluded that this method of educational delivery was an effective alternative to other
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costly and time-consuming methods. Therefore, they suggested further study into this
method as an alternative to other forms of training (Filoromo, et al., 2003).
This study advocates the importance of training clinicians in already
overburdened US emergency departments. It demonstrates the effectiveness of a
medium as simple, and cost effective, as a screensaver program to disseminate
information regarding bioterrorism to a broad range of individuals. Although the
researchers did point to further research on the topic, the need for training is
nonetheless indicated to prepare and train for a bioterrorist attack (Filoromo, et al.,
2003).
Another study that sought to assess the importance of training was conducted by
Henning, Brennan, Hoegg, O’Rourke, Dyer, and Grace (2004). The study utilized a
fictionalized smallpox event at a large, urban health system in the Philadelphia area and
included 39 employees from the 4 hospitals within the system. Participants
represented a wide variety of departments including emergency medicine,
administration, safety, and infection control among others. In addition, the 4 hospitals
involved represented both large and small total bed sizes and number of employees
(Henning, et al., 2004).
The exercise centered mainly on the earliest stages of the outbreak so as to
assess how hospitals would deal with the initial detection and response before any
other governmental agencies could provide assistance. As such, three distinct modules
were presented to the participants, with each allotted time to react to the information
presented, discuss department specific response questions, and formulate decisions
regarding how each department should proceed. It is also important to note that despite
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discussion or recommendations from each module, the proceeding module(s) did not
change based upon feedback (Henning, et al, 2004).
Prior to beginning the exercise, a pre-exercise anonymous survey was
completed that collected demographic information on participants and their respective
hospitals, and asked them to rank a series of 8 objectives that participants hoped to
gain from the exercise. In addition, the survey asked participants to assess their
perceived level of preparedness for a bioterrorist attack for their individual departments.
With 39 of the 50 invited employees participating (78 percent), the exercise was
completed in 3 ½ hours. Following the exercise, a post-exercise survey was
administered that revisited the same 8 objectives ranked in the pre-survey. Participants
were asked to rate the degree to which the exercise aided them in preparing for a
bioterrorist attack, as well as how effective the exercise was overall in helping them to
prepare and build a base of knowledge (Henning, et al., 2004).
Fisher’s exact test and chi-square were then utilized to test for comparisons,
rates, and proportions of the data ascertained. The first module suggested that the
groups addressed many areas of first response, but there was a clear lack of direction
in who would be in charge of decision-making and the order in which to carry out the
tasks mentioned. In module 2, confusion was noted in how to separate patients that
were exposed to the smallpox virus and those who were not, as well as who, when, and
where to administer vaccinations. Module 3 asked participants how they would react to
the exercise if they could repeat the exercise. Participants pointed to a need for clear
lines of communication, yet many cited the ability to communicate effectively as a
critical weakness in preparations. Overall, of the 34 participants that responded to how
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well prepared their department was, 24 percent thought they were poorly prepared, 9
percent thought they were well prepared, and 68 percent reported being moderately
prepared (Henning, et al., 2004).
Moreover, participants overwhelmingly agreed (79 percent) that the exercise had
increased their knowledge of preparing for an attack. In addition, 79 percent felt that the
exercise was extremely or very useful in helping their respective departments to prepare
for an attack and understand their role in the process. Only 3 percent reported it as
marginally useful. Overall, despite the paucity of literature to support the use of training
exercises for a bioterrorist attack, the researchers felt that in this case, the use of
scenarios is not only an appealing alternative, but a necessary one to adequately
prepare (Henning, et al., 2004).
Klein, Atas, and Collins (2004) also sought to assess the impact of training on
bioterrorism preparedness through use of a role-playing scenario. Similar to the
smallpox scenario conducted by Henning, et al., Klein, Atas, and Collins used a fictious
release of smallpox in an urban/suburban hospitals located in an unidentified
metropolitan area with an international boarder. Of the hospitals participating, 3 were
large regional hospitals, 1 was a children’s hospital, 1 an urgent care center (a facility
that does not accept 9-1-1 EMS patients), and the remaining were considered
community hospitals (Klein, Atas, and Collins, 2004).
The unannounced drill included 13 patients “infected” with the smallpox virus, all
illustrating the same signs, symptoms, and prodromal history. The patients were
transported by way of ambulance or the personal cars of drill observers and presented
to the 12 hospitals involved. Endpoints of the drill were established from the beginning
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as either: the expiration of drill time (8 hours), hospital lockdown upon identification of
the virus on the patient, or a breach of drill protocol that might place the participants in
harm’s way (Klein, Atas, and Collins, 2004).
Of the 4 patients transported by ambulance, alarmingly, none were identified as
possibly being infected with the smallpox virus. Only 54 percent (7 patients) were
correctly identified as being possibly infected, thus activating the hospital’s biological
agent protocol. Of those diagnosed correctly, 71 percent (5 of 7 patients) were isolated
and protocol followed. Moreover, only 2 hospitals contacted the local health department,
so as to trigger further warning and communications to other agencies and local
hospitals. The remaining 46 percent (6 patients) were incorrectly diagnosed,
discharged, and sent home to their families, thus possibly causing further spread of the
“infection” (Klein, Atas, and Collins, 2004).
Inconsistent with previous literature, it was the smaller hospitals that diagnosed
the infected patents in a more timely fashion and initiated bioterrorism plans with greater
ease and interest. Moreover, the smaller hospitals isolated the patients quicker, and
initiated safety protocols including putting on protective equipment and contacting the
proper authorities in a timely fashion. The larger hospitals in the drill seemed less eager
to initiate bioterrorism plans, and discharged the patients quickly and with incorrect
diagnoses (Klein, Atas, and Collins, 2004).
Overall, the findings suggest that despite a barrage of education on biological
agents, hospital personnel are still unable to quickly identify a possible infection, and
are either unaware of, or are hesitant to trigger the activation of policies to deal with
such an event. As such, the researchers recommend further education and training of
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hospital personnel to enable them to quickly identify and treat an infected patient.
Further, they felt that the drill was successful in that it identified a number of deficiencies
in bioterrorism planning and pointed to areas that still required improvement so that
detection and treatment is done quickly and efficiently (Klein, Atas, and Collins, 2004).
Alder, Clark, White Jr., Talboys, and Mottice (2004) also delved into the area of
the importance of training for a bioterrorist attack. They sought to ascertain the
educational needs and preferences of Utah physicians with respect to bioterrorism
education and training. Quota sampling was conducted based on location, specialty,
and type of practice, yielding 30 physicians from both urban and rural areas,
representing a variety of specialties. Physicians were grouped into primary care,
emergency care, or specialty care for purposes of analysis (Alder, et al., 2004).
Participating physicians were then asked a series of question regarding the
following: their perceived risk of a bioterrorist attack, what their roles are in detection
and response, what their level of interest in training is, and lastly, their preferences for
method of education. The semi-structured interviews were recorded and later
transcribed to analyze and categorize responses (Alder et al., 2004).
With respect to perceived risk of a bioterrorist attack, all 3 physician groups felt
that such an attack was unlikely, but nevertheless possible. They also felt that while a
national bioterrorism attack was more likely than a local attack, the ramifications of a
national attack might eventually trickle down locally. The ability to detect an infected
case and respond was linked to the type of physician group. For example, primary care
physicians felt that they were inadequately prepared to deal with a potentially infected
case, whereas emergency physicians and specialists felt higher levels of confidence in
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their ability to detect and respond. Emergency physicians felt that their confidence in
quick detection and response could increase even higher if they had previous warning
via alerts from health departments or other agencies (Alder et al., 2004).
Overall, the interest levels in training for bioterrorism were marred by constraints
on time and competing demands from a variety of other issues facing physicians.
Alarmingly, despite their admitted deficiencies and ability to quickly diagnosis and
respond, none of those surveyed felt that training for bioterrorism was or should ever be
their number 1 priority (Alder et al., 2004).
Lastly, the preferred method of education for bioterrorism training revealed a
variety of different modes. The prevailing notion was that the training needed to be
tailored to the specific audience and that it must be presented by what the trainees
perceive as an expert. For example, emergency physicians felt that someone from the
health department should conduct training, and that the trainers should remain sensitive
to the competing demands and time constraints of an emergency physician. Further,
they suggested that training be done via the World Wide Web, disaster drills, and other
exercises that included in depth information on primary and secondary bioterrorism
agents. In addition, all agreed that training should take place, but should be
incorporated into existing training sessions, as time is a critical factor. Physicians also
felt that training should be ongoing, and supplemented with readily available information
as conditions warrant (i.e. an outbreak of SARS) (Alder et al., 2004).
Overall, although this study cannot be generalized to the nation as a whole, it
provides a snapshot of physicians in Utah and their perceived needs for education and
training. Some of the notions suggested with regard to methods of training and use of
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experts may translate into other areas of the country, but not without further analysis.
The premise of tailoring the method of education to the specific audience involved may
increase attention and the likelihood of levels of learning, thus should be further
explored as a method of effectively training physicians for a bioterrorist attack (Alder et
al., 2004).
Study of Disaster
Lastly, a review of Gillespie et al. (1993) and their study on Partnerships for
Community Preparedness is pertinent to the application of previous disaster research to
bioterrorism research. Most specifically, the physical and social properties used in their
research are of particular importance in assessing a hospital’s level of bioterrorism
preparedness.
Physical preparedness as designed by Gillespie et al., explored the importance
and degree by which organizational preparedness plans emphasized certain elements
of safety in an effort to reduce loss of life and damage to property. Social preparedness
encompassed the planning, training, financial, and community subsets in an effort to
ascertain the degree by which these factors influence levels of preparedness (1993).
Planning was used to demonstrate the level by which an organization’s
emphasize on disaster planning influenced their overall preparedness for a disaster.
Planning, as defined by Gillespie et al., “is the degree to which organizations generally
emphasize disaster planning to reduce the loss of life, injury and property damage”
(1993, p.42). Next, Gillespie et al., discussed measurement of the training component
of disaster preparedness. They defined training as, “the degree to which organizations
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emphasize disaster training to reduce the loss of life, injury, and property damage”
(1993, p.42). Utilizing, a summative scale, Gillespie et al., explored the degree to which
organizations emphasize training through classroom lectures and discussion, staff
meetings, simulations, drills, and sending staff to other organizations; training sessions
that dealt with disaster in the community; exercises that deal with disaster in the
community; planned future training sessions; planning exercises; exercise
assessments; and training personnel. The remaining aspects of training were then
scored on a 0-7 scale with 0 representing “no emphasis at all” or “no involvement”, to 7,
which indicated, “very strongly emphasized” to “extremely high involvement” (Gillespie,
1993).
Financial preparedness, or “the degree to which organizations emphasize the
securing of funds for disaster services designed to reduce the loss of life, injury, and
property damage,” was measured next by Gillespie et al. (1993, p. 42). This aspect of
disaster preparedness was measured on a summative scale that indicated the degree
to which organizations are involved in budgeting for preparedness and have secured
funds needed to implement their disaster plan. Again, the 0-7 point scale was used to
measure the level of involvement with 0 representing “does not apply at all” to 7,
representing “applies perfectly” (Gillespie et al., 1993).
Lastly under social preparedness, Gillespie et al. addressed the concept of
community preparedness, or “the degree to which organizations emphasize community
disaster education and community involvement to reduce the loss of life, injury, and
property damage” (1993, p.43). This aspect utilized a summative scale to measure the
degree that organizations: promote public awareness of disaster services (sponsor
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community programs/special events, seek media coverage, distribute literature, etc.),
educate the public about hazards, lobby to improve disaster response, explore new
approaches to delivering disaster services, enjoy an excellent reputation for their
disaster services, and have participated in disaster services (# of years offering
services). Again, the 0-7 point scale was used for measurement purposes (Gillespie et
al., 1993).
Although Gillespie et al., did not specifically measure levels of bioterrorism
preparedness, linkages can be made from their general disaster research to
bioterrorism research. Of particular importance from the Gillespie et al., study was the
use of physical and social properties to compute an overall level of bioterrorism
preparedness.
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Chapter Summary
The literature is in agreement, that although some studies have been conducted
to assess the level of preparedness for a bioterrorist attack, further research needs to
be done (Braun, Darcy, Divi, Robertson, and Fishbeck , 2004; Greenberg, Jurgens, &
Gracely, 2002; Higgins, Wainright, Lu, and Carrico, 2004; Keim, Pesik, and TwumDanso, 2003; Treat, et al., 2001; Wetter, Daniell, & Treser, 2001). Although
preparations and preparedness levels have increased, even after the 2001 terrorist
attacks these hospitals still lack comprehensive plans to deal with a potential attack.
Another recurrent theme throughout the literature is the importance of training. Studies
have shown that training is an effective means of planning and preparing for a
bioterrorist attack as they have the potential to illustrate deficiencies (Alder, Clark, White
Jr., Talboys, and Mottice , 2004; Filoromo, Macrina, Pryor, Terndrup, and McNutt, 2003;
Henning, Brennan, Hoegg, O’Rourke, Dyer, and Grace, 2004; Klein, Atas, and Collins,
2004).
A number of studies have specifically addressed the role of size and location of a
hospital in the case of a bioterrorist attack. Although no studies currently have
assessed the impact of system affiliation, extrapolations were made from theoretical
applications to point to higher preparedness levels in system affiliated hospitals. Most
of these studies, albeit from different sections of the country, indicate a strong
association between larger hospitals in urban areas and higher levels of bioterrorism
preparedness (Greenberg, Jurgens, & Gracely, 2002; Higgins, Wainright, Lu, and
Carrico, 2004; Keim, Pesik, and Twum-Danso, 2003; Treat, et al., 2001; Wetter, Daniell,
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& Treser, 2001). The lone exception to this association was demonstrated in the 2004
Klein, Atas, and Collins study. They found smaller hospitals that diagnosed the
“infected patients” from the drill in a more timely fashion and initiated bioterrorism plans
with greater ease and interest than larger hospitals (Klein, Atas, and Collins, 2004).
Each referenced study provides a glimpse into other parts of the United States,
and how these areas are preparing for a potential attack. However, only one can be
generalized to the nation at large (GAO, 2003). It was the intent of this study to further
explore these issues, and attempt to quantify the levels of preparedness in the state of
Florida post September 11, 2001.
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CHAPTER 4: METHODOLOGY
This chapter served to offer the research questions addressed along with the
corresponding hypotheses. In addition, it discussed the research design, sampling
techniques, and the corresponding sample drawn. It also addressed the development
and administration of the survey including the IRB and informed consent procedures.
Next, the definitions of key variables were offered and the scales of measurement
explained. The chapter concludes with a discussion of the data analysis techniques
employed.
Research Questions and Hypotheses
In keeping with the previous literature, and building on the previous studies
conducted, the intent of the current study was three fold. As such, the following
research questions were explored:
1) Does hospital size affect the preparedness level of a hospital in the event of a
bioterrorist attack?
2) Does hospital location affect the preparedness level of a hospital in the event
of a bioterrorist attack?
3) Does hospital system membership (system vs. non-system) affect the
preparedness level of a hospital in the event of a bioterrorist attack?
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Furthermore, in assessing these research questions and comparing them to the
literature reviewed, the researcher formulated the following hypotheses:
Ha1 = Levels of preparedness for a bioterrorist attack will be directly related to the
bed size of hospital.
Ho1 = There is no relationship between disaster preparedness of a hospital and
the number of beds.
Ha2 = There is a difference in level of preparedness of a hospital between those
in urban and rural locations in the event of a bioterrorist attack.
Ho2 = There is no difference in level of preparedness of a hospital between those
in urban and rural locations in the event of a bioterrorist attack.
Ha3 = There is a difference in level of preparedness of a hospital between those
that are system affiliated and those that are non-system affiliated in the event of
a bioterrorist attack.
Ho3 = There is no difference in level of preparedness of a hospital between those
that are system affiliated and those that are non-system affiliated in the event of
a bioterrorist attack.
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Research Design
This study employed an explanatory survey design to answer all three of the
research questions. A cross sectional survey design was implemented to answer the
research questions. In addition, based upon the previous literature and the above
research questions, the following models were offered to assist in addressing the
hypotheses to be tested:
Level of preparedness = a + b1 size + error
Level of preparedness = a + b1 location + error
Level of preparedness = a + b1 system affiliation + error
Sample
In order to examine the levels of bioterrorism preparedness in hospitals in the
State of Florida, and the effect of system membership, location, and size on those
levels, a purposive non-probability sample was gathered. The acute care hospitals
were selected from a 2003 directory search engine containing over 200 hospitals
provided by the Florida Hospital Association of all hospitals in the State of Florida. In
2004, they were then cross referenced from a current listing of all Florida hospitals with
emergency departments from the Florida College of Emergency Physicians to yield a
total of 201 hospitals from which a sample was drawn (See Appendix B). The only
attributes selected to determine the total number of acute care hospitals in Florida were
“show hospitals and health systems” and “acute care” for organization type.
Additionally, the hospitals were further stratified by total number of beds to determine
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hospital size, and location in Florida to determine whether they reside in an urban or
rural location. The demographics of this sample provided by the directory listing gave
the researcher a starting point in collection of demographic information, but this sample
gathering procedure was not inclusive of all the types of information the researcher
wished to collect. Thus, the survey instrument began with such data collection
questions in order to anonymously compile a demographic profile of the sample.
Additionally, all hospitals were surveyed anonymously to encourage responses
with greater candor. The researcher coded the surveys numerically for tracking and
accuracy purposes only, and only the researcher knew the codes. This served to
minimize the bias factor in the responses received and encourage higher levels of
survey participation.
Survey Development and Administration
As previously stated, a survey was utilized to address the research questions of
the effect of system membership, location, and size of a hospital on the levels of
preparedness for a bioterrorist attack. The survey assessed the areas of physical
properties of the hospital (i.e. facilities, equipment, communication systems, etc.), as
well as the social characteristics of the hospital (planning, training, financial, and
community characteristics) (Gillespie, et al., 1993) (See Appendix C). These
characteristics were adapted from the 1993 study performed by Gillespie et al.,
measuring organizational preparedness in a disaster, and followed the same
measurement scales as created by the researchers.
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The survey questions were adapted from a combination of the questions asked
by the Gillespie et al. (1993), survey. However some of the extraneous verbiage in the
questions was changed to reflect measurement of readiness for a bioterrorist attack.
The more specific bioterrorism questions were adapted from several previous surveys
of hospitals measuring actual preparedness, and perceptions of preparedness in the
case of a bioterrorist attack (AHA, 2002; Booz-Allen & Hamilton, 2002). Questions were
asked in the areas of: 1) general hospital characteristics (demographics); 2) types of
disaster plans in place; 3) training of staff; 4) facility accommodations (i.e. equipment,
space availability, etc.); 5) availability of supplies and pharmaceuticals; 6) security
measures; 7) staffing; 8) budgeting; and 9) community relations/education (AHA, 2002;
Booz-Allen & Hamilton, 2002; Gillespie et al., 1993). Actual survey questions may be
found in Appendix C. Questions asking for specific information about the actions of the
hospitals to prepare for a bioterrorist attack (i.e. training exercises), or information about
equipment or supply inventories, used nominal or ordinal levels of measurement. All
survey questions had options to choose from in order to categorize the responses, and
assure ease of analyzing the data. Conversely, questions from the Gillespie et al.
(1993) research used an ordinal approach to measurement as described in more depth
below. The purpose of the inclusion of these questions was to assess the actual level
of preparedness of the organization based on the responses to the survey.
Once developed, the survey was administered to attendees of the 2004 Florida
Emergency Medicine Foundation’s 25th Annual International Disaster Management
Conference (February 5th-8th) and the 2004 Florida Emergency Medicine Foundation’s
Symposium By the Sea held August 5-8th. In addition, a mail survey was conducted in
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an effort to further boost survey response rates. This survey also was administered in
2004 at the disaster management conference and included: “All persons and agencies
involved with emergency preparedness, management and response...firefighters, EMS
personnel, emergency managers, hospital administrators, physicians, nurses, DMAT
personnel, disaster planning coordinators, medical facility administrators, law
enforcement officials, search and rescue responders, civil preparedness officials, mass
fatality responders, and others who play important roles in critical incidents” (Florida
Emergency Medicine Foundation, 2004, no p#). Attendees at the Symposium By the
Sea included emergency physicians from around the state of Florida.
Conference attendees who were either hospital administrators or managers of
the emergency department were asked to complete the survey. Only one survey per
facility was filled out so as not to skew the data on each facility based upon an uneven
rate of responses. As each survey was completed, the survey was assigned a number
that corresponded to the hospital name. This information was then used for tracking
purposes only and was not used in analysis, nor was it disclosed to anyone other than
the principal investigator.
IRB/Informed Consent Procedures
Approval to proceed with the research as indicated above was secured through
an expedited review by the University of Central Florida’s Institutional Review Board.
Permission was granted initially on February 3, 2004 and renewed January 10, 2005
(See Appendix D). In addition, addenda to the data collection method were filed and
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approved on March 1, 2004 and August 2, 2004 to accommodate the survey mail and
Symposium By the Sea conference collection.
Informed consent was accomplished through the following statement written at
the top of the survey:

“The completion of this anonymous survey constitutes informed consent to
participate in this study. Each organization has been assigned a number for the
purpose of tracking response rates and accuracy of results only – at no time will
anyone other than the principal researcher know the origin of each survey. At
any time, should you not wish to answer a question you may do so without
penalty.”
Variable definitions
This study utilized several different variables for analysis of preparedness in the
event of a bioterrorist attack; each is defined and operationalized below (See Appendix
E for full listing).
System Affiliation
“A system may be defined as an organized or complex whole: an assemblage or
combination of things or parts forming a complex or unitary whole” (Cleland & King,
1983, p. 19). More specifically, a healthcare system is defined as two or more hospitals
or other provider organizations resulting from horizontal, vertical, or virtual integration
(Fottler & Malvey, 2003). In the healthcare arena, a system-affiliated hospital is one
that is affiliated with other organizations (usually through a parent company) to provide
a continuum of care (Ginter, Swayne, & Duncan, 1998).
In addition, hospitals may consolidate by way of mergers or acquisitions (Cueller
& Gertler, 2003). As previously stated, hospitals may become part of a system through
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horizontal integration, or integration by “creation of multi-hospital systems that provided
similar acute care services in multiple locations” (Fottler, Scharoun, & Oetjen, 2004,
p.13). They can also integrate vertically, through a merger of multiple organizations in
an effort to provide a continuum of care that reaches beyond traditional acute are
services (Fottler, Scharoun, & Oetjen, 2004). Most recently, hospitals have even
consolidated through virtual integration, whereby the consolidation takes place via a
contract (Fottler, Scharoun, & Oetjen, 2004).
Size
Size of the hospital was measured by the number of beds the hospital has
available for patient care. For purposes of this study, size was categorized as a ratio
level variable and was divided into four categories. The four categories were divided up
into small (100 or less beds), medium (101-300 beds), large (over 301 beds), and extra
large (over 501 beds).
Location
Whether a hospital was located in an urban or rural area represented location of
the hospital. According to the 2000 United States Census, an urban area, or “cluster” is
defined as “a densely settled area that has a census population of 2,500 to 49,999”
(United States Census Bureau, 2002, no page # available). Conversly, a rural area is
defined as, “all territory, population, and housing units located outside of urbanized
areas and urban clusters” (United States Census, Bureau, 2002, no page # available).
For purposes of measurement, location was categorized as a nominal level variable.
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Levels of Preparedness
For purposes of this study, level of preparedness was measured on an ordinal
level. Each variable was measured on a 0-7 point scale with responses ranging from 0,
indicating “no emphasis at all” or “no involvement”, to 7, which indicated, “very strongly
emphasized” to “extremely high involvement” unless otherwise noted (Gillespie, et al.,
1993). In addition, a “don’t know” category was used to capture such responses. The
categories within levels of preparedness utilized the following topics for measurement:
1) general hospital characteristics (demographics); 2) types of disaster plans in place; 3)
training of staff; 4) facility accommodations (i.e. equipment, space availability, etc.); 5)
availability of supplies and pharmaceuticals; 6) security measures; 7) staffing; 8)
budgeting; and 9) community relations/education (AHA, 2002; Booz-Allen & Hamilton,
2002; Gillespie et al., 1993).
Scales of Measurement
To best measure the levels of preparedness within an organization, the
researcher employed the measurement tool developed by Gillespie, et al. (1993). This
measure of organizational preparedness was originally created to address
organizational preparedness in the case of a “general” disaster, but can be used to
explore the more specific bioterrorist attack scenario. Gillespie et al., “sought measures
specific enough to guide the process of improving preparedness, but general enough to
permit development of theory and comparative study” (1993, p.41). They used two
main focus areas of study in an attempt to quantify levels of disaster preparedness
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including physical preparedness and social preparedness, and then included an
overarching category of overall disaster preparedness (Gillespie, et al., 1993).
Within the first focus area of physical preparedness, Gillespie, et al., sought to
quantify the “degree to which organizational plans emphasize safety of physical facilities
and objects to reduce the loss of life, injury, and property damage” (1993, p.42).
Questions from this section were rated on a seven item summative scale that indicated
the degree to which disaster plans emphasized hazard analysis, site analysis, building
safety, the securing of heavy objects, the protection of vital records, and the testing of
emergency communication systems. Items were then scored on a scale from 0,
indicating “no emphasis at all” or “no involvement”, to 7, which indicated, “very strongly
emphasized” to “extremely high involvement” (Gillespie, et al., 1993).
Next, social preparedness was addressed and measured the different aspects of
a disaster plan such as the internal planning, training, financial, and the external aspect
of community preparedness. This measure was based on a twelve item summative
scale to quantify the organization’s emphasize on gathering knowledge, planning for
disasters, updating disaster plans, and establishing disaster plan goals. All items were
then rated on the same 7-point scale as above with 0 representing “no involvement” and
7 representing “extremely high involvement” (Gillespie, et al., 1993).
Most importantly, the overall disaster preparedness scale developed by Gillespie,
et al., was used. It measures, “the degree to which an organization emphasizes safety
of physical facilities and objects, community disaster planning, disaster training,
community disaster education, and budgeting to reduce the loss of life, injury and
property damage” (1993, p. 43). It used a twelve item summative scale and a 7-point
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scale as above with 0 representing “does not apply” and 7 representing “applies
perfectly.” The end result provides a manner in which to, “examine how the structure of
interorganizational relations is related to organizational disaster preparedness”
(Gillespie et al., 1993, p.43).
Data Analysis
Two types of data were examined. First, the demographic data was examined,
and consequently the three main independent variables of system membership, size,
and location were reviewed. Survey question responses were examined and
correlations (using the bivariate statistical test Pearson’s r) were computed for each
independent variable against the dependent variable of preparedness.
Furthermore, survey questions were analyzed using independent sample t tests
for the location and system affiliation variables, and ANOVA was used for bed size
since the means of more than two variables were computed. The following equations
were run:
1. Level of preparedness = a + b1 size + error
2. Level of preparedness = a + b1 location + error
3. Level of preparedness = a + b1 system affiliation + error
The dependent variable for preparedness contained a subset of twelve
characteristics that together comprised the overall level of preparedness for a
bioterrorist attack. Although there were seventy-seven total responses, a number of
surveys either did not respond to this question, or responded with “don’t know.” Since
the there were so many that fell into this category it was excluded from the final
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analysis. In addition, those surveys that had missing responses from the overall level
of preparedness question were also excluded.
Each of the twelve characteristics were added together and divided by twelve for
each hospital to yield a mean value that represented level of preparedness.
Additionally, this variable and corresponding methodology was tested for its
effectiveness by running a Cronbach Alpha. The Cronbach Alpha yielded a raw
coefficient of .92 and a standardized coefficient of .93, thus illustrating that the chosen
methodology of using the mean for the responses to yield an overall level of
preparedness was an acceptable method.
However, in order to exhaust all other possibilities, and ensure the quality of the
data analysis chosen, a principal component with varimax rotation factor analysis was
performed. Out of the twelve possible factors, an eigenvalue over 1 was only found for
3 of the factors. More over, these factors accounted for seventy three percent of the
total variance explained by each of the factors. These 3 distinct factors were found, and
included:
Planning Factor = New approaches to deliver disaster services (Approach); Set
of stable disaster services provided (Service); Staff/Volunteers are retrained
(Retrain); Info flows up and down (Info); Maintaining high morale is important
(Morale); and Establishing agreements with other organizations is important
(Agree).
Staffing Factor = Staff productivity is emphasized (Product); Bioterrorism
services evaluated (Serv); and Authority over bioterrorism services is clear
(Auth).
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Funding and Communications Factor = All funds needed are secured
(Funds); Understanding unit cost is important (Cost); and Public
relations/communications are important (Comm)
As such, each of the independent variables were run against the mean overall level of
preparedness, as well as each of the factors yielded by the factor analysis.
Chapter Summary
This chapter offered the research questions addressed along with the
corresponding hypotheses. In addition, it discussed the research design, sampling
techniques, and the corresponding sample drawn. It also addressed the development
and administration of the survey including the IRB and informed consent procedures.
Next, the definitions of key variables were offered and the scales of measurement
explained. The chapter concluded with a discussion of the data analysis techniques
employed.
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CHAPTER 5: RESULTS
This chapter will serve to report the data generated from the survey and the
corresponding statistical analysis of the data as it relates to the research questions and
hypotheses. Furthermore, the statistical analysis outlines the main variables used in the
analysis, an overall profile of the sample, including response rates, a report of the
Pearson R correlations for each of the independent variables against the dependent
variable, the results of the ANOVA run for bed size, and the results for the t-tests run for
location and system affiliation.
Profile of the Sample
Of the possible 201 hospitals surveyed, 77 organizations returned a survey to the
researcher. This represented a response rate of 38.3 percent. Although the response
rate was slightly lower than desired, the following information is offered as representing
the logic behind this rate. First and foremost, the delicate and controversial nature of
the topic is offered as a potential reason why hospitals chose not to participate in the
study. Since bioterrorism preparedness is such a sensitive topic with great loss of life to
be considered, many hospitals are reluctant to put themselves out on such a precarious
whim. Moreover, regardless of the anonymity offered to the hospitals, many may have
been reluctant to respond for fear of making their hospitals appear unprepared.
Secondly, the already overcrowded hospital emergency departments are struggling just
to maintain their everyday capacity, thus making it difficult to carve out the time
necessary to complete the survey (Barbera, Macintyre, & DeAtley, 2001).
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Descriptive Statistics
The most common personnel who completed the survey included Emergency
Room (ER) physicians (33.8 percent) and Medical Directors (23.4 percent), followed by
a compilation of other persons such as Chief Medical Officer, Advanced Registered
Nurse Practitioner (ARNP), Disaster Chairperson, Safety Director, and Chairman of the
Emergency Department (See Table 1).
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Table 1
Job Title of Survey Participants
Job Title
ARNP
Associate Residency Director
Assistant Clinical Professor of Emergency Medicine
Chairman Emergency Medicine
Chief Medical Officer
Dept. Chair
Director of Critical Care
Dir. Emergency Services
Disaster Chairperson
ER Director
ER Physician
ER Resident
Environmental Specialist
Fellow
Medical Director
Medical Officer
Org. Preparedness Specialist
Registered Nurse (RN)
Safety Director
Safety Specialist
Other
Totals

Frequency
2
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
2
26
5
1
1
18
1
1
1
7
1
3
77

Percentage
2.6
1.3
1.3
1.3
1.3
1.3
1.3
1.3
1.3
2.6
33.8
6.5
1.3
1.3
23.4
1.3
1.3
1.3
9.1
1.3
3.9
100.0

In addition, the independent variables of system affiliation, location, and bed size
were ascertained. Of the 77 responses, 59 (76.6 percent) came from hospitals in urban
locations, 13 (16.9 percent) from rural locations, and 5 (6.5 percent) chose not respond
to the question. Bed size was broken down into four categories with 12 hospitals (15.6
percent) representing those with 100 or less beds, 26 hospitals (33.8 percent) with 101300 beds, 21 hospitals (27.3 percent) with 301-500 beds, and 18 hospitals (23.4
percent) with over 501 beds. System affiliation yielded 52 hospitals (67.5 percent) that
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were affiliated with a system, 24 (31.2 percent) that were not part of a system, and 1
(1.3 percent) with no response marked (See Table 2).

Table 2
Dependent Variable Frequencies
Variable Name
Location

Variable Category

Frequency

Percentage

Urban
Rural
No response
Total

59
13
5
77

76.6
16.9
6.5
100.0

100 or Less Beds
101-300 Beds
301-500 Beds
Over 501 beds
Total

12
26
21
18
77

15.6
33.8
27.3
23.4
100.0

System
Non-System
No Response
Total

52
24
1
77

67.5
31.2
1.3
100.0

Bed Size

System Affiliation

The independent variable of overall level of preparedness was also run for
frequencies and yielded the following results for both the mean level of preparedness
and the factor analysis components. For the overall mean category, “somewhat high”
represented 27 of the hospitals surveyed (35.1 percent), followed closely by “moderate
application” with 18 hospitals (23.4 percent), and a variation of other responses that
comprised smaller individual percentages of the total responses. Planning from the
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factor analysis yielded a similar result with “moderate application” representing 20
hospitals (26 percent), “somewhat high application” representing 17 hospitals (22.1
percent), “high application” representing 15 hospitals (19.5 percent) and the other
responses that together comprised the rest of the totals.
The staffing factor also stayed in line with the previous runs and returned a result
of “moderate application” representing 21 hospitals (27.3 percent), “somewhat high
application” representing 13 hospitals (16.9 percent), “high application” representing 13
hospitals (16.9 percent), along with the other responses that together comprised the
rest of the 77 responses. Lastly, the funding and communications factor demonstrated
2 of the same front running responses with “somewhat high application” representing 13
hospitals (16.9 percent), “moderate application” with 9 hospitals (11.7 percent), and saw
the of addition of “somewhat low application” from 11 hospitals (14.3 percent).
In addition, it is important to note that “don’t know” was selected by 16 hospitals
(20.8 percent) for the mean overall level, 14 hospitals (18.2 percent) for the planning
factor, 15 hospitals (19.5 percent) for the staffing factor, and 26 hospitals (33.8 percent)
for the funding and communications factor (See Table 3).
The results suggest the possibility that the self reported levels of preparedness
fall in the mid ranges of the preparedness scale. For example, for the overall
preparedness level, almost 59 percent felt that their hospitals ranked a four or a five out
of seven on the scale of preparedness. This suggests that while hospitals may be
better prepared than in the recent past, there is still room for improvement. Accordingly,
the need to achieve higher levels of preparedness is consistent with the findings
reported in a review of bioterrorism literature (Braun, et al., 2004; Greenberg, Jurgens,
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& Gracely, 2002; Higgins, et al., 2004; Keim, Pesik, and Twum-Danso, 2003; Treat, et
al., 2001; Wetter, Daniell, & Treser, 2001). Each of these studies reported a need to
further address the issue of preparedness in an effort to attain higher levels of
preparedness. The findings of this study concur with this notion as the need for
improvement is noted.
Of equal importance is the penchant of respondents to select “don’t know” for
many parts of the overall preparedness question. The results of this question also
suggest a disconnect in the presence of a written plan and communication of the details
of the plan to employees. Evans (2002) suggested that the presence of a separate,
detailed bioterrorism plan is crucial to preparedness. However, communication of the
components of the plan is of equal importance to be successful (Murphy, 2004).
Without communication, this could lead to chaos in the event of a bioterrorist attack, as
employees may not be aware of the policies set forth in the disaster plan, nor their roles
in enacting it (Bazzoli, et al., 2000; Braun, et al., 2004; Charns, 1997; Cueller & Gertler,
2003; Edwards & Fraser, 2001; Friedman & Marghella, 2004; GAO, 2003; Greenberg,
Jurgens, & Gracely, 2002; Helget & Smith, 2002; Higgins, et al., 2004; Keim, Pesik, and
Twum-Danso, 2003; Perrow, 1984; Provan & Milward, 2001; Treat, et al., 2001; Wetter,
Daniell, & Treser, 2001).
von Neumann’s (1944) game theory also supports this disconnect as the internal
characteristics of the hospital (i.e. presence of a written plan and communication of
such) are thought to predict the “moves” a hospital makes. These moves translate into
the hospital’s level of preparedness, and may explain why only average levels of
preparedness exist in Florida hospitals.
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Table 3
Independent Variable Frequencies
Variable Name
Level of Preparedness

Variable Category

Frequency

Percentage

Does Not Apply
Very Low Application
Low Application
Somewhat Low App.
Moderate Application
Somewhat High App.
High Application
Applies Perfectly
Don’t Know
Total

1
1
2
2
18
27
7
7
16
77

1.3
1.3
2.6
2.6
23.4
35.1
9.1
9.1
20.8
100.0

Does Not Apply
Very Low Application
Low Application
Somewhat Low App.
Moderate Application
Somewhat High Application
High Application
Applies Perfectly
Don’t Know
Total

2
2
1
5
20
17
15
1
14
77

2.6
2.6
1.3
6.5
26.0
22.1
19.5
1.3
18.2
100.0

Does Not Apply
Very Low Application
Low Application
Somewhat Low App.
Moderate Application
Somewhat High App.
High Application
Applies Perfectly
Don’t Know
Total

1
3
1
8
21
13
13
1
15
77

1.3
3.9
1.3
10.4
27.3
16.9
16.9
1.3
19.5
100.0

Does Not Apply
Very Low Application
Low Application
Somewhat Low App.
Moderate Application
Somewhat High Application
High Application
Applies Perfectly
Don’t Know
Total

5
3
5
11
9
13
2
3
26
77

6.5
3.9
6.5
14.3
11.7
16.9
2.6
3.9
33.8
100.0

Planning Factor

Staffing Factor

Funding and Communications
Factor
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Demographic Information for the Sample
A look at the demographics of the sample revealed a snapshot of the hospitals
surveyed in this study. System affiliation returned a majority (51.9 percent) that were
part of a horizontally integrated system and 19.5 percent that were part of a vertically
integrated system. Community hospitals comprised 63.6 percent of the hospitals
surveyed, followed by teaching hospitals (20.8 percent), and specialty hospitals (10.4
percent). A slight majority (50.6 percent) of hospitals surveyed represented not for profit
hospitals, followed closely by 37.7 percent of hospitals that enjoyed a for profit status.
50.6 percent of hospitals surveyed had over 701 full time employees, followed by 101300 employees and 501-700 employees comprising 13 percent each of the total
respectively (See Table 4).
Next, data was ascertained with regards to the presence of a written bioterrorism
plan. Close to 91 percent of respondents stated that their organization had a written
bioterrorism plan in place. Of those, the majority (50.6 percent) of those plans are
updated on a yearly basis and 35.1 percent did not know when, if ever, they were
updated. When asked how may years the plan covered, no clear majority was
ascertained. Instead, the highest category represented those that did not respond to
the question at all (33.8 percent). Similar responses were garnered when asked who
was responsible for the plan within the organization. 28.6 percent of respondents
chose “don’t know”, followed by a variation of other response categories (See Table 4).

Table 4
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Demographic Profile of Sample
Variable Name
System Type

Variable Category

Frequency

Percentage

Horizontal
Vertical
No Response

40
15
22

51.9
19.5
28.6

Teaching
Community
Specialty
Other
No Response

16
49
8
1
3

20.8
63.6
10.4
1.3
3.9

For profit
Not for Profit
Government/Tax Distributed
No Response

29
39
7
2

37.7
50.6
9.1
2.6

0-100
101-300
301-500
501-700
Over 701
No Response

5
10
9
10
39
4

6.5
13.0
11.7
13.0
50.6
5.2

Yes
No
No Response

70
5
2

90.9
6.5
2.6

Every Month
Every 6 Months
Yearly
Other
Don’t Know
No Response

2
5
39
3
27
1

2.6
6.5
50.6
3.9
35.1
1.3

1 Year
2 Years
3 Years
4 Years
No Response

20
16
14
1
26

26.0
20.8
18.2
1.3
33.8

CEO
1 Level Below CEO
2 Levels Below CEO
3 Levels Below CEO
Other
Don’t Know

4
13
16
6
16
22

5.2
16.9
20.8
7.8
20.8
28.6

Hospital Type

Ownership Type

# of Full Time Employees

Written Plan for Bioterrorism

When Plan Updated

# of Years Covered by Plan

Who Responsible for Plan
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Lastly, questions regarding training within the organization were asked. A
majority (72.7 percent) of hospitals stated that training activities took place in their
hospitals. Of those hospitals that train employees, 39.9 percent reported training
activities take place every 0-3 months. Personnel that are 2 levels below the CEO were
most often in charge of training activities within the hospital, yet 27.3 percent of
respondents did not know who was in charge. Finally, 66.2 percent of hospitals update
their bioterrorism plans based upon lessons learned from training exercises conducted
(See Table 5).
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Table 5
Demographics of Training Activities of Sample
Variable Name
Is training Conducted?

Variable Category

Frequency

Percentage

Yes
No
Don’t Know

56
12
9

72.7
15.6
11.7

0-3 Months
4-6 Months
7-9 Months
10-12 Months
Over 1 Year
Don’t Know
No Response

30
13
5
6
1
7
15

39.9
16.9
6.5
7.8
1.3
9.1
19.5

CEO
1 Level Below CEO
2 Levels Below CEO
3 Levels Below CEO
Other
Don’t Know
No Response

1
11
19
8
16
21
1

1.3
14.3
24.7
10.4
20.8
27.3
1.3

Yes
No
Don’t Know
No Response

51
3
22
1

66.2
3.9
28.6
1.3

How Often Does Training Take
Place?

Who is in Charge of Training?

Is Plan Updated Based on
Training?

Pearson R correlations were also run for the independent and dependent
variables. Of those run, bed size and location were correlated at the p<.01 level with
each other. In addition, the physical properties and social properties mean component
variables were dropped from the analysis because of a high correlation with the overall
level of preparedness variable (See Table 6).
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Table 6
Correlations for Independent and Dependent Variables
Location

Bed Size

System

Physical
Total

Social
Total

Overall

1

-.49 **

.05

.13

.01

.00

72

.00
72

.70
71

.26
72

.92
72

1.0
72

-.49**

1

.04

.10

.14

.13

.00
72

77

.73
76

.40
76

.22
77

.26
77

.05

.04

1

.09

-.09

-.16

.70
71

.73
76

76

.47
75

.47
76

.18
76

.13

.10

.09

1

.50**

.52**

.26
72

.40
76

.47
75

76

.00
77

.00
77

.01

.14

-.09

.50**

1

.80**

.92
72

.22
77

.46
76

.00
76

77

.00
77

.00

.13

-.16

1

1.0
72

.26
77

.17
76

77

Location
Pearson
Correlation
Sig. (2 tailed)
N
Bed Size
Pearson
Correlation
Sig. (2 tailed)
N
System
Pearson
Correlation
Sig. (2 tailed)
N
Physical
Total
Pearson
Correlation
Sig. (2 tailed)
N
Social
Total
Pearson
Correlation
Sig. (2 tailed)
N
Overall
Pearson
Correlation
Sig. (2 tailed)
N

** Correlation is significant at the .01 level (2-tailed)

From the data analyzed thus far, the following possibilities are noted regarding
future considerations for bioterrorism preparedness. Despite the presence of a written
plan for bioterrorism response in 91 percent of hospitals, deficiencies still exist in
preparedness. For example, 51 percent of hospitals update their bioterrorism plan
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yearly, yet 35 percent of respondents did not know when or if their plans were updated.
In addition, 29 percent did not know who was in charge of updating the aforementioned
plans. This lack of knowledge of the plans suggests that despite the presence of a plan,
many employees are unaware of the contents of the plan or their role in executing it.
Application of game theory to this notion suggests that these hospitals will enjoy lower
levels of preparedness as a result of this weakness (von Neumann, 1944).
In addition, training on the uniqueness of bioterrorism and subsequent execution
of a plan in the event of an attack is of importance (Alder, et al., 2004; Filoromo, et al.,
2003; Henning, et al., 2004; Klein, Atas, and Collins, 2004).

The findings suggest that

positive strides are being made in the use of training exercises in Florida hospitals. For
example, nearly 73 percent of hospitals employ training exercises as a means to
prepare for a bioterrorist attack. Additionally, 66 percent of those that train on a regular
basis use the results of the exercises to update the current bioterrorism plans based
upon lessons learned. This is a positive step as previous studies have shown that
organizations that train on a regular basis are able to pinpoint weaknesses and correct
them before an actual attack occurs (Alder, et al., 2004; Filoromo, et al., 2003; Henning,
et al., 2004; Klein, Atas, and Collins, 2004).
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Analysis of Level of Preparedness vs. Bed Size
Research Question: Does hospital size affect the preparedness level of a hospital
in the event of a bioterrorist attack?
Hypotheses:
Ha = Levels of preparedness for a bioterrorist attack will be directly related to the
bed size of hospital.
Ho = There is no relationship between disaster preparedness of a hospital and
the number of beds.
The first analysis looked for statistical significance between the bed size of a
hospital and the subsequent overall level of preparedness. A one-way analysis of
variance (ANOVA) was run first with the mean overall level of preparedness and then
three more times with each of the factors yielded from the factor analysis. The mean
overall level of preparedness returned a statistically significant difference (F3,73 = 3.71,
p<.05) between hospitals of varying bed sizes. These results are consistent with past
studies conducted on the effect of hospital size on overall levels of preparedness, as the
literature was in agreement that hospital size does affect levels of preparedness
(Greenberg, Jurgens, & Gracely, 2002; Gursky, 2004; Higgins, Wainright, Lu, and
Carrico, 2004; Keim, Pesik, and Twum-Danso, 2003; Treat, et al., 2001; Wetter, Daniell,
& Treser, 2001).
In addition, the overall levels of preparedness ranged form 4.6- 6.0 out of 7 for
all hospitals involved in the study when compared to bed size (See Table 7). However,
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the model only explained 13 percent of the variation in level of preparedness amongst
hospitals of differing bed sizes.
Table 7
Mean Levels of Preparedness as Run With By Bed Size
Variable Category Mean Standard Deviation N
100 or Less Beds
4.58
1.62
12
101-300 Beds
5.77
1.61
26
301-500 Beds
4.57
1.69
21
Over 501 Beds
6.00
1.85
18
Total
5.31
1.78
77
* Means range on a scale of 0-7 with 0= Does not apply and 7 = Applies perfectly

The analysis for level of preparedness using the planning factor did not return a
statistically significant difference (F 3,59 = 1.49, p>.05) between hospitals of varying bed
sizes. In addition, this model explained 4 percent of the variation in level of
preparedness based on bed size of the hospital. The staffing factor analysis produced
similar results and did not return a statistically significant difference

(F 3,58 = 1.14,

p>.05) between hospitals and their respective bed sizes. Moreover, this model only
explained six percent of the variation in level of preparedness based upon bed size.
The last analysis using the funding and communications factor also did not produce a
statistically significant difference (F 3,47 = 1.64, p>.05) in level of preparedness between
hospitals of varying bed sizes. In keeping with the previous factor models, this model
explained three percent of the variation in level of preparedness for hospitals based
upon their respective bed size.
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Analysis of Level of Preparedness vs. Location
Research Question: Does hospital location affect the preparedness level of a
hospital in the event of a bioterrorist attack?
Hypotheses:
Ha = There is a difference in level of preparedness of a hospital between those in
urban and rural locations in the event of a bioterrorist attack.
Ho = There is no difference in level of preparedness of a hospital between those
in urban and rural locations in the event of a bioterrorist attack.
The next analysis was run to test for a difference in location of the hospital with
respect to their overall level of preparedness for a bioterrorist attack. Results of the
effect of bed size on overall preparedness levels suggested that size of the hospital did
in fact affect a hospital’s level of preparedness for a bioterrorist attack. These findings
were consistent with previous literature that suggested size of the hospital as a
significant predictor of levels of preparedness (Greenberg, Jurgens, & Gracely, 2002;
Gursky, 2004; Higgins, Wainright, Lu, and Carrico, 2004; Keim, Pesik, and TwumDanso, 2003; Treat, et al., 2001; Wetter, Daniell, & Treser, 2001). Additionally, if
location of Florida hospitals does in fact predict levels of preparedness, findings from
the aforementioned past studies would be confirmed for the location variable as well as
size.
A t-test was run first using the mean for the overall level of preparedness, as well
as three additional times with each of the factors drawn from the factor analysis of the
level of preparedness question. The mean overall level of preparedness produced no
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statistically significant difference (t = -.01, df=70, p > .05) in level of preparedness
between those hospitals that are located in an urban area versus those located in a
rural area. In addition, those hospitals located in an urban area (mean = 5.31,
s.d.=1.74) and hospitals located in a rural area (mean=5.31, s.d=2.14) both returned
similar mean levels of preparedness. However, since the null was accepted, these
means do not contribute significantly to the model.
The analysis for location versus level of preparedness from the factor analysis
variables for level of preparedness returned similar results. The planning factor for level
of preparedness of an organization produced no statistically significant difference
(t=1.90, df=57, p>.05) in hospitals in urban and rural areas. Additionally, urban
hospitals (mean=4.54, s.d=1.32) had a higher level of preparedness than that of their
rural counterparts (mean=3.57, s.d=1.82). However, since the t-test did not produce a
significant result, the null hypothesis has been accepted.
The staffing factor was then run, and again yielded no statistically significant
difference (t=1.13, df=56, p>.05) in level of preparedness between hospitals in urban
and rural locations. In keeping with the previous results, again the urban hospitals
(mean=4.31, s.d=1.37) had a higher level of preparedness than their rural counterparts
(mean=3.70, s.d=1.95). However, as done previously, these results were not
considered to be significant, thus again accepting the null.
The funding and communications factor was run in the same manner as the
previous factors and returned a similar result. There was no statistically significant
difference (t=1.05, df=45, p>.05) between overall level of preparedness and hospitals in
urban and rural locations. Moreover, the hospitals in urban locations (mean=3.29,
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s.d=1.83) reported higher overall levels of preparedness than their rural counterparts
(mean=2.56, s.d.=1.61). As before however, these results were also discarded and the
researcher accepted the null.
Analysis of Level of Preparedness vs. System Affiliation
Research Question: Does hospital system membership (system vs. nonsystem) affect the preparedness level of a hospital in the event of a
bioterrorist attack?
Hypotheses:
Ha = There is a difference in level of preparedness of a hospital between those
that are system affiliated and those that are non-system affiliated in the event of
a bioterrorist attack.
Ho = There is no difference in level of preparedness of a hospital between those
that are system affiliated and those that are non-system affiliated in the event of
a bioterrorist attack.
The last analysis looked for a difference in overall level of preparedness between
those hospitals that were part of a system and those that were not system affiliated.
Previous literature supported the use of size and location of the hospital in predicting
levels of preparedness for a bioterrorist attack (Greenberg, Jurgens, & Gracely, 2002;
Gursky, 2004; Higgins, Wainright, Lu, and Carrico, 2004; Keim, Pesik, and TwumDanso, 2003; Treat, et al., 2001; Wetter, Daniell, & Treser, 2001).
Although a paucity of literature exists to support the use of system affiliation as a
significant predictor, application of theory to this variable may help to explain the
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existence of such a relationship. For example, extrapolations from Meyer, Brooks, and
Goes’s (1990) environmental jolt theory suggested that a system affiliated hospital
would be better prepared than their non-system affiliated counterparts. Application of
this theory would suggest that those Florida hospitals that are part of a system would be
better prepared as a result of the benefits of system membership (Bazzoli, Chan,
Shortell, & D’Aunno, 2000; Charns, 1997; Cueller & Gertler, 2003; Edwards & Fraser,
2001; Perrow, 1984; Provan & Milward, 2001; Friedman & Marghella, 2004). These
benefits could include: economies of scale, increased access to capital for expansion,
acquisition of technology, and renovations (Charns, 1997). Cueller and Gertler (2003)
concur with this idea, and assert a system’s increased ability to adapt to changes in the
environment as yet another potential advantage of systems.
The first run used the mean variable for overall preparedness and found no
statistically significant difference (t=1.36, df=74, p>.05) in the level of preparedness
whether or not a hospital was part of a system. Those that were affiliated with a system
(mean=5.46, s.d.=1.59) did however return a higher mean level of preparedness than
their non-system affiliated counterparts (mean=4.88, s.d.=2.07).
The next run included the variables of system affiliation and the planning factor
from the factor analysis. Unlike previous runs however, the level of preparedness
(t=2.30, df=60, P<. 05) demonstrated a statistically significant difference in hospitals
based upon affiliation with a system. Moreover, those hospitals that belonged to a
system (mean= 4.62, s.d.=1.28) reported higher levels of preparedness than those
hospitals that did not belong to a system (mean=3.77, s.d.=1.47).
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The next analysis was performed using the staffing factor against system
affiliation, and returned results that were consistent with the majority of the previous
runs. There was no statistically significant difference (t= 1.01, df=60,p>.05) in level of
preparedness and a hospital’s affiliation with a system. Yet again, system membership
(mean=4.40, s.d.=1.28) appeared to produce higher levels of preparedness than those
not affiliated with a system (mean=4.00, s.d.= 1.82), but were disregarded due to the
lack of statistical significance.
The last t-test was run by using system affiliation and the funding and
communications factor to ascertain significance in level of preparedness. Much like the
planning factor analysis, there was a statistically significant difference (t=2.62, df=49,
p<. 05) in level of preparedness and affiliation with a system. In addition, those that
were affiliated with a system (mean=3.74, s.d.= 2.42) reported higher levels of
preparedness than those hospitals not affiliated with a system (mean=2.42, s.d.=1.82).
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Discussion of Results
This study specifically looked at what impact location, bed size, and system
affiliation of a hospital had on the overall level of preparedness for bioterrorist attacks.
Previous research and theoretical applications (Bazzoli, et al., 2000; Braun, et al., 2004;
Charns, 1997; Cueller & Gertler, 2003; Edwards & Fraser, 2001; Friedman & Marghella,
2004; Greenberg, Jurgens, & Gracely, 2002; Helget & Smith, 2002; Higgins, et al.,
2004; Keim, Pesik, and Twum-Danso, 2003; Perrow, 1984; Provan & Milward, 2001;
Treat, et al., 2001; Wetter, Daniell, & Treser, 2001) suggested that a larger, system
affiliated hospital located in an urban area was more likely to enjoy higher levels of
preparedness than that of their smaller, non-system affiliated rural counterparts.
Although no statistically significant difference was found in this study for hospitals with
regards to their system affiliation or location, bed size was found to be a significant
predictor of preparedness in a hospitals ability to deal with a bioterrorist attack (F3,73 =
3.71, p<.05).
Although bed size was suggested as a predictor in preparedness levels, it is not
meant to be an exhaustive predictor of hospital preparedness. Instead, these results
should be looked upon as a snapshot of the healthcare industry in Florida today and
used as a benchmark to help further prepare our healthcare system for the possibility of
a bioterrorist attack. In addition, the absences of a statistically significant relationship for
location and system affiliation subsequently have important ramifications for the
healthcare industry despite its acceptance of the null hypotheses.
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Previous literature supported the use of size and location to as a means to
predict the level of preparedness for a hospital for a bioterrorist attack (Greenberg,
Jurgens, & Gracely, 2002; Gursky, 2004; Higgins, Wainright, Lu, and Carrico, 2004;
Keim, Pesik, and Twum-Danso, 2003; Treat, et al., 2001; Wetter, Daniell, & Treser,
2001). While size of the hospital confirmed the findings of previous literature, the use of
location as a predictor was disproved for the sample used. In addition, despite the
dearth of literature examining the role of system affiliation as a predictor of
preparedness, application of theory was used to formulate hypotheses regarding
system affiliation.
Meyer, Brooks, and Goes’s (1990) environmental jolt theory was offered as the
best way to predict the significance of system affiliation in levels of preparedness.
Application of this theory suggested that the benefits of system membership would lead
to higher levels of preparedness (Bazzoli, Chan, Shortell, & D’Aunno, 2000; Charns,
1997; Cueller & Gertler, 2003; Edwards & Fraser, 2001; Perrow, 1984; Provan &
Milward, 2001; Friedman & Marghella, 2004). Although application of this theory did not
yield a statistically significant relationship, further research exploring this potential
relationship is suggested.
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Analysis of Level of Preparedness vs. Bed Size
Research Question: Does hospital size affect the preparedness level of a hospital
in the event of a bioterrorist attack?
Hypotheses:
Ha = Levels of preparedness for a bioterrorist attack will be directly related to the
bed size of hospital.
Ho = There is no relationship between disaster preparedness of a hospital and
the number of beds.
When using the mean level of preparedness, the data supports the use of bed
size as a statistically significant predictor of preparedness in a hospital, thus rejecting
the null hypothesis. This confirms the findings of previous literature that suggested bed
size as a significant predictor of level of preparedness (Greenberg, Jurgens, & Gracely,
2002; Gursky, 2004; Higgins, Wainright, Lu, and Carrico, 2004; Keim, Pesik, and TwumDanso, 2003; Treat, et al., 2001; Wetter, Daniell, & Treser, 2001). In addition, the
application of game theory to bed size also confirms the variable as a significant
predictor of preparedness (von Neumann, 1944).

Using game theory, the size of the

hospital will create distinct levels of preparedness based upon their respective size
since it will affect the strategic “moves” it makes in the “game.” In essence, the internal
characteristic of size impacts preparedness in that size may affect the amount of
resources available, the number of staff, or surge capacity to handle a bioterrorist
attack.
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Consequently, when combining application of previous studies and theoretical
underpinnings, this study suggests that bed size has an effect on the mean level of
preparedness of a hospital in the event of a bioterrorist attack. Nonetheless, it is
important to note that because of the use of bed size as a fixed factor, the results
cannot be generalized back to the general population.
Analysis of Level of Preparedness vs. Location
Research Question: Does hospital location affect the preparedness level of a
hospital in the event of a bioterrorist attack?
Hypotheses:
Ha = There is a difference in level of preparedness of a hospital between those in
urban and rural locations in the event of a bioterrorist attack.
Ho = There is no difference in level of preparedness of a hospital between those
in urban and rural locations in the event of a bioterrorist attack.
Again, when using the mean level of preparedness, the data suggests that
there is no difference in level of preparedness of a hospital between those in urban and
rural locations in the event of a bioterrorist attack, thus the null hypothesis is accepted.
Although previous studies have supported the difference in preparedness levels based
on location (Braun, et al., 2004; Greenberg, Jurgens, & Gracely, 2002; Higgins, et al.,
2004; Keim, Pesik, and Twum-Danso, 2003; Treat, et al., 2001; Wetter, Daniell, &
Treser, 2001), it was not a strong enough predictor in the Florida hospitals surveyed to
warrant suggesting it as a statistically significant predictor.
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Similarly, application of theory in an attempt to predict the effect of location on
preparedness also was disproved. For example, application of game theory suggested
that an urban hospital would enjoy higher levels of preparedness than their rural
counterparts due to availability of funding and resources available (Meyer, Brooks, and
Goes, 1990). These resources may be increased availability and supply of equipment,
pharmaceuticals, staff, and a myriad of mutual aid agreements amongst other
community entities that enable urban hospitals to be better prepared. In addition, the
perceived risk of an attack was likely to be higher in an urban area, thus the routing of
funds to such areas would be more likely. However, based upon study findings,
location has no effect on preparedness levels of hospitals in Florida.
Analysis of Level of Preparedness vs. System Affiliation
Research Question: Does hospital system membership (system vs.
non-system) affect the preparedness level of a hospital in the event of a
bioterrorist attack?
Hypotheses:
Ha = There is a difference in level of preparedness of a hospital between those
that are system affiliated and those that are non-system affiliated in the event of
a bioterrorist attack.
Ho = There is no difference in level of preparedness of a hospital between those
that are system affiliated and those that are non-system affiliated in the event of
a bioterrorist attack.
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Thus far, application of theory and previous literature confirmed the notion
that size of the hospital effects level of preparedness and disproved the notion that
location has an impact on preparedness. The last research question delves into the
previously unexplored area of impact of system affiliation. As such, the mean level of
preparedness was used to ascertain the effect of system affiliation on preparedness of a
hospital. No difference in level of preparedness of a hospital between those that are
system affiliated and those that are non-system affiliated in the event of a bioterrorist
attack was found, thus the null hypothesis was accepted.
Despite the extrapolations made from theory and previous literature, (Bazzoli, et
al., 2000; Braun, et al., 2004; Charns, 1997; Cueller & Gertler, 2003; Edwards & Fraser,
2001; Friedman & Marghella, 2004; Greenberg, Jurgens, & Gracely, 2002; Helget &
Smith, 2002; Higgins, et al., 2004; Keim, Pesik, and Twum-Danso, 2003; Perrow, 1984;
Provan & Milward, 2001; Treat, et al., 2001; Wetter, Daniell, & Treser, 2001), system
affiliation failed to be a statistically significant predictor of level of preparedness for a
hospital. Meyer, Brooks, and Goes’s (1990) environmental jolt theory was used to posit
that hospitals that were members of a system would enjoy higher levels of
preparedness than their non-system affiliated counterparts. This was due in part to the
perceived benefits of economies of scale, increased access to capital for expansion,
acquisition of technology, and renovations (Charns, 1997). However, despite the
presence of these perceived benefits, no effect of system affiliation was determined.
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Further Considerations
Regardless of the significance, or lack of, found in this study, other startling data
was garnered from the surveys collected which was in keeping with information
obtained from previously conducted surveys from both pre and post September 11,
2001. The TFAH’s study released in late December of 2004 confirms the idea that
although preparedness activities are taking place more often than before September 11,
2001, there is nonetheless room for a great deal of improvement (Hearne, Segal, Earls,
& Unruh, 2004). Studies such as the TFAH’s, as well as others, pointed to a lack of
preparedness within the healthcare industry. They also showed a need for more
activities involving widespread planning and preparedness in order to be ready for the
inevitable attack (Braun, et al., 2004; Greenberg, Jurgens, & Gracely, 2002; Higgins, et
al., 2004; Keim, Pesik, and Twum-Danso, 2003; Treat, et al., 2001; Wetter, Daniell, &
Treser, 2001). This study confirmed these same notions, which indicated a lack of
preparedness across the board, despite the strides made in preparedness activities
post September 11, 2001.
Perhaps one of the most startling illustrations of this lack of preparedness came
in the form of the number of survey responses marked “don’t know.” For example, in
question sixteen of the survey, which measured the overall level of preparedness,
between fourteen (18.2 percent) and twenty six (33.8 percent) of those hospitals
surveyed, marked “don’t know” as their chosen response for at least part of the
question. The implication drawn from the number of hospitals surveyed that answered
“don’t know” for many of the questions demonstrates a disconnect between many
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individuals within the hospitals and the policies and procedures, if any, that are in place
to deal with such an event. A review of the previous literature (Braun, et al., 2004;
Greenberg, Jurgens, & Gracely, 2002; Higgins, et al., 2004; Keim, Pesik, and TwumDanso, 2003; Treat, et al., 2001; Wetter, Daniell, & Treser, 2001), both pre and post
September 11, 2001 further illustrates this disconnect, and points to a need for further
planning and policies to be put forth so that America’s hospitals can deal with the
inevitable bioterrorist attack.
In keeping with these results, some clear policy implications can be drawn. For
example, the need for monetary assistance that is distributed in an equitable manner to
those hospitals in Florida that are in need of such assistance is critical. Previous
distributions often favored the larger urban hospitals and left the smaller rural hospitals
to fend for themselves (Gursky, 2004). These monetary contributions will allow these
hospitals to engage in training exercises that simulate an attack, procure the necessary
equipment needed, and develop separate plans designed specifically for a bioterrorist
attack. Although monetary gains have been made for hospitals in the war on
bioterrorism, the funding that has come through for the hospitals as of late is not
enough, and often does not trickle down to all of the hospitals that are in need of
monetary assistance (Krizner, 2002; AP, 2004). Without such assistance, the already
financially burdened healthcare industry will not be able to effectively plan for
bioterrorism, as other more critical and pertinent needs will have to be addressed first.
In short, the monetary assistance will allow them to deal with bioterrorism in a more
proactive manner, rather than a reactive manner after the attack occurs.
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Traditionally, acts of terrorism have been dealt with by the more conventional
emergency response entities of law enforcement and fire rescue services (Henderson,
2001). A bioterrorist attack caused this paradigm to shift, and placed the nation’s
hospitals on the first line of defense to deal with bioterrorism (American Hospital
Association, 2002). This paradigm shift is why it is crucial for the healthcare industry to
plan and prepare as best they can for the inevitable bioterrorist attack. Although no one
can be sure how, when, or where a bioterrorist attack will occur, higher levels of
planning should translate into a more efficiently implemented disaster plan and a
reduction in potential loss of life.
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Chapter Summary
This chapter served to report the data garnered from the survey and the
corresponding statistical analysis of the data as it relates to the research questions and
hypotheses. Previous studies conducted in other parts of the United States, as well as
theory, suggest the idea that a larger, urban, system affiliated hospital will be better
prepared than their smaller, rural, non-system affiliated counterparts. Consequently, the
findings of this study concurred with past studies only on the effect of bed size on
preparedness.
Although a statistically significant relationship for levels of preparedness was only
found in bed size, the implications are still important. For example, although location
and system affiliation did not prove to be significant predictors of level of preparedness,
other information was ascertained from the results. For example, although there are
more hospitals with written plans in place, and more hospitals that are conducting
training activities, a disconnect between plans and communications of these plans still
exists. Even with these improvements in overall preparedness level, almost 59 percent
felt that their hospitals ranked a four or a five out of seven on the scale of preparedness.
This suggests that while hospitals may be better prepared than in the recent past, there
is still room for improvement.
In addition, as previous literature suggests, although planning has improved,
there are still many deficiencies to correct. Implications of this need to plan further, the
disconnect illustrated within Florida hospitals, and suggestions for improving
preparedness efforts will be discussed further in the next chapter.
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CHAPTER 6: CONCLUSIONS
This chapter has compiled results garnered from this study, along with
recommendations from previously conducted research, to provide a framework of
hospital bioterrorism procedures which would allow them to effectively prepare for a
potential attack. Clear planning and policy implications were drawn in order to assist
hospitals in preparing for an attack. In addition, this chapter addressed the
contributions to the literature on bioterrorism, strengths and weaknesses of the study,
and concludes with recommendations for future research.
Contributions to the Literature
This study contributes to the growing body of literature on bioterrorism
preparedness. It specifically contributes a study conducted entirely post September 11,
2001 in early 2004. Most studies conducted immediately following the 2001 terrorist
attacks cited increased preparedness may have been due to increased awareness
following the tragedy (Alder, et al., 2004; Braun, et al., 2004; GAO, 2003; Gursky,
2004;Henning, et al., 2004; Higgins, et al., 2004; Klein, Atas, and Collins, 2004). Even
though many hospitals still believe a bioterrorist attack is unlikely, caution must be
exercised as bioterrorism can affect any area at any time (Bartlett, 2001; Karwa, Curie,
and Kvetan, 2005; Tieman, 2002). To assume that bioterrorism cannot and will not
affect the world, as we know it is imprudent; as such a lackadaisical attitude can spell
tragedy for an unprepared hospital.
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Although there have been an increased number of studies surrounding
bioterrorism preparedness, most have centered on the effects of location, size, and
types of training conducted (Alder, et al., 2004; Filoromo, et al., 2003; Greenberg,
Jurgens, & Gracely, 2002; Helget & Smith, 2002; Henning, et al., 2004; Klein, Atas, and
Collins, 2004; Treat, et al., 2001; Wetter, Daniell, & Treser, 2001). Conversely, none
have looked at the effect of system affiliation on levels of preparedness. This study
examined the role of location, size, and system affiliation on levels of preparedness,
thus contributing to both the body of literature already published, as well a new
contribution for system affiliation.
Previous studies, which examined the role of size and location, suggested that
larger urban hospitals were more prepared for a bioterrorist attack than their smaller
rural counterparts (Greenberg, Jurgens, & Gracely, 2002; Gursky, 2004; Higgins,
Wainright, Lu, and Carrico, 2004; Keim, Pesik, and Twum-Danso, 2003; Treat, et al.,
2001; Wetter, Daniell, & Treser, 2001). For example, Higgins, et al., (2004) examined
levels of preparedness in Kentucky hospitals. They found that hospitals located within
the Metropolitan Medical Response System (MMRS) tended to have more advanced
levels of preparedness than their non-MMRS counterparts (Higgins, et al., 2004). In
addition, Gursky’s 2004 study of hospitals pointed to overall unprepared hospitals, and
cited stronger deficiencies in preparedness in smaller rural hospitals. The lone
dissenting opinion in the literature belonged to Klein, Atas, and Collins (2004). They
found that in a mock drill, smaller hospitals diagnosed the infected patents in a more
timely fashion and initiated bioterrorism plans with greater ease and interest than their
larger counterparts (Klein, Atas, and Collins, 2004).
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Consistent with previous literature, this study supports the idea that larger
hospitals are more prepared than their smaller counterparts. However, it does not
support the use of location or system affiliation as a predictor of preparedness levels.
Despite the lack of statistical significance for location and system affiliation, the findings
still suggest an overall need to improve levels of preparedness, which was a common
thread throughout all of the previously reviewed literature.
This study also made theoretical contributions to a subject not traditionally
thought of in terms of theoretical implications. Unlike most areas of healthcare, a
paucity of theory devoted to bioterrorism exists. As such, an application of theory from
other fields was used in to attempt to explain why some hospitals are more prepared
than others. Extrapolations were made from game theory (von Neumann, 1944) and
environmental jolt theory (Meyer, Brooks, and Goes, 1990) in an effort to identify those
characteristics of a hospital that most significantly contributed to their overall level of
preparedness.
Consequently, the findings of this study support the use of game theory as a
predictor of the characteristics necessary to predict levels of preparedness in hospitals.
Using this theory, it was posited that larger, urban, system affiliated hospitals would be
better prepared than their counterparts due to the opportunities, equipment, and staff
available for use in a disaster situation. It was further posited that hospitals located in
larger urban areas were more likely to be a target, thus should be better prepared as a
result of this increased risk for a bioterrorist event. Although the findings of this study
only supported the use of bed size as a predictor of level of preparedness, game theory
is nonetheless offered as a plausible theory to apply to bioterrorism planning. In fact, of
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the two theories explored, game theory is offered as the best option for explanation of
hospital bioterrorism preparedness levels.
Additionally, environmental jolt theory was found to be a less effective predictor
of levels of bioterrorism preparedness. This theory was originally posited as a basis for
predicting system affiliated hospitals would be better prepared than their non-system
affiliated counterparts. Previous research concluded that the advantages of a
healthcare system are conducive to handle an environmental jolt, such as a bioterrorist
attack, better than their free standing counterparts (Bazzoli, Chan, Shortell, & D’Aunno,
2000; Charns, 1997; Cueller & Gertler, 2003; Edwards & Fraser, 2001; Perrow, 1984;
Provan & Milward, 2001; Friedman & Marghella, 2004). In fact, application of Cueller
and Gertler’s (2003) research suggested that systems would be better prepared due to
the increased ability to adapt to changes in the environment. Charns (1997) concluded
with this idea and further asserted the advantages of systems to include: economies of
scale, increased access to capital for expansion, acquisition of technology, and
renovations. Despite these theoretical underpinnings, system affiliation was not found
to be a significant contributor to preparedness levels. This downplayed the use of
environmental jolt theory in an effort to explain the effect of system affiliation on
preparedness levels.
In addition, one of the most startling issues uncovered in hospitals surveyed was
the respondent’s lack of knowledge concerning bioterrorism protocols and procedures.
Despite the fact that 91 percent of hospitals surveyed had bioterrorism plans in place,
knowledge of such plans was sporadic. This is best illustrated by the question
measuring overall preparedness components. In this question, between 18.2 percent
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and 33.8 percent of those hospitals surveyed, marked “don’t know” as their chosen
response for at least part of the question. This points to disconnect between planned
policies and procedures, and relay of such information to all hospital staff. This
ignorance of bioterrorism plans stems from a lapse in communication between
departments and could lead to chaos in the event of an attack. The literature supports
this finding that despite improvements in planning, deficiencies such as this lack of
communication still exist (Bazzoli, et al., 2000; Braun, et al., 2004; Charns, 1997;
Cueller & Gertler, 2003; Edwards & Fraser, 2001; Friedman & Marghella, 2004; GAO,
2003; Greenberg, Jurgens, & Gracely, 2002; Helget & Smith, 2002; Higgins, et al.,
2004; Keim, Pesik, and Twum-Danso, 2003; Perrow, 1984; Provan & Milward, 2001;
Treat, et al., 2001; Wetter, Daniell, & Treser, 2001).
As such, training is suggested to uncover such deficiencies and assist in
correcting them before an attack occurs. Previous literature suggests that at least
some form of training is beneficial in preparing for a bioterrorist attack (Alder, et al.,
2004; Filoromo, et al., 2003; Henning, et al., 2004; Klein, Atas, and Collins, 2004).
While there is some disagreement on what types of training are paramount, all agree
that said training needs to happen regularly and must be individually tailored to the
hospital’s needs.
Of the hospitals surveyed in this study, 72.7 percent reported training activities
took place in their hospitals. Nearly 40 percent of hospitals reported training occurs
every 0-3 months, followed by 17 percent, which train every 4-6 months. In addition,
66.2 percent of hospitals updated their bioterrorism plans based upon lessons learned
from training exercises. Although 29 percent of those surveyed indicated they had no
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knowledge if plans were updated as a result of training, the outcomes suggest
improvements have recently been made. This also suggests a positive trend in Florida
hospitals, as the respondents seem to understand the importance of training.

As such,

findings concur with the literature that training is an important part of planning for a
bioterrorist attack, and are being carried out in Florida hospitals (Alder, et al., 2004;
Filoromo, et al., 2003; Henning, et al., 2004; Klein, Atas, and Collins, 2004).
Policy Implications/Recommendations for Preparing
A review of previous literature (Bazzoli, et al., 2000; Braun, et al., 2004; Charns,
1997; Cueller & Gertler, 2003; Edwards & Fraser, 2001; Friedman & Marghella, 2004;
GAO, 2003; Greenberg, Jurgens, & Gracely, 2002; Helget & Smith, 2002; Higgins, et
al., 2004; Keim, Pesik, and Twum-Danso, 2003; Perrow, 1984; Provan & Milward, 2001;
Treat, et al., 2001; Wetter, Daniell, & Treser, 2001) demonstrates despite a heightened
awareness following the terrorist attacks of 2001, much work is still needed for
America’s hospital’s to be truly prepared. In fact, when examining the overall
preparedness level, almost 59 percent felt that their hospitals ranked a four or a five out
of seven on the scale of preparedness. This suggests that while hospitals may be
better prepared than in the recent past, there is still room for improvement.

This

concurs with suggestions from previous studies to further address the issue of
preparedness in an effort to attain higher levels.
However, despite the mid to high self-reported levels of preparedness in the
respondent’s hospitals, a discrepancy exists when the results reported a high
percentage of respondent’s who chose “don’t know” for many of the survey questions.
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This discrepancy could exist as a result of the variety of respondents that took part in
the survey rather than a uniform response from individuals who perform the same duties
each hospital (i.e. all medical directors). Therefore, it is posited that this discrepancy
may be a result of the survey reaching unintended recipients who did not have full
knowledge of bioterrorism planning in the hospital. This lack of knowledge could
include the aforementioned stricter JCAHO regulations for bioterrorism planning.
However, despite this, a lack of communication of the plan to employees of all levels is
still troubling. As such, it is suggested that the breakdown in communication be
addressed in the form of education and training regardless of the role the individual
plays in the hospital.
In fact, immediately following the 2001 attacks, bioterrorism planning was
deemed a priority. This prioritization, as of late, has decreased in urgency and intensity
for hospitals (Murphy, 2004). This decrease in priority level has resulted in a sense of
complacency due to the perceived belief that an attack is unlikely (Bartlett, 2001; Karwa,
Curie, and Kvetan, 2005; Tieman, 2002).
As such, several focus areas are suggested as a means to effectively prepare for
a bioterrorist attack. They include: promotion of community involvement and
communication, education and training of staff, improvements in informational
technology, and acquisition of equipment specific to the demands of a bioterrorist attack
(Murphy, 2004). These focus areas build upon the sample planning guidelines
discussed previously and address more specific aspects of planning and preparedness.
The previous areas of focus included the overarching categories of: preparedness and
prevention, detection and surveillance, diagnosis and characterization of biological and
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chemical agents, response, and communication (AHA, 2000; CDC, 2000; Johns
Hopkins, 2001).
In addition, von Neumann’s (1944) game theory and Meyer, Brooks, and Goes’s
(1990) environmental jolt theory point to a need to explore such focus areas as a means
of preparation. Application of game theory to planning for a bioterrorist attack
transforms the notion of planning for an attack into a “game”. In addition, the strategic
“moves” that hospitals make could be anything from the focus areas and are often
predicated by the internal and external characteristics of the hospital (AHA, 2000; CDC,
2000; Johns Hopkins, 2001; Murphy, 2004). These characteristics can include
everything from size and location of the hospital to the linkages or affiliations it has with
other community organizations. In this particular study, it is clear that the only
characteristic affecting the hospital’s “moves” is bed size. Although system affiliation
and location are still certainly important, their lack of statistical significance downplays
their worth in this study.
Meyer, Brooks, and Goes’s (1990) environmental jolt theory also points to the
importance of planning for an attack. The application of an environmental jolt theory to
the healthcare industry, and more specifically to a bioterrorist attack, categorizes such
an attack as an environmental jolt. This “jolt’s” impact, although never fully planned for,
can be moderated based upon the corresponding healthcare organization’s
preparedness levels. This includes their level of commitment to the focus areas
suggested as helpful planning tools.
In this case, the jolt to the healthcare industry is represented by a bioterrorist
attack. How well prepared the hospital is helps to determine how well the event is
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handled and allows for minimization of chaos. In addition, the commitment to training
displayed by survey participants shows a commitment to preparation, thus helping to
lessen a potential jolt’s impact. Although application of environmental jolt theory
suggested that a hospital that is part of a system will be better prepared, results of this
study disprove this notion. Instead, as the results suggest, system affiliation has no
impact on how well prepared a hospital is.
At the foundation of preparing for bioterrorism, it is critical that a separate,
detailed bioterrorism plan be added to the organization as a stand-alone policy (Evans,
2002). Simply utilizing current disaster plans, which do not specifically address
bioterrorism, is an unacceptable means of preparation. The difficulty in this task lies in
the unpredictable nature of bioterrorism and the high costs of implementing and
maintaining a separate bioterrorism plan (Murphy, 2004). Compounding the situation is
the fact the medical community was previously able to follow scripts formulated through
prior experiences; however, the lack of experience for a bioterrorist attack renders this
method useless (Bullard, Strack, & Scharoun, 2002).
Moreover, accreditation by the Joint Commission on Accreditation of Healthcare
Organizations (JCAHO) requires a disaster plan on file before the hospital’s Joint
Commission survey, yet many plans are thrown together last minute (“Terrorist attacks,”
2001). Prior to September 11, 2001, JCAHO had emergency plans in place for all of its
hospitals (Aldridge & Launt, 2004). However, in 2001, they amended their standards to
include an “all hazards” approach to disaster preparedness, which allowed chemical
and biological forms of terrorism to be considered disasters (Aldridge & Launt, 2004).
Effective January 1, 2002, JCAHO implemented two standards to prepare for a disaster.
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They included the presence of an emergency plan and the regular conduction of drills to
test the emergency plan (JCAHO, 2002). These standards are still in place as of the
2004 update, but have continued to evolve as more is learned about bioterrorism
preparedness.
The presence of an emergency management plan was established as
standard EC.1.4. This standard ensures that the plan addresses the four phases of
emergency management: mitigation, preparedness, response, and recovery.
In addition, the plan must provide for the orientation and education of plan
components to all staff involved in the emergency management process. Components
of the training should include: delineation of each person’s role in the plan, how to
recognize the different typed of emergencies, the skills necessary to perform their
respective duties, the backup communication system to be utilized in case of
emergency, and the supplies and equipment necessary for all emergency types. The
standard also provides for an annual review of the organization's hazard vulnerability
analysis and of the plan itself (JCAHO, 2002).
Standard EC.2.9.1 provided for the implementation of drills in an effort to test the
emergency management plan in place. This standard established guidelines that called
for the bi-annual occurrence of drills no less than four months and no more than eight
months apart. In addition JCAHO requires that the testing include the following:
a. “For organizations that offer emergency services or are designated as disaster
receiving stations, at least one drill yearly that includes an influx of volunteer or
simulated individuals.
b. Participation in at least one community-wide practice drill yearly (where
applicable) relevant to the priority emergencies identified by the organization's
hazard vulnerability analysis, that assesses communication, coordination, and
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the effectiveness of the organization's and community's command structures”
(JCAHO, 2002, p# unavailable).
It is important to note that a tabletop exercise performed in the organization does not
qualify as an emergency management drill.
The aforementioned standards, although still in place for the 2004 update, have
been revised and expounded on to create a broader more detailed response to
bioterrorism. The following are the current standards for 2004 that apply to bioterrorism
preparedness:














“EC.1: The hospital plans for a safe, accessible, effective, and efficient
environment consistent with its mission, services, law, and regulations
EC.1.10: The hospital manages safety risks (includes planning for worker and
hospital environmental safety)
EC2.10: The hospital identifies and manages its security risks.
EC.3.10: The hospital identifies and manages its hazardous materials and waste
risks.
EC.4.10: The hospital addresses emergency management.
EC.6.10: The hospital manages medical equipment risks.
HR.2.20: staff members, licensed independent practitioners, students, and
volunteers, as appropriate, can describe or demonstrate their roles and
responsibilities, based on specific job duties or responsibilities, relative to safety.
EC.2.9: The hospital conducts emergency drills regularly.
EC.4.20: The hospital conducts regularly to test emergency management.
EC.8.10: The hospital establishes and maintains an appropriate environment.
EC.9.10: The hospital monitors conditions in the environment.
EC.9.20: The hospital analyzes identified environment issues and develops
recommendations for resolving them” (JCAHO, 2004, CX 26-28.)
Although these standards are in place by JCAHO, there is increasing concern

these plans could not be implemented effectively in the case of a real disaster (Henning,
et al., 2004; “Terrorist attacks,” 2001). In addition, the high percentage of survey
respondents who did not appear to be aware of these standards, suggests that the
presence of an emergency plan and communication of its components is not being done
on a large scale. While many of the staff may know of the plan and its components, all
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staff may not be privy to this information, thus illustrating the disconnect. As such,
further staff education and training is suggested to improve knowledge of the plan and
its components to employees of all levels.
Other ways to improve emergency plans were suggested by Cameron Bruce, a
healthcare consultant from California. He suggests plans should be concise, yet
practical as he offers the following list as the pinnacle weak points of bioterrorism plans:
1. “Not based on flexible incident command system
2. Do not contain enough multidisciplinary input
3. Do not consider enough probable scenarios, i.e., no hazard vulnerability
analysis
4. Lack essential response information, such as checklists, flowcharts, and data
5. Lack overview of communications backup systems
6. Do not contain adaptable forms for managing information
7. Do not adequately address backup supplies -- locations, amounts, and vendor
agreements
8. Have not undergone a review by local authorities
9. Lack alarm points signaling that critical supplies are running low
10. Do not include rapid troubleshooting tools for responding to problems such as
water failure
11. Have not undergone adequate drilling or testing of the plan and its
components
12. Have not undergone continuous improvement of the plan based on drill
results” (“Terrorist attacks,” 2001, p. 154).

In keeping with these weaknesses, an important component of a bioterrorism
plan is its provisions for community involvement (Braun, et al., 2004; CDC, 2000;
Karwa, Curie, and Kvetan, 2005; Murphy, 2004; Greenberg and Hendrickson, 2003).
Strong linkages with other community agencies such as fire rescue, law enforcement,
emergency management agencies, public health departments and local governments
are essential to overall preparedness and discourage duplication of services (Braun, et
al., 2004). Moreover, the CDC recommends hospitals should, “maintain a public health
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preparedness and response cooperative agreement that provides support to state
health agencies who are working with local agencies in developing coordinated
bioterrorism plans and protocol” (2000, p.12).
Additionally, a concerted effort amongst all community organizations will assist in
curtailing and containing public hysteria (Murphy, 2004). This includes aiding hospitals
in dealing with a mass influx of the “worried well,” which will seek medical attention out
of fear and panic (CDC, 2000; Karwa, Curie, and Kvetan, 2005). Establishing a clear
delineation of responsibilities also allows for an integrated community response rather
than a fragmented one (Braun et al., 2004).
In accordance with the importance of community involvement, hospitals must
consider what their individual surge capacity is (Karwa, Curie, and Kvetan, 2005).
Although traditionally thought of as the maximum numbers of patients that can be
handled, surge capacity also involves the number of staff, supplies, and equipment a
hospital possesses (Karwa, Curie, and Kvetan, 2005; Murphy, 2004). Mutual aid
agreements can help to expand a hospital’s surge capacity by sharing resources such
as these to those that need it most (Murphy, 2004).
Since emergency rooms are often going to be the first line of defense against
bioterrorism, it is imperative all staff receives training specific to their role in the hospital
(Greenberg and Hendrickson, 2003; Murphy, 2004). Although there is little experiential
knowledge regarding the “best” methods of training, there is little dissent concerning its
importance (Henning, et al., 2004). In fact, the literature is in agreement that training is
an essential component of bioterrorism preparedness (Alder, et al., 2004; Filoromo, et
al., 2003; Henning, et al., 2004; Klein, Atas, and Collins, 2004).
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Accordingly, several key points should be addressed when planning training
exercises for bioterrorism. Initially, it is recommended each hospital have access to a
core group of experts available to train on issues such as: decontamination, infectious
diseases, medical toxicology, and use of protective equipment (Greenberg and
Hendrickson, 2003). It is equally important experts hired by hospitals be credible
sources of knowledge as deemed by their audience, as sensitivity to the needs and
demands of life in each department is critical (Alder, et al., 2004).
While there is some debate over the best methods of training, a one-size fit all
approach should definitely be avoided (Alder, et al., 2004; Greenberg and Hendrickson,
2003). It is important to tailor the training program to the individual needs of the hospital
and it’s staff (Alder, et al., 2004). In addition, time constraints and competing demands
are often cited as roadblocks to additional training (Alder, et al., 2004; Filoromo, et al.,
2003). To overcome these issues, it is sometimes necessary to think outside the box.
For example, Filoromo et al. (2003), designed a clinician based screensaver and
website containing important bioterrorism information. Access to these
screensavers/websites is readily available in hospital emergency departments. This
method was found to not only be an efficient use of time, but is an economical option for
disseminating and updating staff on the most current bioterrorism information (Filoromo,
et al., 2003).
Still other methods of training can be used in a hospital. Alder et al. (2004),
suggested that web based exercises like the Filomoro et al. screensaver exercise could
be useful along with disaster drills, and other exercises that included comprehensive
bioterrorism information. Henning et al. (2004) used role-playing exercises through use
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of scenario presentations to encourage discussion on how to handle such an event and
pinpoint deficiencies. Klein, Atas, and Collins (2004) touted the use of unannounced
drills as a means to train staff and again look for any deficiencies in preparations. Each
exercise was effective for the organization they were tested in, but needed to be tailor fit
to the individual needs of each hospital for maximum effectiveness.
Improvements in information technology (IT) and communications are also
significant in preparing for a bioterrorist attack. Information technology and
communications go hand in hand as information technology is a vital part of effective
communication both within the hospital and to other community organizations (Murphy,
2004). Pre-established communication channels are also important to allow for rapid
dissemination of bioterrorist or suspected bioterrorist attacks (Greenberg and
Hendrickson, 2003). Information technology can also be used to track unusual clusters
of symptoms that can be similar to exposure to a bioterrorist agent (Murphy, 2004).
This is crucial as, “early detection is essential for ensuring a prompt response to a
biological or chemical attack, including the provision of prophylactic medicines, chemical
antidotes, or vaccines” (CDC, 2000, p.9).
One method that melds information technology together with communications is
the use of the Health Alert network. The Health Alert Network is an electronic database
that stores email addresses and fax numbers to key agencies in an area. If there is a
need to disseminate information about a possible attack, an alert is issued to health
departments, hospitals, local governments, and other agencies through this system.
This method allows for quick transmission of information to a large group of entities
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since time is such a critical issue in such cases (M’ikanatha, Lautenbach, Kunselman,
Julian, Southwell, Allswede, Rankin, and Aber, 2003).
Additional preferred methods of communication are the World Wide Web and
medical journals (M’ikanatha, et al., 2003; Murphy, 2004). The Web, which also
encompasses the use of information technology, is another excellent way to
disseminate information quickly to a large number of people (M’ikanatha, et al., 2003).
In addition, it can be rapidly updated as information changes, or becomes available.
Information Technology can also be used as referenced above in the training
exercises. The use of online educational programs would not be possible without the
proper information technology to support it (Murphy, 2004). Moreover, in addition to
training, information technology can be used to aid hospitals in distributing and tracking
vaccinations should the need arise (US Newswire, 2003).
Lastly, procuring the proper equipment specific to the demands a bioterrorist
attack creates is also a critical part of planning. In order to treat victims of a bioterrorist
attack, it is sometimes necessary to have large quantities of medications and
specialized equipment readily available for use (Murphy, 2004). Although the hospital
itself may not be able to keep such large quantities of medicine or equipment on hand, a
community stockpile or mutual aid agreements may be used to procure the proper
supplies (Karwa, Currie, and Kvetan, 2005).
Recommendations for necessary supplies vary from apparatus as simple as
charts to aid in symptom recognition, to decontamination suits and gear (Greenberg and
Hendrickson, 2003). Personal protective equipment, ventilators, decontamination
shower units, isolation/quarantine beds, and pharmaceutical supplies are all suggested
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supplies to have on hand (Murphy, 2004). Again, resource sharing is critical as most
equipment is expensive and can be used collectively for greater efficiency.
Additionally, although not a tangible piece of equipment, qualified personnel are
also an important resource to have available (Murphy, 2004). A pool of additional
physicians, nurses, emergency medical technicians, public health professionals, and
other staff should be available in case of a surge of patients (Karwa, Currie, and Kvetan,
2005). Staffing agreements with other hospitals, organizations within the community, or
surrounding areas are an inexpensive way to ensure the proper number of employees
could potentially be available to handle a mass influx of patients (Murphy, 2004).
Discussion of Study Strengths and Limitations
Study Strengths
The current study built upon the work done previously by other researchers and
shares the view that although low levels of bioterrorism preparedness were found, that
further research is warranted (Bazzoli, et al., 2000; Braun, et al. 2004; Charns, 1997;
Cueller & Gertler, 2003; Edwards & Fraser, 2001; Friedman & Marghella, 2004; GAO,
2003; Greenberg, Jurgens, & Gracely, 2002; Helget & Smith, 2002; Higgins,et al., 2004;
Keim, Pesik, and Twum-Danso, 2003; Perrow, 1984; Provan & Milward, 2001; Treat, et
al., 2001; Wetter, Daniell, & Treser, 2001). Caution should be used when generalizing
these findings to other parts of the country as it only assessed hospitals in the state of
Florida.
September 11, 2001 was a turning point in the war on bioterrorism. It raised
awareness levels, and brought the issue of bioterrorism to the forefront of debate. Its
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impact, while not yet fully quantified in terms of hospital preparedness, is an important
factor to consider when researching this topic. In fact, its impact may never truly be
quantified until an actual attack occurs.
This study was one of the first to quantify the levels of preparedness since the
events of September 11th in the State of Florida and assess its impact, if any, on the
way a hospital prepares for the inevitable bioterrorist attack. In addition, unlike studies
conducted immediately following the events of September 11, 2001, this study was
conducted in early 2004. This lapse in time between the terrorist attacks and the survey
period, allowed for the immediate rush to prepare to settle, and assess the true levels of
preparedness. This helped to eliminate the initial reactive spike in awareness of
preparedness levels that followed the 2001 attacks. In short, it allowed for a better
measurement of preparedness as the events of 2001 became more of a memory and a
sense of complacency slowly returned.
Additionally, this study provided a baseline assessment of the levels of
preparedness for Florida hospitals. When the inevitable brush with bioterrorism occurs,
the results of this study can then be used to benchmark preparedness levels and
compare them to levels of preparedness after an actual attack has occurred.
Weaknesses/Limitations
The researcher suggests four principle limitations to the study which are the
willingness to respond to the survey and consequent low response rate, the variety of
individuals that responded to the survey, the candor of the information garnered from
the surveys, and the tendency of Florida hospitals to be system affiliated, thus leaving a
small sample of non-system affiliated hospitals for study.
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First and foremost, given the sensitive nature of the topic, and the often
overwhelming pace at which hospitals operate, the survey response rate was a bit lower
than normal research standards would indicate. Normally, at least a fifty percent
response rate is desired to have a viable research project. However, due to the
historically low response rate of hospitals in answering surveys, especially one with
such a sensitive topic, the research was conducted using the thirty eight percent
response rate. This was done in an effort to create a baseline measurement for further
research.
Previous research supports using lower response rates as other hospital surveys
returned lower than normal response rates as well. For example, a 2003 study on the
smallpox vaccinations for emergency medical providers returned a 43 percent response
rate (Everett, Coffinn, Zaoutis, Halpern, and Strom, 2003). This rate was low due to the
sensitive nature of the topic as well as the time constraints placed upon hospital
personnel.
In addition, despite addressing the survey to the medical directors of the
emergency department, a variety of individuals responded to the survey in lieu of the
director. For example, only eighteen ED directors responded, whereas twenty-six ER
physicians, seven safety directors, and an assortment of other individuals responded to
the survey. This may have been due to the time constraints of the directors, thus the
survey was passed along to other individuals for completion. In today’s already
overcrowded emergency departments, time is of essence; therefore a survey such as
this may be deemed a low priority and handled as such.
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For future research, several suggestions are offered to boost the response rates
and insure that the correct individual answers the survey. One method offered is to
conduct interviews with a designated person at each hospital who fulfills the same role
at each hospital surveyed (i.e. ED medical director). In this case, interviews would have
been conducted with the medical directors of the emergency department, thus ensuring
a uniform response rate from individuals who perform similar job functions at each
hospital. Additionally, this will help to boost response rate as face to face interviews
negates the possibility of passing the survey off to another individual or not participating
at all.
Another suggested method of improving response rate and ensuring uniformity of
the roles of the respondents is to conduct focus groups. This will also allow for a better
response rate as a captive audience can answer all survey questions in person. This
will again, allow the researcher to ensure that the targeted respondent is indeed the
person actually giving his or her respective hospital’s information requested.
Next, the candor of the responses was of concern. Given that many questions
on the survey require the respondent to self assess his or her hospital’s readiness for a
bioterrorist attack, a certain degree of bias could be introduced into the responses.
There also may be a tendency to over exaggerate the true readiness of the hospital in
an attempt to portray a hospital that is in control and capable of handling such an event.
While there is no way to ascertain whether or not the responses have been
exaggerated, the researcher will attempt to alleviate this problem by keeping self
assessment questions to a minimum, and focus on more quantifiable questions such as
the presence of a plan, training activities, etc.
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At the time of the study, there were 201 acute care hospitals in the State of
Florida (Florida College of Emergency Physicians, 2004). Of those, the majority are
affiliated with a system, leaving only a relatively small number of hospitals in the sample
as non-system affiliated. Although clearly the system affiliated hospitals outnumber the
non-system affiliated, conclusions still can be drawn regarding the affect of system
affiliation on the levels of preparedness. However, despite any conclusions drawn,
caution must be exercised in generalizing this information to a larger sample such as all
hospitals in the United States.
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Future Research
This study served to quantify the levels of preparedness for a bioterrorist attack
in Florida’s acute care hospitals. As of late, there has been a boom in the literature
regarding bioterrorism. This study will add to the growing body of literature surrounding
the topic. Since there have been no major experiences with bioterrorism, research
studies such as this are the only means available to assess levels of preparedness. In
addition, studies such as this can help to identify deficiencies in planning so that
corrections can be made before an attack occurs.
Although only capturing a snapshot of one area of the United States, it serves as
starting point for future research in this area. Most importantly, the findings serve as a
baseline measurement for hospital preparedness in Florida’s hospitals before an actual
attack has occurred. Further study of this issue will enable hospitals to learn more
about bioterrorism and how their respective hospitals can prepare.
For example, further research on this issue could focus on the training activities
taking place in Florida hospitals. The findings suggested that training is taking place,
and that approximately two thirds of hospitals incorporated training results into their
plans. While this is a positive step towards preparedness, future research may look into
what types of training are taking place and if there are any underlying characteristics of
hospitals that cause training to occur more than in others.
Another area of future research may delve into the presence of written plans and
its impact on preparedness. This can be done through studying role playing exercises
and ascertaining their impact. This can help to measure the worth and effectiveness of
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the written plan as it is carried out in the exercise, as well as the worth of the exercise
itself.
Another possible area of future research could lie in exploring the impact of other
factors on overall preparedness levels. While most of the literature (Bazzoli, et al.,
2000; Braun, et al. 2004; Charns, 1997; Cueller & Gertler, 2003; Edwards & Fraser,
2001; Friedman & Marghella, 2004; GAO, 2003; Greenberg, Jurgens, & Gracely, 2002;
Helget & Smith, 2002; Higgins,et al., 2004; Keim, Pesik, and Twum-Danso, 2003;
Perrow, 1984; Provan & Milward, 2001; Treat, et al., 2001; Wetter, Daniell, & Treser,
2001) has explored the effect of size, location, and training, other variables such as
ownership type, community partnerships, and mutual aid agreements can be explored.
As of late, the literature is beginning to explore the use of mutual aid agreements
as a means to prepare for a bioterrorist attack (Braun, et al., 2004; CDC, 2000; Karwa,
Curie, and Kvetan, 2005; Murphy, 2004; Greenberg and Hendrickson, 2003). Possible
future research could look at the impact of such agreements on bioterrorism
preparedness, and assess the its worth on overall planning activities.
Although system affiliation was not found to be a statistically significant predictor
of preparedness levels, future research could also shed light on this variable. As
previously discussed, the tendency of Florida hospitals to be system affiliated left a
small percentage of non-system affiliated hospitals to study. Forthcoming research
could look more specifically at only non-system affiliated hospitals and see what
characteristics impact their preparedness levels.
In addition, although past research indicated a relationship between
preparedness levels and location of a hospital, this study found no such relationship.
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Other research could re-explore this characteristic and look for significance, and if still
none is found, look for the underlying reasons why.
The uniqueness of the situation has left many to wonder if the planning being
done will be successful when an actual attack occurs. However, when the inevitable
occurs, future research can use this study to assess levels of preparedness before and
after the attack, and measure the impact of experiencing the situation on the levels of
preparedness the hospitals operate at. While it is the hope of the researcher that such
an attack never comes to fruition, it is better to be prepared than to assume that it will
never happen.
Overall, it is also the intention of this researcher to continue studying
bioterrorism, as it is an area of great importance to the healthcare industry. It is the
hope that further research be conducted on a larger scale so that it may be generalized
to hospitals across the nation. Armed with the information that studies like these can
provide, the nation’s hospitals can be prepared for a bioterrorist attack should it occur.
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Chapter Summary
This chapter melded together the findings of the study with previous research
and theoretical underpinnings. It explored the contributions the study made to the
literature, along with implications for policy. It also suggested some planning activities
that can help to create a more effective and efficient bioterrorism plan. In addition, it
explored the strengths and weaknesses of the study, along with suggesting areas of
future research to be explored at a later date.
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APPENDIX A: SUMMARY OF LITERTAURE REVIEWED
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Authors

Area Studied

Date

Independent Variable(s)

Wetter,
Daniell, &
Treser

US Public Health
Service Region X
(Alaska, Idaho,
Oregon, &
Washington)

1998





Location
ED annual census
Proximity to US Army’s chemical weapons depot



Dependent
variable(s)
Preparedness

Greenberg,
Jurgens &
Gracely

Greater
Philadelphia area

2000



At least 1 emergency physician on staff who had
completed formal training with respect to biological
and chemical weapons,
Ability to decontaminate at least 10 patients per
hour,
Written policies that addressed how to evaluate and
treat biologically and chemically exposed patients,
Written cooperative agreements with local agencies
that address biological and chemical weapons
attacks,
Participation in a drill or exercise relating to
chemical and biological weapons within the last 12
months, and
A self characterized “adequate” supply of antidotes
for the treatment of biological and chemical
weapons.



Preparedness
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Significant Findings
Indicate that hospital
ED’s generally are
not prepared in an
organized fashion to
treat victims of
incidents involving
chemical or
biological weapons”
(p.714).

Found that fewer
than 2% of all
respondent
hospitals had
achieved this
minimum level of
preparedness (as
set by independent
variable
benchmarks)

Treat,
Williams,
Furbee,
Manley,
Russell, &
Stamper

FEMA Region III
(West Virginia,
Pennsylvania,
Maryland,
Virginia, & DC)

2001



Qualitative/ no discernable independent variables



Preparedness

“Hospitals in this
sample do not
appear to be
prepared to handle
WMD (weapons of
mass destruction)
events, especially in
areas such as mass
decontamination,
mass medical
response,
awareness among
health care
professionals, health
communications,
and facility security
(p. 562).”
98% stated that they
did not feel as if they
were adequately
prepared for an
attack of this nature

Helget &
Smith

Nebraska

2001



None – just 6-question survey to capture the
perceptions, and physical readiness of the facilities.



Preparedness

Keim, Pesik,
and TwumDanso

21 hospitals in an
unidentified major
metropolitan area
of the United
States

2003






Stockpiles of antidotes for chemical exposure
Decontamination equipment availability
Levels of worker protection established
Staff training procedures



Preparedness

Hospitals were
unprepared to deal
with a chemical
terrorist attack

General
Accounting
Office (GAO)

Urban hospitals
across the US

2003





Planning and preparedness activities
Training of staff
Capacity to respond to a bioterrorist attack



Preparedness

More hospitals were
preparing in the
form of written plans
for a bioterrorist
attack, but
inadequacies in
training and
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equipment exist
Higgins,
Wainright,
Lu, and
Carrico

Kentucky short
and long term
hospitals

2004






Disaster plans in place
Training exercises used
Sharing of Info on training
Collaborative agreements in place



Preparedness

Emergency plans
were in place in the
majority of hospitals,
but some
deficiencies in
planning

Braun,
Darcy, Divi,
Robertson,
and
Fishbeck

Hospitals
scheduled for
accreditation by
(JCAHO)

2004






Preparedness



Emergency management plans
Hospital’s perception of community wide
emergency plans
Hospital’s perception of overall community
relationships for disaster
Demographic information

More plans in place
and training taking
place on a wider
scale/ suggests
more research be
done




Preparedness activities
Planning for disaster



Preparedness

An improvement in
preparedness
activities and overall
levels of
preparedness/ $$
not going to rural
areas

Gursky

Rural hospitals



2004
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Training
Studies

Filoromo,
Macrina,
Pryor,
Terndrup,
and McNutt

Emergency
department of the
University of
Alabama
Birmingham

2003






ED rotation (before and after)
Screensaver usage
World Wide Web usage
Overall technology training



Preparedness

Scores increased
post rotation after
use of screensavers
and the web

Henning,
Brennan,
Hoegg,
O’Rourke,
Dyer, and
Grace

Philadelphia area

2004



Scenario modules presented and feedback
ascertained (no clear variables)



Preparedness

Addressed the
situation but with
mass confusion/
scenarios useful in
training

Klein, Atas,
and Collins

Unidentified
metropolitan area
with an
international
boarder

2004







Identification of exposure
Implementation of disaster plan
Protocol initiated
Communication
Use of drills



Preparedness

Overall most unable
to identify smallpox,
but smaller hospitals
were better and
quicker to respond
and implement
plans

Alder, Clark,
White Jr.,
Talboys, and
Mottice

Utah

2004







Educational needs
Educational preferences
Specialty
Location
Type of practice



Preparedness

Training is
necessary although
a low perceived risk
of attack/ needs to
be individually
tailored to physician
audience
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Hospital Name

Address

Shands at AGH

801 S.W. 2nd Ave

All Children's Hospital

801-6th St S.

North Ridge Medical Center

5757 N. Dixie Hwy

Palm Beach Gardens Medical
Ctr.
3360 Burns Rd
Palmetto General Hospital
Aventura Hospital & Medical
Center
Baptist Hospital, Inc.

2001 W. 68th St

City/State
Gainesville, FL
32601-6298
St. Petersburg, FL
33701
Ft. Lauderdale, FL
33334
Palm Beach
Gardens, FL 334104331
Hialeah, FL 330161898

Ownership

Parent System

County

Beds

Private/Not-For-Profit

Shands HealthCare

Alachua

367

Private/Not-For-Profit

All Children's Health System

Pinellas

216

Private/Investor-Owned Tenet HealthSystem

Broward

395

Private/Investor-Owned Tenet HealthSystem

Palm Beach

204

Private/Investor-Owned Tenet HealthSystem

Dade

360

Dade

407

Escambia

492

Aventura, FL 3318020900 Biscayne Blvd. 1407
Private/Investor-Owned HCA East Florida Division
Pensacola, FL
Private/Not-For-Profit Baptist Health Care, Inc.
1000 W. Moreno St
32501
Miami, FL 33176-

Baptist Hospital of Miami, Inc. 8900 N. Kendall Drive 2197
Baptist Medical Center
Baptist Medical Center
Beaches
Bartow Memorial Hospital
Bascom Palmer Eye
Institute/Anne Bates
Bay Medical Center

Baptist Health South Florida

Dade

551

800 Prudential Drive

Private/Not-For-Profit

Baptist Health

Duval

403

1350 13th Ave S.

Jacksonville Beach,
FL 32250
Private/Not-For-Profit

Baptist Health

Duval

90

1239 E. Main Street

Bartow, FL 33830

Private/Investor-Owned LifePoint Hospitals, Inc.

Polk

56

Private/Not-For-Profit

Dade

100

Government/County

Bay

353

Pinellas

502

Private/Not-For-Profit

Palm Beach

362

Palm Beach

394

900 N.W. 17th Street

Miami, FL 33157
Panama City, FL
615 N. Bonita Avenue 32401

St. Petersburg, FL
Bayfront Medical Center
701 6th Street South 33701-4814
Boynton Beach, FL
Bethesda Healthcare System 2815 S. Seacrest Blvd. 33437

Boca Raton Community
Hospital
Bon Secours-St. Joseph
Hospital
Shands at Starke

Private/Not-For-Profit

Jacksonville, FL
32207-8244

Private/Not-For-Profit

Bayfront Health System

800 Meadows Road

Boca Raton, FL
33486-2386

Private/Not-For-Profit

2500 Harbor Blvd.

Port Charlotte, FL
33952-5396

Private/Not-For-Profit

Bon Secours Health System, Inc.

Charlotte

212

922 E. Call St

Starke, FL 32091

Private/Not-For-Profit

Shands HealthCare

Bradford

49

133

Brandon Regional Hospital
Brooksville Regional Hospital

119 Oakfield Drive
55 Ponce De Leon
Blvd

Broward General Medical
Center

1600 S. Andrews
Avenue

Calhoun-Liberty Hospital, Inc.

Ft. Lauderdale, FL
33316-2591
Blountstown, FL
20370 NE Burns Ave. 32424

Campbellton-Graceville Hospital 5429 College Drive

Cape Canaveral Hospital
Cape Coral Hospital
Cedars Medical Center
Citrus Memorial Hospital

Brandon, FL 33511
Brooksville, FL
34601

701 W. Cocoa Beach
Cswy

Private/Investor-Owned HCA West Florida Division

Hillsborough

Private/Investor-Owned Hernando HMA, Inc.

Hernando

Government/Hospital
District

Broward

744

Private/Investor-Owned DasSee Community Health Systems Calhoun

36

North Broward Hospital District

Government/Hospital
Graceville, FL 32440 District
Cocoa Beach, FL
32931
Cape Coral, FL
33990

Private/Not-For-Profit

Health First, Inc.

Private/Not-For-Profit Lee Memorial Health System
636 Del Prado Blvd.
1400 N.W. 12th
Avenue
Miami, FL 33136
Private/Investor-Owned HCA East Florida Division
502 W. Highland Blvd. Inverness, FL 34452 Private/Not-For-Profit

Kindred Hospital North Florida 801 Oak St
Cleveland Clinic Hospital

3100 Weston Rd.

Coral Gables Hospital

3100 Douglas Road

Green Cove Springs,
Private/Investor-Owned Kindred Healthcare
FL 32043-0808
Weston, FL 333313602
Private/Investor-Owned Tenet HealthSystem
Coral Gables, FL
Private/Investor-Owned Tenet HealthSystem
33134

255
91

Jackson

49

Brevard

150

Lee

281

Dade
Citrus

560
171

Clay

60

Broward

150

Dade

273

Broward

200

Coral Springs, FL
Coral Springs Medical Center 3000 Coral Hills Drive 33065-4108

Government/Hospital
District

Pasco Regional Medical
Center

13100 Fort King Rd

Private/Investor-Owned Health Management Associates

Pasco

120

Jackson South Community
Hospital

9333 S.W. 152nd
Street

Government/Public
Health Trust

Dade

199

Delray Medical Center
DeSoto Memorial Hospital,
Inc

5352 Linton Blvd.

Private/Investor-Owned Tenet HealthSystem

Palm Beach

307

Private/Not-For-Profit

Desoto

Doctors' Memorial Hospital, Inc.

407 E. Ash Street

Perry, FL 323472104

Kindred Hospital Hollywood

1859 Van Buren St
401 E. Byrd Avenue

Hollywood, FL 33020 Private/Investor-Owned Kindred Healthcare
Bonifay, FL 32425 Private/Investor-Owned Community Health Systems, Inc.

Doctors Memorial Hospital

Dade City, FL
33525-5294
Miami, FL 331571824
Delray Beach, FL
33484

Arcadia, FL 34266900 N. Robert Avenue 2180

North Broward Hospital District

Jackson Health System

Triad Hospitals, Inc.

Private/Not-For-Profit
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Taylor
Broward
Holmes

82
48
124
34

Miami Jewish Home and Hospital 5200 N.E. 2nd Avenue Miami, FL 33137
Zephyrhills, FL
East Pasco Medical Center
7050 Gall Blvd.
33541

Private/Not-For-Profit
Private/Not-For-Profit

Adventist Health System

Dade

32

Pasco

154

Lehigh Regional Medical Center 1500 Lee Blvd.

Lehigh Acres, FL
33936-4897

Private/Investor-Owned Health Management Associates

Lee

88

Baker Community Hospital &
Health Ctr.

159 N. 3rd St

Macclenny, FL
32063-2196

Government

Baker

25

Edward White Hospital

2323 9th Avenue,
North

St. Petersburg, FL
33733-2018

Private/Investor-Owned HCA West Florida Division

Pinellas

167

George E. Weems Memorial
Hospital

135 Avenue G

Apalachicola, FL
32320

Private/Investor-Owned DasSee Community Health Systems Franklin

29

700 Medical Blvd.

Englewood, FL
34223

Private/Investor-Owned HCA West Florida Division

Sarasota

100

21298 Olean Blvd.

Port Charlotte, FL
33949

Private/Investor-Owned HCA West Florida Division

Charlotte

238

401 Palmetto St
3301 Overseas Hwy

New Smyrna Beach, Government/Hospital
FL 32168
District
Halifax Fish Community Health
Marathon, FL 33050 Private/Investor-Owned Health Management Associates

Volusia
Monroe

116
58

Flagler Health Care System, Inc.

St Johns

274

Adventist Health System
Adventist Health System

Orange
Lake

902
182

Broward

459

Englewood Community
Hospital, Inc.
Fawcett Memorial Hospital,
Inc.
Bert Fish Medical Center
Fishermen's Hospital
Flagler Hospital, Inc.

Florida Hospital Orlando
Florida Hospital Waterman
Florida Medical Center
Fort Walton Beach Medical
Center

St. Augustine, FL
Private/Not-For-Profit
400 Health Park Blvd. 32086-5779
Orlando, FL 32803601 E. Rollins Street 1287
Private/Not-For-Profit
201 N. Eustis St
Eustis, FL 32726
Private/Not-For-Profit
5000 W. Oakland Park Ft. Lauderdale, FL
Blvd
33313

Private/Investor-Owned Tenet HealthSystem

Gadsden Community Hospital

1000 Mar-Walt Dr
US Highway 90 East

Glades General Hospital

1201 S. Main St

Ft. Walton Beach, FL
32547-6795
Private/Investor-Owned HCA North Florida Division
Okaloosa
Quincy, FL 32351
Private/Investor-Owned DasSee Community Health Systems Gadsden
Belle Glade, FL
Private/Investor-Owned Province Healthcare Corporation
Palm Beach
33430

1309 N. Flagler Dr

West Palm Beach,
FL 33401

Good Samaritan Medical
Center
Baptist Hospital, Inc. d/b/a/
Gulf Breeze Hospital

Gulf Breeze, FL
1110 Gulf Breeze Pky 32561

247
51
73

Private/Investor-Owned Tenet HealthSystem

Palm Beach

341

Private/Not-For-Profit

Santa Rosa

60
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Baptist Health Care, Inc.

Gulf Coast Hospital

13681 Doctor's Way

Ft. Myers, FL 33912 Private/Investor-Owned HCA West Florida Division

Lee

120

Gulf Pines Hospital

102 20th St

Port St. Joe, FL
32456

Private/Investor-Owned Marquis Management Group

Gulf

45

Private/Not-For-Profit
Government/Tax
District

Hillsborough

162

Halifax Medical Center

12902 Magnolia Dr
303 N. Clyde Morris
Blvd

Tampa, FL 336129497
Daytona Beach, FL
32114

Volusia

734

Trinity Community Hospital

506 N.W. 4th St

Jasper, FL 32052

Private/Investor-Owned Trinity Health System

Hamilton

14000 Fivay Rd

Hudson, FL 34667

Private/Investor-Owned HCA West Florida Division

Pasco

1401 W. Seminole
Blvd.

Sanford, FL 32771

Private/Investor-Owned HCA North Florida Division

Seminole

226

5731 Bee Ridge Road Sarasota, FL 34233 Private/Investor-Owned HCA West Florida Division
Panama City, FL
449 W. 23rd St
32405
Private/Investor-Owned HCA North Florida Division
2020-59th Street, W. Bradenton, FL 34209 Private/Investor-Owned HCA West Florida Division

Sarasota

168

Bay
Manatee

176
383

Ft. Pierce, FL 34950 Private/Investor-Owned HCA East Florida Division

St Lucie

305

Ocala, FL 34474
Largo, FL 33770

Marion
Pinellas

230
256

St Lucie

150

Pasco

401

Alachua

278

Broward

175

Hernando

204

Private/Investor-Owned LifePoint Hospitals, Inc.

Putnam

141

Private/Investor-Owned HCA East Florida Division

Okeechobee

101

H. Lee Moffitt Cancer
Ctr/Rsrch Inst

Regional Medical Center
Bayonet Point
Central Florida Regional
Hospital
Doctors Hospital of Sarasota

Gulf Coast Medical Center
Blake Medical Center
Lawnwood Regional Medical
Center
1700 S. 23rd St
Ocala Regional Medical
Center
1431 S.W. 1st Ave
Largo Medical Center
201 14th St S.W.
St. Lucie Medical Center
Community Hospital
North Florida Regional
Medical Center
Northwest Medical Center
Oak Hill Hospital
Putnam Community Medical
Center
Raulerson Hospital

Halifax Fish Community Health

Private/Investor-Owned HCA North Florida Division
Private/Investor-Owned HCA West Florida Division

1800 S.E. Tiffany
Avenue

Port St. Lucie, FL
Private/Investor-Owned HCA East Florida Division
34952-7595
New Port Richey, FL
5637 Marine Parkway 34652
Private/Investor-Owned HCA West Florida Division
Gainesville, FL
Private/Investor-Owned HCA North Florida Division
6500 W. Newberry Rd 32605
Margate, FL 330632801 N. State Rd 7
9002
Private/Investor-Owned HCA East Florida Division
Brooksville, FL
Private/Investor-Owned HCA West Florida Division
11375 Cortez Blvd
34613
Highway 20 West
1796 Hwy 441 N.

Palatka, FL 32177
Okeechobee, FL
34972
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42
290

Tallahassee Community
Hospital
Twin Cities Hospital

2626 Capital Medical
Blvd
2190 Highway 85
North

Tallahassee, FL
32308-4402

West Florida Hospital

8383 N. Davis Hwy

Health Central

10000 W. Colonial Dr

HealthSouth Doctors' Hospital

5000 University Dr

Ocoee, FL 34761
Coral Gables, FL
33146

Larkin Community Hospital

7031 S.W. 62nd Ave

South Miami, FL
33143-4781

Private/Investor-Owned Oracle Health Systems, Inc.

Dade

122

Heart of Florida Regional
Medical Center

40100 Highway 27

Davenport, FL
33837-5906

Private/Investor-Owned Health Management Associates

Polk

75

Tarpon Springs, FL
34689-3524

Private/Not-For-Profit

University Community Health

Pinellas

168

Government/Hospital
Authority

Triad Hospitals, Inc.

Hendry

66

Niceville, FL 32578
Pensacola, FL
32514

Helen Ellis Memorial Hospital 1395 S. Pinellas Ave
Hendry Regional Medical
Clewiston, FL
Center
500 W. Sugarland Hwy 33440-3597

Hialeah, FL 330133878

Hialeah Hospital

651 E. 25th St

Highlands Regional Medical
Center

Sebring, FL 338703600 S. Highlands Ave 5495
Hollywood, FL
3600 Washington St
33021-8216

Hollywood Medical Center
Holmes Regional Medical
Center

Private/Investor-Owned HCA North Florida Division

Leon

Private/Investor-Owned HCA North Florida Division

Okaloosa

65

Private/Investor-Owned HCA North Florida Division

Escambia

493

Government/Hospital
Authority

Orange

141

Private/Investor-Owned HealthSouth Corporation

Dade

285

Private/Investor-Owned Tenet HealthSystem

Dade

378

Private/Investor-Owned Health Management Associates

Highlands

126

Private/Investor-Owned Tenet HealthSystem

Broward

324

Holy Cross Hospital, Inc.

4725 N. Federal Hwy

Melbourne, FL
32901-3276
Ft. Lauderdale, FL
33308

Imperial Point Medical Center

6401 N. Federal Hwy

Ft. Lauderdale, FL
33308-1405

Indian River Memorial
Hospital

1000 36th St

Jackson Hospital

4250 Hospital Dr

Vero Beach, FL
Government
32960-4810
Marianna, FL 32446- Government/Hospital
1939
District

Jackson Memorial Hospital

1611 N.W. 12th Ave

Miami, FL 331361017

Jay Hospital

221 S. Alabama St

Jay, FL 32565-1070 Private/Not-For-Profit

1350 S. Hickory St

180

Private/Not-For-Profit

Health First, Inc.

Brevard

468

Private/Not-For-Profit

Catholic Health East

Broward

577

Government/Hospital
District

North Broward Hospital District

Broward

204

Indian River

335

Jackson

100

Government/Public
Health Trust
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Triad Hospitals, Inc.
Jackson Health System

Dade

Baptist Health Care, Inc.

Santa Rosa

1392
55

JFK Medical Center
Jupiter Medical Center
Kendall Medical Center
Lake City Medical Center
Shands at Lake Shore
Lakeland Regional Medical
Center
Leesburg Regional Medical
Center

5301 S. Congress Ave Atlantis, FL 33462
Jupiter, FL 334581210 S. Old Dixie Hwy 7299
11750 Bird Rd
Miami, FL 33175

Private/Investor-Owned HCA East Florida Division

Palm Beach

387

Private/Not-For-Profit Brim, Inc.
Private/Investor-Owned HCA East Florida Division

Palm Beach
Dade

156
412

1050 North Commerce
Lake City, FL 32055 Private/Investor-Owned HCA North Florida Division
Blvd.
Lake City, FL 32055560 E. Franklin St
3000
Private/Not-For-Profit Shands HealthCare
1324 Lakeland Hills
Blvd

Lakeland, FL 33805 Private/Not-For-Profit

600 E. Dixie Ave

Leesburg, FL 34748 Private/Not-For-Profit

Lower Florida Keys Health
System

5900 College Rd

Orlando Regional Lucerne
Hospital
Madison County Memorial
Hospital

Manatee Memorial Hospital
Mariners Hospital

Charlotte Regional Medical
Center

Memorial Hospital of Tampa
Florida Hospital - Flagler
Memorial Regional Hospital
Florida Hospital - Memorial
Division

75

Columbia

99

Polk

851

Lake

294

Key West, FL 33040 Private/Investor-Owned Health Management Associates

Monroe

118

818 S. Main Lane

Orlando, FL 32801

Private/Not-For-Profit

Orange

267

201 E. Marion St

Madison, FL 32340

Private/Not-For-Profit

Orlando Regional Healthcare

Orlando Regional Healthcare

206 Second Street, E. Bradenton, FL 34208 Private/Investor-Owned Universal Health Services, Inc.
91500 Overseas
Highway
Tavernier, FL 33070 Private/Not-For-Profit Baptist Health South Florida

Martin Memorial Medical Center 300 Hospital Avenue

Mease Hospital/Countryside
Mease Hospital/Dunedin

Columbia

Stuart, FL 34994

3231 McMullen Booth Safety Harbor, FL
Rd
34695-1098
601 Main St
Dunedin, FL 34698

Madison

42

Manatee

491

Monroe

42

Private/Not-For-Profit

Martin Memorial Health Systems, Inc. Martin

236

Private/Not-For-Profit
Private/Not-For-Profit

BayCare Health System
BayCare Health System

Pinellas
Pinellas

144
234

Private/Investor-Owned Health Management Associates

Charlotte

208
174

Punta Gorda, FL
809 E. Marion Avenue 33950
Tampa, FL 336092901 Swann Ave
4057
60 Memorial Medical Palm Coast, FL
Pkwy.
32164
Hollywood, FL
3501 Johnson St
33021-5487

Private/Investor-Owned Iasis Healthcare

Hillsborough

Private/Not-For-Profit
Government/Tax
District

Adventist Health System

Flagler

Memorial Healthcare System

Broward

684

Ormond Beach, FL
32174-5197

Private/Not-For-Profit

Adventist Health System

Volusia

205

875 Sterthaus Ave
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81

Memorial Hospital
Jacksonville
Mercy Hospital

Jacksonville, FL
3625 University Blvd S. 32216
Miami, FL 331333663 S. Miami Ave
4237
Miami, FL 331553100 S.W. 62nd Ave 3009

Miami Children's Hospital
Mount Sinai Med Ctr & Miami
Heart Inst.
4701 Meridian Ave

Private/Investor-Owned HCA North Florida Division

Duval

353

Private/Not-For-Profit

Dade

512

Dade

268

Catholic Health East

Private/Not-For-Profit

Morton Plant Hospital

323 Jeffords St

Miami Beach, FL
33140-2910
Clearwater, FL
34616

Mount Sinai Medical Center
Munroe Regional Medical
Center
Naples Community Hospital,
Inc.
Baptist Medical Center
Nassau

4300 Alton Rd

Miami Beach, FL
33140-2849

Private/Not-For-Profit

Mount Sinai Health System

131 S.W. 15th Street

Ocala, FL 34474

Private/Not-For-Profit

Munroe Regional Health System, Inc. Marion

323

350 7th St N.

Naples, FL 34102

Private/Not-For-Profit

NCH Healthcare System

Collier

408

1250 S. 18th Street

Fernandina Beach,
FL 32034-3098

Private/Not-For-Profit

Baptist Health

Nassau

54

Levy

40

Nature Coast Regional Health
Network

125 SW 7th St.

North Bay Hospital

6600 Madison St

North Broward Medical Center 201 E. Sample Rd
North Okaloosa Medical
151 Redstone Ave
Center
S.E.
North Shore Medical Center 1100 N.W. 95th St
Northside Hospital and Heart
Institute
6000 49th St
Northwest Florida Community
Hospital
1360 Brickyard Rd
Orange Park Medical Center 2001 Kingsley Ave
Orlando Regional Medical
Center
1414 Kuhl Ave

Private/Not-For-Profit

Mount Sinai Health System

Dade

258

Private/Not-For-Profit

BayCare Health System

Pinellas

687

Dade

701

Williston, FL 32696Private/Investor-Owned Cypress Health Systems
2040
New Port Richey, FL
34652
Private/Not-For-Profit BayCare Health System

Pasco

122

Broward

409

Okaloosa

110

Dade

357

Private/Investor-Owned HCA West Florida Division

Pinellas

288

Government/County

Washington

Private/Investor-Owned HCA North Florida Division

Clay

219

Orange

517

Pompano Beach, FL Government/Hospital
33064
District

North Broward Hospital District

Crestview, FL 32539 Private/Investor-Owned Community Health Systems, Inc.
Miami, FL 33150Private/Investor-Owned Tenet HealthSystem
2098
St. Petersburg, FL
33709-2140
Chipley, FL 32428
Orange Park, FL
32073

Orlando, FL 32806Private/Not-For-Profit
2093

139

Orlando Regional Healthcare

81

Osceola Regional Medical
Center

700 W. Oak St.

Kissimmee, FL
34741

Private/Investor-Owned HCA North Florida Division

Osceola

171

Columbia Hospital

2201 45th Street

West Palm Beach,
FL 33407-2069

Private/Investor-Owned HCA East Florida Division

Palm Beach

250

Palm Springs General Hospital

1475 W. 49th St

Hialeah, FL 330123222

Private/Investor-Owned

Dade

247

Private/Investor-Owned Iasis Healthcare

Pinellas

307

Private/Investor-Owned HCA East Florida Division
Private/Not-For-Profit

Palm Beach
Dade

117
146

Private/Investor-Owned Tenet HealthSystem
Government/Tax
District
Government/Hospital
Memorial Healthcare System
District

Dade

382

Brevard

210

Broward

301

Volusia
Broward

119
264

Palms of Pasadena Hospital
Palms West Hospital
Pan American Hospital

Parkway Regional Medical
Center
Parrish Medical Center

St. Petersburg, FL
1501 Pasadena Ave S. 33707-3717
Loxahatchee, FL
13001 Southern Blvd. 33470
5959 N.W. 7th St
Miami, FL 33144
160 N.W. 170th St
951-4 N. Washington
Ave.

Memorial Hospital Pembroke 7800 Sheridan Street

North Miami Beach,
FL 33169-5521
Titusville, FL 327962194
Pembroke Pines, FL
33024
Ormond Beach, FL

Memorial Hospital-Peninsula 264 S. Atlantic Avenue 32176-8192
Private/Not-For-Profit Adventist Health System
Plantation General Hospital 401 N.W. 42nd Ave
Plantation, FL 33317 Private/Investor-Owned HCA East Florida Division
850 E. Main St

Lake Butler, FL
32054

Private/Investor-Owned

Union

Santa Rosa Medical Center

5151 N. 9th Ave
1450 Berryhill Rd

Pensacola, FL
32504
Milton, FL 32570

Private/Not-For-Profit Ascension Health
Private/Investor-Owned Health Management Associates

Escambia
Santa Rosa

431
129

Sarasota Memorial Hospital

Sarasota, FL 34239- Government/Hospital
1700 S. Tamiami Trail 3555
Authority

Sarasota

742

Sebastian River Medical Center

13695 U.S. Hwy 1

Private/Investor-Owned Health Management Associates

Indian River

129

Seven Rivers Community
Hospital
Shands at the University of
Florida

Crystal River, FL
6201 N. Suncoast Blvd 34428

Private/Investor-Owned Tenet HealthSystem

Citrus

128

Private/Not-For-Profit

Shands HealthCare

Alachua

570

Homestead Hospital

160 N.W. 13th St

Private/Not-For-Profit

Baptist Health South Florida

Dade

120

Lake Butler Hospital/Hand
Surgery Center

Sacred Heart Hospital of
Pensacola

1600 SW Archer Rd.

Sebastian, FL
32958-3230

Gainesville, FL
32610-0326
Homestead, FL
33030-4299
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27

South Bay Hospital

South Lake Hospital, Inc.

4016 State Rd 674
301 N. Alexander St
1099 Citrus Tower
Blvd.

South Miami Hospital

6200 S.W. 73rd St

Orlando Regional South
Seminole Hospital

South Florida Baptist Hospital

South Shore Hospital/Medical
Center
Southwest Florida Regional
Medical Center

Specialty Hospital
Jacksonville

Sun City Center, FL
33573-5298
Private/Investor-Owned HCA West Florida Division
Plant City, FL 33566 Private/Not-For-Profit BayCare Health System

Hillsborough
Hillsborough

112
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Clermont, FL 34711 Private/Not-For-Profit
Miami, FL 331434901
Private/Not-For-Profit

Orlando Regional Healthcare

Lake

68

Baptist Health South Florida

Dade

445

555 W. State Rd 434

Longwood, FL 32752 Private/Not-For-Profit

Orlando Regional Healthcare

Seminole

206

630 Alton Rd

Miami Beach, FL
33139-5502

Dade

196

2727 Winkler Ave

Ft. Myers, FL 33901Private/Investor-Owned HCA West Florida Division
9396

Lee

400

Duval
Hernando

107
75

Pinellas

405

Orlando Regional Healthcare

Osceola

84

BayCare Health System

Hillsborough

559

Private/Not-For-Profit

Spring Hill Regional Hospital

4901 Richard St
10461 Quality Drive

St. Anthony's Hospital, Inc.

1200 7th Ave N.

Jacksonville, FL
32207
Private/Investor-Owned HCA North Florida Division
Spring Hill, FL 34609 Private/Investor-Owned Hernando HMA, Inc.
St. Petersburg, FL
Private/Not-For-Profit BayCare Health System
33705

Orlando Regional St. Cloud
Hospital

2906 17th St

St. Cloud, FL 347696099
Private/Not-For-Profit

St. Joseph's Hospital, Inc.

3001 W. Dr. M.L. King
Tampa, FL 33607
Jr. Blvd

Private/Not-For-Profit

St. Luke's Hospital

4201 Belfort Rd

St. Mary's Medical Center

901 45th St

Jacksonville, FL
32216-5898
West Palm Beach,
FL 33407

St. Petersburg General
Hospital

6500 38th Ave N.

St. Petersburg, FL
33710

Private/Investor-Owned HCA West Florida Division

Pinellas

219

1800 Barrs St

Jacksonville, FL
32204-4704

Private/Not-For-Profit

Ascension Health

Duval

528

University Community Health
Shands HealthCare

Pinellas
Suwannee

300
15

Leon
Hillsborough
Hillsborough

770
877
201

St. Vincent's Medical Center
Sun Coast Hospital
Shands at Live Oak
Tallahassee Memorial
Hospital
Tampa General Hospital
Town & Country Hospital

Private/Not-For-Profit

Duval

289

Private/Investor-Owned Tenet HealthSystem

Palm Beach

460

2025 Indian Rocks Rd Largo, FL 33774
Private/Not-For-Profit
1100 S.W. 11th St
Live Oak, FL 32060 Private/Not-For-Profit
1300 Miccosukee Rd
2 Columbia Drive
6001 Webb Rd

Tallahassee, FL
32308-5093
Tampa, FL 33606
Tampa, FL 33615

Private/Not-For-Profit Tallahassee Memorial HealthCare
Private/Not-For-Profit Florida Health Sciences Center, Inc.
Private/Investor-Owned Iasis Healthcare
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Kindred Hospital Central
Tampa

Private/Investor-Owned Kindred Healthcare

Hillsborough

102

Private/Not-For-Profit

University Community Health

Hillsborough

431

Private/Not-For-Profit

University Community Health

Hillsborough

120

Tamarac, FL 33321Private/Investor-Owned HCA East Florida Division
3011

Broward

257

Jacksonville, FL
32209-6597

Private/Not-For-Profit

Duval

760

1475 N.W. 12th Ave

Miami, FL 331361002

Private/Not-For-Profit

Dade

40

5190 S.W. 8th St

Coral Gables, FL
33134-2495

Private/Investor-Owned Kindred Healthcare

Dade

53

Private/Investor-Owned Kindred Healthcare

Broward

64

Private/Investor-Owned Kindred Healthcare

Hillsborough

73

Private/Not-For-Profit

Bon Secours Health System, Inc.

Sarasota

342

Sebring, FL 338714200 Sun 'n Lake Blvd. 9400

Private/Not-For-Profit

Adventist Health System

Highlands

111

Healthmark Regional Medical
Center

4413 US Highway 331 DeFuniak Springs,
South
FL 32433

Private/Investor-Owned Healthmark Corporation

Walton

Wellington Regional Medical
Center

West Palm Beach,
10101 Forest Hill Blvd FL 33414
Boca Raton, FL
21644 State Rd 7
33428-1842

Private/Investor-Owned Universal Health Services, Inc.

Palm Beach

120

Private/Investor-Owned Tenet HealthSystem

Palm Beach

185

Private/Not-For-Profit

Volusia

156

Dade

100

Broward

204

Polk
Orange

496
297

UCH-Medical Center

4801 N. Howard Ave
3100 E. Fletcher Ave
7171 N. Dale Mabry
Hwy

UCH-Carrollwood
University Hospital & Medical
Center
7201 N. University Dr
Shands Jacksonville Medical
Center
655 W. 8th St
University of Miami
Hospital/Clinics

Kindred Hospital South
Florida/Coral Gables
Kindred Hospital Ft.
Lauderdale
Kindred Hospital Tampa
Bon Secours-Venice
Healthcare
Florida Hospital Heartland
Med. Ctr.

West Boca Medical Center
Florida Hospital Deland
Westchester General Hospital

Westside Regional Medical
Center
Winter Haven Hospital
Florida Hospital Winter Park

Tampa, FL 33603
Tampa, FL 336134688
Tampa, FL 336142670

Ft. Lauderdale, FL
1516 E. Las Olas Blvd 33301-2346
4555 S. Manhattan
Ave
Tampa, FL 33611
540 The Rialto

Venice, FL 34285

701 W. Plymouth Ave. Deland, FL 32720
2500 S.W. 75th
Miami, FL 33155Avenue
2895

Shands HealthCare

Adventist Health System

Private/Investor-Owned

Plantation, FL
Private/Investor-Owned HCA East Florida Division
8201 W. Broward Blvd 33324-2701
Winter Haven, FL
200 Avenue F, NE
33881
Private/Not-For-Profit Mid-Florida Medical Services
200 N. Lakemont Ave Winter Pk, FL 32792 Private/Not-For-Profit Adventist Health System
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50

Wuesthoff Health Systems,
Inc.
110 Longwood Ave
Kindred Hospital Bay Area/St.
Petersburg
3030 6th Street S.
Lee Memorial Hospital
Arnold Palmer Hosp for
Children & Women

2776 Cleveland
Avenue

Rockledge, FL
32955

Private/Not-For-Profit

Brevard

295

Private/Investor-Owned Kindred Healthcare
Government/Hospital
Ft. Myers, FL 33901 Authority
Lee Memorial Health System

Pinellas

60

Lee

427

St. Petersburg, FL
33705-3720

Orlando, FL 32806

Private/Not-For-Profit

Orlando Regional Healthcare

Orange

281

Florida Hospital East Orlando

92 West Miller Street
7727 Lake Underhill
Drive

Orlando, FL 32822

Private/Not-For-Profit

Adventist Health System

Orange

108

Florida Hospital Kissimmee

2450 N. Orange
Blossom Tr.

Kissimmee, FL
34744

Private/Not-For-Profit

Adventist Health System

Osceola

40

Private/Not-For-Profit

Adventist Health System

Seminole

278

Private/Not-For-Profit

Adventist Health System

Orange

50

Monroe

49

Highlands

50

Florida Hospital Altamonte
Florida Hospital Apopka

Altamonte Springs,
601 E. Altamonte Drive FL 32701-4878
Apopka, FL 32703201 N. Park Avenue
9964

Health System Florida Keys and
DePoo
1200 Kennedy Dr

Florida Hospital Lake Placid

1210 U.S. Hwy 27 N.

Lake Wales Medical Centers 410 S. 11th St
Lee Memorial Health System
(Health Park)
9981 Health Park Cir
Martin Memorial Hospital South

Memorial Hospital West

Key West, FL 33040 Private/Investor-Owned Health Management Associates
Lake Placid, FL
Private/Not-For-Profit Adventist Health System
33852-9436
Lake Wales, FL
33853-4256
Private/Not-For-Profit Mid-Florida Medical Services
Government/Hospital
Ft. Myers, FL 33908 Authority

Stuart, FL 349972100 S.E. Salerno Rd 6503
Private/Not-For-Profit
Pembroke Pines, FL Government/Hospital
703 N. Flamingo Rd
33028
District
11190 Health Park
Blvd
Naples, FL 33941
Private/Not-For-Profit

North Collier Hospital
Palm Bay Community
Hospital
1425 Malabar Rd N.E. Palm Bay, FL 32907 Private/Not-For-Profit
Orlando Regional Sand Lake
Hospital
9400 Turkey Lake Rd Orlando, FL 32819 Private/Not-For-Profit

Lee Memorial Health System

Polk

154

Lee

220

Martin Memorial Health Systems, Inc. Martin

100

Memorial Healthcare System

Broward

184

NCH Healthcare System

Collier

98

Health First, Inc.

Brevard

60

Orlando Regional Healthcare

Orange

153
192

St. Joseph's Women's Hospital

3030 W. Dr. M.L. King Tampa, FL 33607Jr. Blvd
6394

Private/Not-For-Profit

BayCare Health System

Hillsborough

Florida Hospital Wauchula

533 W. Carlton St

Private/Not-For-Profit

Adventist Health System

Hardee

Wauchula,33873
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25

Wolfson Children's Hospital

800 Prudential Dr

Jackson North Maternity Center

Jacksonville, FL
32207

Baptist Health

Duval

180

14701 N.W. 27th Ave

Private/Not-For-Profit
Government/Public
Opalocka, FL 33054 Health Trust

Jackson Health System

Dade

60

Regency Medical Center

101 S.E. Avenue O

Winter Haven, FL
33880-9854

Private/Not-For-Profit

Mid-Florida Medical Services

Polk

61

Florida Hospital Fish
Memorial

1055 Saxon Blvd

Orange City, FL
32763

Private/Not-For-Profit

Adventist Health System

Volusia

97

Tampa Children's Hospital

3001 W. Dr. M.L. King
Jr. Blvd.
Tampa, FL 33607

Private/Not-For-Profit

BayCare Health System

Hillsborough

Private/Not-For-Profit

Adventist Health System

Osceola

60

Collier

70

Sumter

60

Florida Hospital Celebration
Health
Cleveland Clinic
The Villages Regional Hospital

Celebration, FL
400 Celebration Place 34747
Naples, FL 341196101 Pine Ridge Rd. 3900
The Villages, FL
1451 El Camino Real 32159

Private/Not-For-Profit
Private/Not-For-Profit
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Orlando Regional Healthcare
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APPENDIX C BIOTERRORISM PREPAREDNESS SURVEY
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The completion of this anonymous survey constitutes informed consent to participate in this
study. Each organization has been assigned a number for the purpose of tracking response rates
and accuracy of results only – at no time will anyone other than the principal researcher know
the origin of each survey. At any time, should you not wish to answer a question you may do so
without penalty. Thank you for your time.
1) Location: ____ Urban

____ Rural

2) # of beds: ____ 100 or less beds ____ 101-300 beds ____ Over 301 beds
3) Is your hospital part of a system? ____ Yes (go to question 3a) ____ No (go to question 4)
3a) If yes, what type of system?
____ Horizontal (multiple locations of same type of facility)
____ Vertical (multiple organizations beyond only acute care services)
____ Virtual (consolidation only by way of contracting)
4) Operation status: ____ For-profit ____ Not-for-profit
5) # Of full time employees: ___ 0-50 ___ 51-100 ___ 101-150 ___ 151-200 ___ Over 200
6) Does your organization have a written plan for bioterrorism response? ___ Yes ___ No
6a) If, yes, when does it get updated? ___ Every month ___ Every 6 months ___ Yearly
___ Other (please specify) _________
7) Number of years covered by the bioterrorism plan? ___ 1 ___ 2 ___ 3 ___ 4 ___ 5 or more
8) Who is responsible for updating the bioterrorism response plan?
____ CEO
____ Person directly under the CEO
____ Person 2 levels under CEO
____ Person 3 levels under CEO
____ Other, please specify ___________________
9) Does your organization conduct training specific to the characteristics of a bioterrorist
attack? ___ Yes ___ No ___ Don’t know
9a) If yes, when was the last training provided?
___ 0- 3 months
___ 4-6 months
___ 7-9 months
___ 10 – 12 months
___ Over 1 year
10) What type(s) of bioterrorism training is (are) used in your organization?
____ Classroom lecture/discussion
____ Drills
____ Outside training
____ None
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11) Who is in charge of bioterrorism preparedness training?
____ CEO
____ Person directly under the CEO
____ Person 2 levels under CEO
____ Person 3 levels under CEO
____ Other, please specify ___________________
12) Does your organization update its bioterrorism plan based on lessons learned from training/exercises
held? ____ Yes ____ No
13) To what extent does your organization’s internal bioterrorism response plan emphasize the following
components?
No emphasis
Very Strong
emphasis
a. Hazard analysis
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
DK
b. Site analysis

0

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

DK

c. Building safety

0

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

DK

d. Securing heavy objects

0

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

DK

e. Protecting vital records

0

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

DK

f. Evacuating personnel 0

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

DK

g. Notifying families

0

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

DK

14) Please rate your organization’s bioterrorism involvement on each of the following preparedness
activities:
No involvement
Extremely high
a. Gathering knowledge

0

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

DK

b. Planning for disasters

0

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

DK

c. Updating disaster plans

0

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

DK

d. Plan exercises

0

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

DK

e. Exercise assessments 0

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

DK

f. Budgeting

0

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

DK

g. Stockpiling for response

0

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

DK

h. Training personnel

0

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

DK

i. Testing communications

0

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

DK

j. Working with other orgs

0

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

DK

k. Educating the public

0

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

DK

0

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

DK

l.

Lobbying to improve
bioterrorism response
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15) Listed below are organizational characteristics. How well does each one apply to
bioterrorism disaster services in your organization?
Does not apply
Applies perfectly
a. New approaches to deliver 0
disaster services are explored

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

DK

b. Staff productivity
is emphasized

0

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

DK

c. A set of stable disaster
services are provided

0

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

DK

d. Staff/volunteers are
retrained

0

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

DK

e. All funds needed are
secured

0

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

DK

f. Understanding unit cost
of disaster services is
important

0

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

DK

g. Information flows up and 0
down at all levels

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

DK

h. Maintaining high morale
is important

0

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

DK

i. Est. agreements w/other
organizations is important

0

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

DK

j. Bioterrorism services
evaluated

0

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

DK

k. Authority over
0
bioterrorism services is clear

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

DK
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Variable
Classification
Dependent
Variable

Variable Name Definition

Scale

Level of
Preparedness

0-7 scale

Independent
variable

System
Affiliation

Independent
variable

Location

Independent
variable

Size

“The degree to which organizations
emphasize safety of physical facilities
and objects, community disaster
planning, disaster training, community
disaster education, and budgeting to
help reduce the loss of life, injury, and
property damage” (Gillespie, et al, 1993,
p.43).
One that is affiliated with other
organizations (usually through a parent
company) to provide a continuum of
care (Ginter, Swayne, & Duncan, 1998).
Area in which the hospital is located
shall measure location of the hospital
(www.census.gov, 2003).
The number of beds the hospital has
available for patient care assuming a
census of zero.
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Level of
measurement
Ordinal

0 = “no emphasis at all” or
“no involvement”
7=“very strongly
emphasized” to
“extremely high
involvement”
0 = Non system
1= System

Rural = 0
Urban = 1

Nominal

Nominal

Small (100 or less beds) = Nominal
0
Medium (101-300 beds) =
1
Large (over 301 beds) = 2

Independent
variable

Independent
Variable

Physical
preparedness

Social
preparedness

“The degree to which organizational
plans emphasize:
 Hazard analysis
 Site analysis
 Building safety
 The securing of heavy objects
 The protection of vital records
 The testing of emergency
communication systems”
(Gillespie, et al, 1993, p.42).
 Planning: “the degree to which
organizations generally
emphasize disaster planning to
reduce the loss of life, injury, and
property damage”
 Training: “the degree to which
organizations generally
emphasize disaster training to
reduce the loss of life, injury, and
property damage”
 Financial: “the degree to which
organizations generally
emphasize the securing of funds
for disaster services designed to
reduce the loss of life, injury, and
property damage”
 Community: “the degree to which
organizations generally
emphasize community disaster
education to reduce the loss of
life, injury, and property damage”
(Gillespie, et al, 1993, p.42-43).
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0-7 scale

Ordinal

0 = “no emphasis at all” or
“no involvement”
7=“very strongly
emphasized” to
“extremely high
involvement”
0-7 scale
0 = “no emphasis at all” or
“no involvement”
7=“very strongly
emphasized” to
“extremely high
involvement”

Ordinal
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